CENTRAL LIBRARY

111/.037A
6/916

ADWAITA PHILOSOPHY

AN INTRODUCTION

TO

ADWAITA PHILOSOPHY

[SANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA]

BY

KOKILESWAR SASTRI, VIDYARATNA, M.A.

LECTURER IN VEDANTA, AND IN INDIAN BRANCH OF PHILOSOPHY, CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY AND AUTHOR OF THE THREE VOLUMES OF THE "UPANISHADER UPADESH," "THE ADWAITAVADA," "OUTLINES OF VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY;" &c. &c. &c.,

AND

SABA-PANDIT OF THE 'COOCH-BEHAR DURBAR.'

111 037A

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA * THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING *

POST GRADUATE COUNCIL IN ARTS
LENDING LIBRARY
CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED BY THE

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

1924

22,436.

PRINTED BY BHUPENDRA LAL BANERJEE
AT THE CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY PRESS, SENATE HOUSE, CALCUTTA

BCU 2273

Reg. No. 21B—23-7-24—300.

अद्वैतवाद-मुकुरः किल शङ्करस्य
गाढं कदर्थ-रजसा तमसानुलिप्तः ।
तस्यैव भाष्यमवलम्ब्य मया कृतोऽस्मिन्
कामंमलापनयनेऽस्य महान् प्रयत्नः ॥

PREFACE

The Adwaita philosophy of India was a most magnificent achievement of Indian thought and it towers like a pyramid above all other philosophical schools which pale almost into insignificance before the dazzling brilliancy it sheds both on the practical and the metaphysical needs of humanity. The leader of this school was the great Sankarâchârayya who accepted it as he found it floating among other schools of thought in the intellectual atmosphere of India. It was in no sense a school founded by him. His credit lies in his successful attempt at systematization, development, elaboration and methodically philosophical treatment under which the doctrine appeared in what may be characterised as an altogether new garb in which he clothed it with a master's hand. A large part of its principles existed embedded in the hymns of the Rig-veda * and in the elaborate exigetical rules and injunctions connected therewith. Later on the diverse theories of Buddhistic philosophy so obscured its principles that its presence seemed at times hardly suspected, and its traces were almost lost sight of. It was mainly Sankarácháryya who first discovered and then brought it out from its unmerited obscurity into the clear light of day, adding to it the lustre which has since gathered round it.

---

* We have shown this in our Third volume of the "Upanishader Upadesh."

Of late, many volumes have been written and the system criticised by a large number of brilliant scholars, nearly all of which have tended to fall into a groove—an undesirable state of things which cannot but demand serious and careful consideration on the part of those who are desirous of seeing the Adwaita philosophy preserve its original features untouched by such elements as are likely to prove inconsistent with its special lines of thought and reasoning. It is now clear to the scholars who take real interest in this system that the Adwaita philosophy has of late been presented before the learned world in forms which are different from the ideas of its original interpreters.

The main object of this book is to consider all the new forms in which this system has been sought to be presented and it has been the author's attempt to form an estimate of these with a view to finding out if they really come into a line with the original form in which Sankarâchârryya himself presented it. The time seems almost ripe when a clear note of warning should be sounded for all those who wish really to study the Adwaita system. They will have to utterly forget all preconceptions and pre-imbibed ideas and to approach this system of philosophy with an open and unbiassed mind which enable them to make for themselves a correct estimate of the positions adopted therein.

The author further attempts to bring forward, in brief but clear outlines, all the main issues which are generally discussed in the Adwaita system, and which have been unfavourably criticised in other quarters. For the student of philosophy, all the points raised here are absolutely necessary for a clear grasp and right comprehension of the Adwaita doctrine in its principal aspects. Information requisite for a deeper study of the original works on the subject has been brought together in this book. In dealing with the different topics, an endeavour has been

made to discover the real teaching of Sankara. The author has not been unmindful of the imperious necessity which every teacher feels to guide, with a due measure of caution, the foot of the beginner through the naturally difficult track, rendered, in the case of this system, more intricate by the unfavourable criticisms directed against its main theories.

In this book an endeavour has been made at the very outset to furnish the student and the general reader with the right views about the teachings of Sankara on each of the topics treated herein, and to equip them with the help needed to reach a proper solution of the difficulties they are likely to experience when diving deeper into the subject. No pains have been spared to make the work a suitable introduction to the proper study of the originals, and the subject-matter has been arranged in such a way as to make the book an indispensable companion for any full understanding of Sankara's position. It presents also to beginners an opportunity of making themselves familiar with antagonistic views on various points, and supplies them with reasons to combat those views, from Sankara's works. The whole of the book is expository and contains the essentials of Sankara's teaching in as simple a form as the subject-matter allows, no principles being left out which a student ought to keep in view in the systematic study of Sankara's original works.

The author's experience as a lecturer in the Indian branch of philosophy has convinced him of the necessity of help in the shape of a book like this for the student who may have drifted from the old moorings. It has been his special study to present the expositions as faithfully as possible in the lines adopted and pursued by Sankara himself, and with a view to establishing the various positions, the author has quoted innumerable extracts in

the footnotes from Sankara's writings, in support of those opinions. In this respect all the commentaries of Sankara have been treated as of equal importance. For this purpose, the ten Upanishads he has commented upon have been laid under contribution as also his commentaries on the *Brahma-Sutra* and the *Gita*.

Considering the intrinsic difficulty in getting at the right sense of Sankara's position from his voluminous writings on the subject,—writings whose style, though admirably lucid and impressively attractive, is not always easy of comprehension on account of long polemics against his opponents, and considering also the difficulty in putting the most abstruse of the reasonings of Sankara in a foreign tongue, the readers, the author trusts, will look upon this work with a kind indulgence.

Suggestions for the improvement of the book from sympathetic critics and scholars will be most gratefully accepted.

Lastly, the author takes this opportunity to express a very deep debt of gratitude he owes to the Hon'ble Justice Sir Asutosh Mookerjee who almost from the beginning of the author's college career has always fostered his literary aspirations and has very liberally helped him. It is needless to say that but for such generous help from him, the desire that impelled the author to undertake this work would have been baffled.

CALCUTTA :
May, 1924.

KOKILESWAR BHATTACHARJEE

POST GRADUATE COUNCIL IN ARTS
LENDING LIBRARY
CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

On Brahma as Creator.

	Page.
Brahma reveals its nature to finite individual through his organisms	1
Two aspects of Brahma—Nirguna and Saguna—Transcendent and Immanent	4
Brahma as Efficient and Material cause ...	5
Brahma—not a solitary and remote being, but ever present behind Prâna-Sakti and its manifestations	7
Prâna-Sakti—never absent from Brahma and from the finite self as well	10
Prâna is distinguishable but not separable from Brahma	11
Prior State of the World and the *Susupta* State of the finite self	14
Creation—eternal ;—not an event in time : God is prior to the world in a logical sense, not in a temporal sense	17
Creator or *Iswara* is not different from (*ânya*) Brahma	19
To regard Iswara as *anya* is wrong	22
Brahma preserves its identity in its manifestations...	24
Finite individuals have a 'nature' and differences in their experiences imply differences in their respective 'natures'	26

PAGE.

Substantive and adjectival modes of individual existences 28
Individual 'nature' is not resolvable into their works or relations 29
Human responsibility for works 31
Every finite individual has a distinct nature of its own 32
Sâmânya (universal) and *Vishesas* (particulars) ... 34
Brahma's 'nature': It is self-conscious and self-determining power 36
The purpose or end of the creation 39

CHAPTER II.

THE PURE EGO AS ACTIVE POWER.

The current view that the Ego is not active—how arose? 44
The Empirical and the Transcendental Self ... 46
The Transcendental Self is the true 'agent' ... 46
Brahma is revealed in man as infinite ideal ... 48
This ideal is the moving power 50
Distinction between *Swârtha* (স্বার্থ) and *Parârtha* (পরার্থ)—between self and not-self. Every individual is a *Swârtha* (স্বার্থ) or a 'purpose' or end 51
Contrast between the 'nature' of the finite individual and its states and activities 55
This 'nature' cannot be resolved into its states and activities 57

PAGE.

This underlying nature is a seat of power—
(*a*) The power is revealed in sensitive and intellectual activities 60
(*b*) The power is revealed in ideational activities 64
(*c*) The power is revealed in ethical and religious activities 68
(*d*) The power is revealed in the construction of plant and animal organisms 70
(*e*) The power is revealed in the construction of human organisms 73
Brahma—a seat of power revealed as prime-mover of Prâna in which it is revealed *to be* ... 74
Empirical resolution of this power impossible ... 78
Relation between 'one' and 'many' 78
Individuals cannot be absorbed as *parts* in the whole 79

CHAPTER III.

ON THE FALSITY OF THE WORLD.

Contributory causes of the widely current opinion about the falsity of the World 86
(1) Three classes of objects :
Analysis of their fundamental and distinctive features does not favour the idea of falsity ... 87
(2) Our waking and dreaming-experiences compared :
Comparison does not suggest the falsity ... 94

PAGE.

(3) Doctrine of causality elaborated :
Relation between unity and multiplicity does not imply falsity 98
(4) Certain terms, phrases and expressions examined :
This examination does not favour falsity ... 104
(5) A typical illustration analysed :
Cause strives towards future end which is real power present and realised in the changes which are inseparable. This inseparability proves their reality 118
(6) No conflict between परिणामवाद and विवर्त्तवाद :
Multiplicity does not oppose unity, but is incorporated in it as its necessary expressions. Thus there is no dualism between God and the World 121

CHAPTER IV.

The Ethics and Religion in Vedanta.

Opinion prevails that *Vedanta* is opposed to Ethical theism and anti-theistic in religion ; and its goal is not enrichment but emptying of human soul... 126
Man's impulsive nature or disposition (जैव प्रकृति) ... 128
Actual man and possible or Real man ... 132
Man is solely responsible for his deeds ... 135
The nature of the self :—
(1) It is an end—purposive-power. It utilises all its activities for its own realisation ... 136
(2) It is a 'free causality' 139

PAGE.

Karma and *Jnana* : Both cannot be the ultimate end or परमपुरुषार्थ 142

Karma and Jnana contrasted and compared ... 144

Higher altruistic Karmas and their needs ... 146

(*a*) They are indispensable for purification of mind 147

(*b*) Karma-section of the Veda not useless ... 150

(*c*) Higher नित्य-Karmas regenerate man from animality to rationality 153

Reasons why higher disinterested works are not to be hypostatised as an *End* :

They are to be used as a *means* 154

(*d*) Higher works point to transcendental goal 159

(*e*) Moral endeavour passes into a higher fulfilment and is *completed* in the transcendental goal 162

Nothing short of a transcendental good satisfies man 165

Ethical virtues and altruistic deeds :

They are enumerated in *four* main groups ... 166

Certain anomalous passages explained... ... 175

True relation between Brahma and the World :

The Vedantic Mukti 179

POST GRADUATE COUNCIL IN ARTS
LENDING LIBRARY
CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

ABBREVIATIONS

बृ० भा०—Brihadáranyaka-Bhásya
छा० भा०—Chándogya-Bhásya
वे० भा०—Vedanta-Bhasya or Brahma-Sutra-Bhásya
गी० भा०—Gitá-Bhásya
प्र० भा०—Prasna-Bhásya
तै० भा०—Taittiriya-Bhásya
ऐ० आ० भा०—Aitareya-Âranyaka-Bhásya
उप० सा०—The Upadesha-Sáhasri
मा० भा०—Mándukya-Bhásya
मा० का० भा०—Mándukya-Káriká-Bhásya
केन० भा०—Kena-Bhásya
के० भा०—Kena-Bhásya
क० भा०—Katha-Bhásya
बृ०—Brihadáranyaka-Bhásya
तैत्ति० भा०—Taittiriya-Bhasya
ऐ० भा०—Aitareya-Bhásya
ईश० भा०—Ishá-Bhásya
मा० आ०—Mándukya-Bhásya, Ânandagiritiká
वे०—Vedanta-Bhásya
मा० कारि०—Mándukya-Káriká-Bhásya
मु० भा०—Mundaka-Bhásya
कठ० भा०—Katha-Bhásya.

AN INTRODUCTION

TO

ADWAITA PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I.

On Brahma as Creator.

1. It has been laid down in the Adwaita System of philosophy that the *Prána-spandan*—the universally diffused vibratory Prána is the revelation of Brahma's 'nature' which involved the creative activity of Brahma. From this Prána-Spandan or external nature (विषय), gradually stages after stages, step by step, the human organisms with their external and internal elements (कार्य्यकरण-संघात) have been built up, as the last stage of the process of manifestation. Had there been no such revelation of the 'nature' of Brahma, we could not know its real nature, and it would remain for ever an abstract and remote being. That Brahma is a self-conscious power (प्रज्ञानघनाख्यं रूपं) would have remained

Brahma reveals its nature to finite individual through his organism.

shut up from our knowledge.[1] Elsewhere, we find this fact stated still more distinctly. It has been stated that in order to reveal, by degrees, what she contains in herself, nature has gradually assumed the form of human organs—external and internal ;—so that she may, through these organs, reveal the infinite treasure she contains within her to the human selves.[2] The organs are merely the different phases of herself, which nature has assumed, and in which she is present herself. This description shows that the building up of the human organisms, or in other words, the evolution of the beings with their cognitive and active organs [3] through which the rational human beings become variously conscious of the external world and can act in diverse ways within it,—is the goal—

---

[1] "स प्राणमसृजत। तस्य च आत्मचैतन्यज्योतिः सर्व्वदा अभिव्यक्ततरं" (ब्र° भा°, 4. 4. 2)। "नामादिप्राणान्तानि उत्तरोत्तरविशिष्टानि तत्त्वानि, अतितराञ्च तेषामुत्कृष्टतमं भूमाख्यं तत्त्व" (छा° भा° 7.1.1) "यदि हि नाम-रूपे न व्याक्रियेते, तदा अस्यात्मनो निरुपाधिकं रूपं न प्रतिख्यायेत। यदा तु पुनः कार्य्य-करणात्मना नाम-रूपे व्याकृते भवतः, तदा अस्य रूपं प्रतिख्यायेत" (ब्र° भा° 2.5.18)। (कार्य्य= Physiological and करण=functional side of the organisms).

There was the revelation of Brahma as the rarefied, universally diffused *Prána-spandan*, or *Sutra*. It gradually became more and more integrated, and it differentiated into five classes of elements (पञ्चतन्मात्र), which became, as the result of combination in different proportions, gross (स्थूलभूत), out of which the organisms were built up in accordance with the inner 'nature' or स्वरूप of the individual ("इन्द्रियादीनां यत् स्वरूपधारणं, तत्तु 'पारार्थ्येन' निमित्तभूतेन, चैतन्यात्मकृतमेव"—गी° भा°, 13. 22).

[2] "विषय समान जातीयं करणं मन्यते श्रुतिः। विषयस्यैव स्वात्मयाहकत्वेन··· स्वात्मविशेषप्रकाशकत्वेन संस्थानान्तराणि करणानि" (ब्र° भा°, 2.4.11)।

[3] "विज्ञान-क्रियाशक्तिहयसंमूर्च्छितात्मा (जीवः)"—This is the Rational and moral self (छा° भा°, 8.12.3).

is the final fulfilment, to reach which nature strives. Thus, Brahma has manifested itself as the external nature, with a view to reveal to the human beings its own immense and infinite riches through her. The organisms of the different grades of beings[1] are but the differentiations—not separation—from the common environment universally existent. There are thus action and reaction always going on between the organisms and the particular portion of the environment—within which they are placed. As there is always a feeling-element which accompanies these reactions, the organised beings—particularly the human beings whose organs have been more highly developed—come to enjoy what is श्रीमत् (beauty), विभूतिमत् (grandeur) and ऊर्जितं (sublimity)[2] in the external world; and as the human being actively arranges these feelings and rationally acts for the realisation of his own end,—this contact with the world reveals to him the important truth that he is a *rationally active* being. Thus we find that to furnish the human selves with their *objects* of knowledge and action in the shape of cognitive and active organs, *manas*, etc.—appears to be the purpose for which nature perpetually works, and this she does, because an eternal, inexhaustible Power (Brahma) is present behind her, which is realising its own Swarupa (स्वरूप), gradually in higher and higher forms, through the successive stages of nature.[3] Such creation is perpetually going on and it

---

[1] The Individuals are classified under *four* typical divisions—स्वेदज, अण्डज, उद्भिज्ज and जरायुज।

[2] *Vide* Gita, 10.41.

[3] "स्थावरत्वादारभ्य उत्तरोत्तरमाविस्तरत्वमात्मन:" (ऐ° आ° शङ्कर-भाष्य, 2.3)। "एकस्यापि कूटस्थस्य चित्त-तारतम्यात् ज्ञानैश्वर्याणामभिव्यक्ति: परेण परेण भूयसी भवति" (वै° भा°, 1.3.30. "प्राण: सर्व्वप्राणभृत्-क्रियात्मक:···सूत्रसंज्ञकं

still continues.[1] The creation is described in the Vedanta, for this reason, as not an event in time done once for all,[2] but as an eternal act and its purpose has not yet ceased or been finished.[3]

Two aspects of Brahma—Nirguna and Saguna—transcendental and immanent.

2. Thus, Brahma is represented in the Vedanta in its two inseparable aspects—its निर्गुण or Transcendental aspect and its सगुण or Immanental aspect. As Brahma is revealed partially in the activities of *Prán*, it is Saguna (सगुण) ; and as it is present behind its activities as the infinite and inexhaustible *source* of these activities, it is Nirguna (निर्गुण) । The same fact has been stated in another form. Brahma is *both* the Efficient cause (निमित्त कारण) and Material cause (उपादान कारण) of the world.[4] If one of these aspects be ignored, a serious defect will at once vitiate the theory. If you represent Brahma in its *purely* immanent character, the world would be invested with a false independence, and everything of the world would have to be accepted as it is. The world, in this case, would be an exhaustive

---

जगतो विधारयिव···अस्यापि अन्तर्यामिणं, तस्यैव सूत्रस्य नियन्तारं विद्यात्" (ब्र° भा°) । "स प्राणमसृजत । तत्र च आत्मचैतन्यज्योतिः सर्व्वदा अभिव्यक्ततरं"। "सत्त्वाधिक्यात् आविस्तरत्वोपपत्तिः ।···यत्र च सत्त्वमत्यन्तप्रकाशं तत्र आविस्तरं ज्योतिः ।···तुल्येऽपि सुखसंस्थाने···आदर्शादौ स्वच्छे स्वच्छतरे च तारतम्येन आविर्भवति" (गी° भा°, 15.12) ।

[1] "यथा कार्य्यमपि जगत् त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति, तथा कारणमपि ब्रह्म त्रिष्वपि कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति" (वे° भा°, 2.1.16) । "सर्गाणामादिरन्तः-मध्यञ्च—अहमेव" (गीता) ।

[2] "अनादित्वात् संसारस्य—इत्यादि" (वे° भा°, 2.1.35) ।

[3] "तदेव बहुभवनं प्रयोजनं नाद्यापि निवृत्तं" (छा° भा° 6.3.2) ।

[4] *Vide* वे° भा° 1. 4. 23=26.

expression of Brahma, and a self-sufficient, an independent, completed whole—all its steps being predetermined by its antecedent steps in time. The individuals also, being mere parts of this whole, would be but automatic machines, acting their parts as they are made to act. If, on the other hand, Brahma is represented in its *purely* transcendental character, it is absolutely *separated* from the world, and has no concern with any activities going on in the world. It would thus be a distant and remote being absolutely cut off from the changes,—an abstract, incomprehensible, extra-mundane being, exalted beyond all predicates (नेति, नेति).

Almost all the critics of *Vedanta* with whose writings we have come across, have, unfortunately, thought of Nirguna (निर्गुण) Brahma in this light. They speak of Vedantic Nirguna Brahma as a "void—without consciousness, without activity,—a characterless nothing." It is something "abstract and remote and having no relation whatever with the world." "The Upanishads"—one of these writers declares—"reach their goal by the method of *excluding all difference*—the goal being *pure undifferenced being*; Sankara's doctrine is in this direction."

Brahma as Efficient and Material cause.

Everywhere Sankara has repeatedly declared Brahma to be—"अभिन्न-निमित्तोपादान-कारणम्";—that is to say, his Brahma is to be regarded in *both* of its aspects; *i. e.*, Brahma's transcendency and immanence are *inseparable* (अभिन्न) aspects. Brahma is revealed in the world in the diversities of náma-rupa (नाम-रूप), but yet it is present behind its manifestations in its own inexhaustible (पूर्ण) nature. In the 1. 4. 25-27, (वे° भा°), Brahma is described as evolving from its own nature the changes or the emergent effects,

itself being their prior cause, present behind each change :—

"पूर्व्वसिद्धोऽपि हि सन् आत्मा, विशेषेण विकारात्मना परिणमयामास आत्मानम्"।

It is its own Átmá, its own 'nature' or स्वरूप, which differentiated itself into the multiplicity of changes, but it retains, behind them, its own unity or identity which it does not lose in them.

In the Gitá-Bhásya, the world, *i. e.*, the active common medium (प्राण-स्पन्दन) and the finite individuals—these two are called as the two *Prakritis* of God, and they are stated as eternal (नित्य). Sankara here remarks that unless the elements to be controlled by God are eternal, God the controller of these two would himself prove to be non-eternal (अनित्य), and thus his 'God-hood' (ईश्वरत्व) would fall to the ground.[1] In the Vedanta-Bhásya, he calls ईश्वर to be eternal (नित्यसिद्ध), in all places.[2] The creative act of Brahma has also been declared as eternal (नित्य)—

"तस्य नित्य-सिद्धस्य ईश्वरस्य सृष्टि-स्थिति-संहृति-विषयं नित्यज्ञानं भवतीति" (वे° भा°, 1.1.5)।

That is to say, "the idea, of creation and maintenance of everything in existence is eternal in Brahma." These gradually-revealed náma-rupas (नाम-रूपस) have also been declared to be the 'object' to which Brahma stands related as the 'subject'.—

"किं पुनस्तत् 'तस्य' यत् प्रागुत्पत्ते रीश्वरज्ञानस्य 'विषयो' भवतीति ?···नामरूपे···व्याचिकीर्षिते इति ब्रूमः" (वे° भा°, 1.1.5).

---

[1] "नित्येश्वरत्वात् ईश्वरस्य तत्-प्रकृत्योरपि युक्तं नित्यत्वेन भवितुं" (गी° भा°, 13.19).

[2] *Vide* वे° भा°, 4. 4. 17, 18, 21, etc.. etc.

In the face of such distinct and unmistakable expressions, how can the revealed differences (changes) be *severed* altogether from the underlying Brahma, making it a "remote, difference-less being?"

Brahma—not a solitary and remote being: but ever present behind its manifestations.

3. In the commentaries of Sankara, the gradually created Náma-rupas (नाम-रूप)—the evolving and emerging changes—have always been described as *accompanied* by the underlying causal Power, *i. e.*, Brahma. "Whenever and whereever the changes emerge, they can never emerge *separated* or detached from their underlying Átmá or Brahma"—

"यदा नाम-रूपे व्याक्रियेते, तदा नाम-रूपे आत्मस्वरूपापरित्यागेनैव, ब्रह्मणाऽ-प्रविभक्त-देशकाले, सर्व्वास्ववस्थासु' व्याक्रियेते"।

"न हि आत्मनोऽन्यत्···तत्-प्रविभक्तदेशकालं···भूतं भवत् भविष्यद्वा वस्तु विद्यते" (वै° भा°, 2. 6)।

i. e., Nothing can be there, *separated* from the Brahma's nature'—either in time or in space".

"When the कलाs, *i. e.*, the emerging differences or changes are created, are maintained in existence, and will merge in their final end—they do so *not separated* from the underlying *chaitanya*, *i.e.*, the 'nature'—स्वरूप of the self"—

"चैतन्याव्यतिरेकेणैव हि कलाः जायमानास्तिष्ठन्त्यः प्रलीयमानाश्च सर्व्वदा लक्ष्यन्ते" (प्र° भा°, 6.2)।

Again—

"All the emergent effects or changes are never *severed from* their underlying cause on which they stand. When they emerge and are sustained

in existence after their emergence,—they are always grounded in the underlying *sat* (सत्) or the Causal Power '!—

" प्रजाः न केवलं सन्मूलाः एव, इदानीमपि स्थितिकाले सदायतनाः सदाश्रया एव " (छा° भा°, 6.8.4) ।

" Can घट, *viz.*, a transformed state of मृत्तिका, stand even for a moment, if severed or disconnected from clay, from the underlying मृत्तिका ? "—

" यस्य च यस्मादात्मलाभो भवति, स तेन अप्रविभक्तो दृष्टः, यथा घटादीनां मृदा " (ब्र° भा°, 1.6.1).

If such be the case ; if under all circumstances, the emergent changes are found to be accompanied by their underlying causal reality, and if this causal reality main tains its unity in the successive changes,—it follows that the underlying Brahma which is the source of all these varieties of the evolving changes can never be looked upon as *purely* transcendent and as unrelated to, and cut off from, these changes.

In the Vedanta, Brahma as well as the finite individuals have been proved to have a ' nature '—a स्वरूप, of their own. This ' nature ' or स्वरूप of Brahma, or of the individual beings, has never, in the Bhásyas, been regarded as a *solitary* nature standing *alone* on its own account, remote from and unrelated to, the emerging states and activities produced from that nature. It is always looked upon as *adhisthána* (अधिष्ठान),[1] because it has a ' nature,' a ' character ' of its own which *sustains* all.

---

[1] " चैतन्यस्य एकत्वेन, नित्यत्वात् जगद्भिन्नत्वेन, तस्य 'अधिष्ठान'त्वोपपत्तेः " (आनन्दगिरि) । " न च असतोऽधिष्ठानत्वं आरोपितानुविधाभावात् " (मा° भाष्ये, आ° गिरि, ३।३२) । " यस्य यत् सम्बन्धितया वर्त्तमानं तत्—' सत् '—9.19 गी°." " सर्व्वानुस्यूतस्यापि असङ्गस्वभावतया निर्व्विशेषत्वं " (उप° साङ्ग° 4.57) ।

Apparent cases of solitary character of Brahma and finite self —explained.

4. It is indeed true that sometimes, the prior condition—प्रागवस्था—of the world, where there were supposed to be no changes as yet created or emerged, has been described; and Brahma has also been described as standing alone, without a second, during that condition. And this apparently solitary being, *viz.*, Brahma has sometimes been likened, in the Bhásyas, to the individual self during its dream-less sleep (सुषुप्तावस्था), when all its states and activities disappear in the self, and the self thus stands *alone*, as it were, at that time. Now, it may be asked, what explanation can be suggested to clear off this situation. Apparently this is a condition described in the Sankara-Bhásya, where the *pure* transcendence of the self or of Brahma—cut off from all relations with the world—seems to be made quite evident.

OUR ANSWER TO THIS ENQUIRY IS TWO-FOLD.

(*i*) Firstly: When the dream-less state of the finite self is described, it will be seen that the self is not actually *solitary* or *alone* even during this condition. Sankara tells us that the self is not an 'empty subject' even then. The subject has for its 'object,' during that condition, the presence and operation of the Prána (प्राणशक्ति). When the action of the external environment upon our sense-organs ceases to operate, during the time when we fall asleep, there are no functions of the organs

---

"सद्ब्रह्मानुवृत्तेः सत्ताऽनिवृत्तिरिति"—इत्यादि (शा° भा°, 6.2.1)। अधिष्ठान= Sustaining ground.

excited. In the absence of these, our mind (*manas*) also ceases to act. Necessarily, all the external and internal functions, says Sankara, merge in the *Prána*—the source of all kinds of activities of the human organism.[1] All activities lie latent in the Prána now. This latent प्राणशक्ति, though its functions as differentiated in time and space-orders have ceased, is actually present within the organism, as is evidenced by the heat of the body and the other actions during our dream-less sleep. The self is not solitary and alone even now. It controls the Prána-sakti ("प्राणाध्यक्ष"). When we again wake up, all the latent activities of this Prána will again go on, as before, as soon as they are elicited from the Prána by the actions of the external environment upon our sense-organs. This emergence again of these activities proves the presence of the Prána within our organism during our sleep.[2] Similar is the condition of Brahma, when the infinite varieties of the changes of Náma-rupa (नाम-रूप) are merged in the universally existent *prána-spandan* or *sutra* (vibratory tremor of the diffuse Prána); and this Prána is the source of all subsequently developed activities emerging after the creation. It appears therefore that this Prána-sakti or the नाम-रूप-शक्ति was *existent in* Brahma during the प्रागवस्था, *i.e.*, at the time of first manifestation (after the last *pralaya*). Thus we find

Prána-sakti—never absent from the finite self and—

never absent from Brahma also.

---

[1] "देहे चेष्टात्मक-जीवनहेतुत्वं प्राणस्येति 'आयुष्ट-निर्देशः'" (वे° भा°, रत्नप्रभा)।

[2] "मनन-दर्शनात्मकानां चलनात्मकानाञ्च 'क्रियासामान्यमावे' प्राणेऽन्तर्भावः" (ब्र° भा°)। "दर्शन-श्रवणे एव हि मनः-स्पन्दिते, तदभावे हृदीव अविशेषेण प्राणात्मना अवस्थानं·····बीजात्मकत्व मपरित्यज्यैव प्राणशब्दत्वं सतः" (सा° भाष्य)।

that Brahma was not *alone* or solitary even then. Sankara took sufficient care to observe—

"आत्मस्थे अनभिव्यक्ते नाम-रूपे"।—

i.e., the नाम-रूप—the root-cause of all differentiations *existed in* Brahma; and it was an 'object' in relation to which Brahma was described as its 'subject.' Brahma was, therefore, not *alone* and solitary and *object-less*, even then. To show the presence of this Prána-sakti in Brahma, the Katha-bhásya thus expresses the idea :—

> "As in an almost imperceptible tiny seed of a *Bata*-tree, its final end, *viz.*, the immense and gigantic Bata-tree is existent as a *future*-power; so in the 'nature' of Brahma is to be found existent the subsequently developed world with all its varieties, as a latent *future* power.[1] Otherwise, the changes or differences are to be imagined to have been produced out of nothing (असत्)."

"अव्यक्तं सर्व्वस्य जगतो बीजभूतं अव्याकृत-नाम-रूपसतत्त्वं सर्व्वकार्य्य-करण-शक्ति-समाहार-रूपं·····परमात्मनि ओत-प्रोत-भावेन समाश्रितं, वटकणिकायामिव वटबीज-शक्तिः" (कठ° भा°, 3. 11).

In the Chándogya-Bhásya also, the presence of this náma-rupa (नाम-रूप) *in* Brahma and its control by Brahma are beautifully expressed thus—

---

[1] "इदमेव जगत् प्रागवस्थायां···बीजशक्त्यवस्थं अव्यक्तशब्दयोग्यं" (वे° भा°, 1. 4. 2)। "प्रलये सर्व्वकार्य्यकरणशक्तीनां अवस्थानमभ्युपगन्तव्यं, शक्तिलक्षणस्य नित्यत्वनिर्व्वाहाय" (कठ° भा°, आ° गिरि)। 'प्राण-चेष्टा'—is a distinguishing property of a चेतन (वे° भा°, 3. 3. 35)।

"Brahma is *distinguished* from the namarupa existent in it, and *untouched* by it but it *controls* its activities"—

"ते नाम-रूपे···यस्य ब्रह्मणो मध्ये वर्त्तेते·····यद्·····नामरूपाभ्यामस्पृष्टं ...नाम-रूप-विलक्षणं···तथापि तयोर्निर्व्योढृ एवंलक्षणं ब्रह्म" (छा° भा°, 8. 14. 1).

Exactly similar observations occur in the Vedanta-Bhásya also.[1] We find then that Brahma has nowhere been really described as a *solitary* being without anything for it to control, *i.e.*, as 'object-less' or difference-less 'subject.'

(*ii*) We shall now come to our second answer—

The individual self, according to Sankara, has a distinct 'nature' or स्वरूप of its own, and this स्वरूप cannot be resolved into its states and activities evoked from it through its interaction with the external environment. his nature or स्वरूप maintains its unity or identity in all its evolved changes or states. Brahma, too, in this system of philosophy, has a distinct 'nature' or स्वभाव of its own, and this स्वभाव maintains its unity, as distinguished from the infinite varieties of the changes of náma-rupa (नाम-रूप)—ever evolving from this स्वभाव.[2] The importance of this truth cannot be too highly emphasised. Most people are liable to resolve this unity into

---

[1] "ईश्वरस्य आत्मभूते इव...नामरूपे...मायाशक्तिः प्रकृतिरिति च अभिलप्येते। ताभ्यामन्यः सर्व्वज्ञ ईश्वरः" (वे° भा°, 2. 1. 14).

[2] "नहि उपाधियोगादपि अन्यादृशस्य वस्तुनोऽन्यादृशः 'स्वभावः' सम्भवति" (वे° भा°, 3. 2. 11)। "तदव्यक्तमनिन्द्रियग्राह्यं—सर्व्वदृश्य-साक्षित्वात" (3. 2. 23)। "उपाधिभूतेषु सविशेषा इव अवभासन्ते, न च 'स्वाभाविकीं' अविशेषात्मतां जहति (3. 2. 25)।

the visible multiplicity of the changing states and to take the aggregate of these states to be the only self. It is therefore necessary to impress the mind of the seekers of truth with this great principle, so that the people may not forget this स्वरूप of their own, as well as of Brahma itself,—as underlying all the diversities of the changes.

During our dreaming and waking states, our real 'nature' or स्वरूप becomes utterly obscured by our waking and dreaming *experiences*, as the case may be. The sum-total of these experiences appears to us to be the only self. It is most difficult to distinguish the presence and operation of our true self which underlies these experiences, unaffected by them.[1] It is needful therefore to choose a condition where, if possible, these varieties of experiences do not appear to disturb the 'nature' of the self. Our dream-less sleep is the right condition, when all the outward and inward distractions seem to cease. There the true underlying self, unaffected by the experiences, comes distinctly into the view. For this very reason, the dream-less condition (सुषुप्तावस्था) has been taken to be the स्वरूपावस्था, *i.e.*, the true condition where the real 'nature' (स्वरूप) of the self is to be discovered. It is not really meant to show that the self is actually solitary or object-less.[2] In a similar way, the Prágabasthá (प्रागवस्था) of the world has been chosen to exhibit the true unaffected 'nature' or

---

[1] "उपाधिकृतस्वरूपतिरोभावात्...स्वरूपस्य च अनपायित्वात्" (वे° भा°, 3. 2. 25)।

[2] "जाग्रद्विषये...बाह्याभ्यन्तरकार्य्य-करण-व्यवहार-शस्त्रिपातव्याकुलत्वात्, न शक्यते तज्ज्योतिरात्माख्यं सुक्ष्मं धीकावत् निष्कृष्य दर्शयितुं" (ब्र° भा°, 4. 3. 7)। "जाग्रत्-स्वप्नौ...तयोर्बीजं कारण···सुषुप्तिसंज्ञकं तमोबीजं" (उप° सा°)। "स्वप्न-जागरितयोस्तु उपाधिसम्पर्कवशात् पररूपापत्तिमिवापेक्ष्य...सुषुप्तेः 'स्वरूपा'पत्तिर्वर्ण्यते ...स्वरूपस्य अनपायित्वात्" (वे° भा°, 3. 2. 7)। "एकस्य अनेकस्वभावत्वानुपपत्तेः" (3. 2. 21)।

स्वरूप of Brahma which underlies the world, *i.e.*, its emerging changes or विकारs, and which is thus distinguished from them. The chance becomes infinitely harder to detect the presence of this 'nature' unaffected by the changes, when the infinite diversities of náma-rupa (नामरूप) perpetually work, as at present. The सुषुप्तावस्था of the individual self and the प्रागवस्था of the world both help us in easily detecting the presence of the 'nature' or स्वरूप of both the individual self and Brahma respectively, and in becoming convinced of a unity amidst diversity. It has been thought advisable, on account of this very difficulty, to select or rather to imagine a condition of the world when the changes as yet did not appear to emerge, but just on the point of emerging into the view. This condition is named as Prâgabasthá (प्रागवस्था) of the world. It would be far easier to grasp the undisturbed true nature (स्वरूप) of Brahma in the absence of any emerging changes or विकारs. During this प्रागवस्था, there is no possibility to resolve the nature of Brahma into, and to identify it with, the empirical changes—taking the aggregate of these changes to be the only reality. It is for this that we find the प्रागवस्था (Prágabasthá) of the world described in the commentaries of Sankara. Its real purpose is not to show that there can ever be a state when Brahma can exist *without* any differences, as a *solitary* being self-sufficient without the created world—an object-less subject. To imply this fact, the náma-rupa (नाम-रूप) has been expressly stated, in the beginning of the Vedanta-bhásya, as the 'विषय' or the 'object' of Brahma—the 'subject.'[1] It

Prior state of world and *susupta* state of finite self—meant to show the 'nature' of Brahma and self respectively.

[1] "किं पुनस्तत्कर्म, यत्प्रागुत्पत्तेः ईश्वरज्ञानस्य 'विषयो'भवति ?...नामरूपे व्याचिकीर्षिते इति ब्रूमः" (वे° भा°, 1. 1. 5)। "तत् दर्शनस्य विषयो भवति—

is therefore an erroneous attempt to interpret Brahma as 'object-less,' as Dr. Paul Deussen has done in his *Philosophy of the Upanishads*. This Prior state or प्रागवस्था has been chosen to show that Brahma has a 'nature' of its own and this nature must be existent *prior* to its manifestations and that Brahma is not an 'abstraction.'

Illustration of the above fact from Sankara-bhasya.

That Brahma in its own character is invariably to be found *present* behind all the changes of the world and that the latter can never exist without the underlying Brahma—is everywhere repeatedly shown in the commentaries of Sankara. How carefully and beautifully the above fact is stated will appear from the following passages which we have selected with a view to support what has been stated in the preceding page.

In the Mándukya-bhásya, in describing the nature of the Transcendantal (तुरीय) Brahma, Sankara states—

(*i*) If, it may be asked, Brahma is to be taken as something which lies *beyond* what has been manifested in the world; if it be *apart* from all changes, all states, all actions which are visible in the empirical world;—then it necessarily follows that no speech, no language, no word can describe its nature; in as much as the speech, the word and the language are included in the manifested things of the world. Then go a step further. That which cannot be expressed by a word; to which no thoughts—no words can be applied;—we may very well take that to be a non-entity, a mere void (शून्य). Raising this objection, Sankara thus meets it :—'No, Brâhma is not a void,

---

कर्मतामापद्यते इति। तत् कथं कर्मभूतंसत्, कर्तृस्वरूपदृष्टिविशेषवत् स्यात्?... कर्म हि कर्तृक्रियया व्याप्यमानं भवति; अन्यच्च व्याप्यं, अन्यत्व्यापकं; न तेनैव तद्व्याप्यते" (ब्र° भा°, 4. 4. 6)।

never a non-entity. Brahma always *underlies* the changes and sustains them. All manifestations come out from that underlying sustaining ground. The ground which gives support to these changes and constantly sustains them cannot prove to be a mere void or non-entity. It must have a positive nature of its own. Even when a snake, a silver, a mirage appears to arise,—all these appearances are invariably found to be supported, in each case, by a sustaining ground upon which they appear, *viz.*, a rope, an oyster, and the surface of a desert; unsupported by which, these appearances cannot for a moment stand. Hence the Brahman's 'nature' is the sustaining ground of all changes, all manifestations,—in the absence of which the latter cannot stand, cannot live. If the sustaining ground is held to be a non-entity,—nothing, then, can mere 'nothing' give birth to the positive things of the world ? [1]

(*ii*) Our life begins with our *experiences.* These experiences are of two kinds. Those which we experience in our waking state and those which are experienced in our dream. All our experiences are various, successive, and they change their aspects always. But underlying these changing experiences and unaffected by them, there is our true self which experiences them as they arise. This self is the sustaining ground of all our experiences, in the absence of which the latter cannot stand and operate. The experiences are, as noted above, successive,

---

[1] " सर्व्वशब्दप्रवृत्ति-निमित्तशून्यत्वात्, तस्य शब्दानभिधेयत्वमिति, विशेषप्रतिषेधेनैव 'तुरीयं' निर्दिदिक्षति।.....शून्यमेव तर्हि ? तन्न। मिथ्याविकल्पस्य निर्निमित्तानुपपत्तेः। न हि रजत-सर्प-पुरुष-मृगतृष्णिकादि विकल्पाः शुक्तिका-रज्जु-स्थाणूषरादि-व्यतिरेकेण अवस्त्वास्पदाः शक्याः कल्पयितुं। एवं तर्हि प्राणादिसर्व्वविकल्पास्पदत्वं तुरीयस्य " (मा° भा°, 1.7).

multiple in their nature and transitory. But the underlying self which lives in them and sustains them is a unity and it maintains its identity unaffected by these changing experiences. Our self is in touch with the transcendental (तुरीय) Brahma, which is our real self. There is no other way left to us to comprehend the nature of the self, except as the sustaining ground of our experiences, through which that nature realises or expresses itself. It cannot be a non-entity.[1]

No further quotation is necessary. These will suffice to prove the position of Sankara.

Brahma is thus regarded in the Vedanta, as perpetually present and operative, as an inexhaustible source, *behind* the changes or transformations evolving from it. It is thus intimately related to the विकारs or changes, as their ever-present ground and controller. It is therefore impossible to regard Brahma as *remote* and *solitary* and as an 'abstract void.' As the creation is perpetually going on—

" नाद्याप वडुभवनं प्रयोजनं निहत्तं " (छा° भा°)—

and newer and newer differences are emerging continuously,

"उत्तरोत्तर सर्व्वकार्य्येषु" (गौ°)—

how can these be *separated* from Brahma, making it a difference-less abstract?

All the phenomenal cognitions elicited from the self are premeated and pervaded by the eternal consciousness

---

[1] "जागदादिस्थानेषु एक एवायमात्मा इत्यव्यभिचारी यः प्रत्ययः, तेन अनुसरणीयं ...तुरीयं ब्रह्म।...निर्व्विशेषे एव आत्मनि सुखित्वादि-विशेषाः कल्पिताः। आत्मा एतेषु अनुगतः, सर्व्वत्र अव्यभिचारात्" (मा° भा°, 1.7)। "व्यवस्थयैव आत्मनः तुरीयत्वेन प्रतिपिपादयिषित्वात्"।

underlying them[1] ; and the self is the *source* of all its visible activities in which the underlying power is manifesting itself partially. The self is, for this reason, characterised as *Sattá-sphurti-rupah* (सत्ता-स्फुर्त्ति-रूपः).[2] It is partially manifest *in* its cognitions and in its activities, and they are therefore regarded as a *means*—द्वारभूतानि—indicative marks—for the presence and operation of the underlying Rational power.[3]

---

[1] "आत्मनः 'स्वरूपं'—ऋतिः। तथापि बुद्धे रूपाधिलक्षणायाः चक्षुरादिद्वारे-र्विषयाकारेण परिणामिन्याः ये शब्दाद्याकारावभासाः (*i.e.*, cognitions or states of consciousness), ते...आत्मविज्ञानेन व्याप्ता एव उत्पद्यन्ते।...तस्मात् विज्ञानशब्द-वाच्याः, विज्ञानावभासाश्च ते" (तै° भा°, 2.1)। *Cf.* also "अन्यच्च व्याप्यं, अन्यत्-व्यापकं ; न तेनैव तत्व्याप्यते। कर्म्म हि कर्तृक्रियया व्याप्यमानं भवति" (ब्र° भा°, 4. 4. 6)। "सर्व्वे प्रत्यया विषयीभवन्ति यस्य, स आत्मा...सर्व्वप्रत्ययदर्शी" (के° भा°, 2.4)।

[2] "सकलविकारानुस्यूत—सत्ता-स्फुर्त्तिरूपः—विकारोपमर्द्देन अनुसन्धेयः" (उप° सा°) (सत्ता=Being; स्फुर्त्ति=Active Power)।

"निष्कलं निष्क्रियं...जगद्बीजप्रवर्त्तकं नियन्तृत्वात् अन्तर्यामिसंज्ञं भवति" (ऐ° भा°)। "चेतनेनाप्रवर्त्तितस्य प्रवर्त्तानुपपत्तेः" (वे° भा°, 3. 2. 38)।

[3] So it is likened sometimes to the reflected image of the sun upon a surface of a lake. As the reflected image is an imperfect and partial expression of the sun which underlies the image; so the nature of the self is imperfectly and partially reflected or manifested in our cognitive states and activities.

अयं पुरुषः भूतमात्रासंसर्गतः प्रविभक्तः, जलादौ चन्द्रादिप्रतिबिम्बवत्, कार्य्यकरणे ष्वेह प्रविष्टः" (ब्र०भा०)।

"तदन्तःकरण-देहेन्द्रियोपाधिद्वारेणैव निर्द्दिश्यते 'विज्ञानादि'-शब्दैः।"

"अस्ति···सर्व्वान्तरतमं कूटस्थं···योचादेरपि तत्-सामर्थ्यनिमित्तं। योचादेः, स्वविषयव्यञ्जनसामर्थ्यं...चैतन्येऽसंहृते सर्व्वान्तरे सति भवति, नासतीति" (केन० भा० 1. 2.)

Iswara or creator is not a different being *other than* Brahma.

5. From what has been stated above, it is evident that neither Brahma, nor the individual self can be resolved into, or identified with, its evolving changing states or विकारs, through which it is perpetually expressing itself in higher and higher forms. Yet some interpreters of the Adwaita philosophy have thought it fit to regard *Iswara* to be a *different* and *separate* being other than Brahma. A passage in the Vedanta-Bhásya is perhaps responsible for this hasty conclusion formed with regard to the nature of *Iswara*. We shall consider this passage presently. But before we do so, a remark or two on the subject is necessary. Sankara himself has made no distinction between the two—Brahma and Iswara. The act of creation ought not to be regarded as a *separate* and distinct act, by which Brahma has become something *other than* its own self ;—as if it was Brahma *first*, and *then* a creator. Such manner of thought would introduce a false difference in the 'nature' of Brahma which is always a real *unity*. The act of creation is but the *revelation* of its own nature. As the revelation cannot be exhaustive and must necessarily be partial, every fresh act of creation must be regarded as the revelation of its nature *so far forth*. The nature of Brahma being infinite (अव्यय) and inexhaustible (पूर्ण), no act of creation can be the exhaustive expression of its nature. Sankara observes—

"यद्यपि कार्यात्मना उद्रिच्यते, तथापि यत्स्वरूपं
पूर्णत्वं तन्न जहाति । पूर्णमेव उद्रिच्यते" (ब्र०भा०, 5. 1. 1)--

i.e., as Brahma is inexhaustible in its nature, it is eternally making (उद्रिच्यते) itself—creating itself—to realise its own nature. If Brahma, creating the world, had exhausted its nature, the world, in that case, would have to be regarded

as a complete and finished whole. But such cannot be the nature of Brahma which is inexhaustible and infinite. Sankara has told us that—

"ध्येय ब्रह्म, *i.e.*, *Iswara* can never really be an aggregate of many parts—भेदसमाकुलं अनेकरसं" (ब्र०भा०, 5. 1. 1.)

In the Gītá-Bhásya hé observes that—

"the being which has revealed itself as the world is *no other* than the 'nature' of Brahma itself."[1]

In the Kena-Bhásya, a similar remark is recorded—

"तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः...सगुणत्वेन उपासनम्। ब्रह्मेति परः, लिङ्गात्।
न हि अन्यच्च परादीश्वरात्...तत्वं वक्तुं सामर्थ्यमस्ति" (3,1.).

That is to say—the immanent God is the same as the transcendent Brahma. Sankara is still more explicit and expressive there in the sentence—

"ब्रह्मशब्दवाच्य ईश्वर इति अवसीयते" (के०भा०, 3. 1.)

Elsewhere, the same fact is stated expressly thus—

"It is the same transcendental Paramátmá who sustains everything in the world by His Power."[2]

---

[1] "नहि...शतसहस्रभेदसमाकुलं समुद्रवनादिवत् (*i.e.*, a *whole* aggregate of parts: mere unity of collection) अनेकरसं ब्रह्म—ध्येयत्वेन विज्ञेयत्वेन वा—श्रुत्या उपदिश्यते" (ब्र०भा०, 5. 1. 1.)। "एकस्य अनेकस्वभाव-त्वानुपपत्तेः" (ब्र०भा०)। [Otherwise a false difference would be introduced into the 'nature' (स्वभाव) of Brahma which is always a unity (एकः स्वभावः).

[2] "यत् 'पदं' सर्व्वस्य अवभासकमपि, अग्न्यादित्यादिकं ज्योतिर्नावभासयते··· यत्-प्राप्ता मुमुक्षवः न निवर्त्तन्ते...तस्य पदस्य सर्व्वात्मत्वं सर्व्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं विवक्षुः... विभूतिसंक्षेपमाह" (गी०भा०, 15. 11.)

"चरेषु अचरेषु 'अस्यैव स्वरूपस्य' (निर्गुणस्य) या या अभिव्यक्तिः, सा सा अस्य 'विशिष्टरूपं'।···स्वरूपसद्भावमावेश्य सर्व्वं बिभर्त्ति" (गी०भा०, 15. 19.)

BCU 2273

Thus, it is wrong to ascribe to Sankara the view that in his system, his *Iswara* is something *other than* and distinct from Brahma, that Iswara is a *lower* and empirical Brahma. It is the Sankara's established theory that, in revealing itself as the world, Brahma has not become something *other than* its own nature.

In his commentary on the Vedanta-Sutra II. 1. 14, a remark of Sankara, as we have stated above, has been made much of. The remark runs to the effect that—

> "it is only in the practical concerns of life that there is Iswara and the idea of a controller and the controlled. But when the real knowledge will dawn, where is the creation and where is the creator?"

"परमार्थावस्थायां ईशितृशिक्षव्यव्यवहाराभाव: प्रदर्श्यते।
व्यवहारावस्थायान्तु उक्त: श्रुतावपि-ईश्वरादिव्यवहार:" (वे० भा० 2.1.14)

Now, the true idea of the passage, as it appears to us, has not been correctly grasped and Sankara has been unjustly ridiculed as "recognising a pinchbeck deity," and his system has been thought "to have no place, in it, for theism."

[*i.e.*, Iswara is not to be really looked upon as *identified* with the world; for Brahma has not really and actually been *reduced* to the created elements and thereby has become something else. It is the same Brahma still. Hence, Brahma and Iswara are not distinct, but the *same* being. This is the पारमार्थिक दृष्टि, *i.e.*, true view of the case.]

"स्वरूपसद्भावमावेण सर्व्वं विभर्त्ति—न तु व्याप्ततया"।

N. B.—Col. Jacob in his introduction to his edition of the *Vedantasara* is wrong in pointing out 'inconsistencies' in the writings of Sankara. The reader will see that he has failed to grasp the true sense of the relation of ब्रह्म and ईश्वर।

22,436.

6. We shall here try to give a right explanation of the Sankara's remarks from his own stand-point and we crave our reader's attention to this important point. It will be seen that Sankara begins his discussion in this commentary with the sentence—

Iswara no other than Brahma.—Reasons stated.

" अविद्यात्मक-नामरूपबीज-व्याकरणापेक्षत्वात् ईश्वरस्य "—

He means to say that ordinarily the creative act is regarded as a *separate* act and the creator or the revealer of the infinite diversities of náma-rupa (नाम-रूप) or the changes which work in the world is thought to be something *other than* Brahma itself. That this was his view, that he took *Iswara* in this popular sense is evident from the employment of the term Avidyá in—

" अविद्यात्मक-नामरूपोपाध्यनुरोधी ईश्वरो भवति "—

Now, the sense of avidyá used throughout in his system has been brought out very clearly in his Introduction to the Vedanta Philosophy, from which it will appear that under the influence of Avidyá, men ignore the distinct presence of the underlying unity and identifies it with the changing states evolved from it. Men, under the power of Avidyá, identify the underlying Brahma with the emergent changes as soon as they are produced or created ; and Brahma, to these people, appear now as Iswara, *i.e.*, something *other than* Brahma itself. Now, this view is, Sankara observes entirely wrong. Iswara is really not at all a *separate* being ; it is the same identical Brahma still ; it is the same Brahma and no one else. For, Brahma's nature or स्वरूप *maintains its identity* in all the changes in the world ;—

" न विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति.....
स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् " (वे० भा०, 2.1.18) ।

it does not become actually *reduced* to these. Brahma is infinitely *more* in its 'nature' than that which acts actually in the world ; Brahma is measurelessly more than its actual revelation. The created elements have been evolved from the 'nature' of Brahma for its own realisation. Brahma has not sundered itself into these elements ; it has not actually passed into, or been converted into, these elements and thereby has become something *other than* its own nature. It expresses itself through these. We have therefore no right to *separate* these from it and take them as 'something' distinct and complete in themselves ;

"न हि 'वस्तुतत्त्वेन' विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति" (वे०भा०)।—

The evolving changes—the diversities of emerging námarupa—are not something other than Brahma's nature, but they are really the further and further revelations of this nature. Hence also is Sankara's remark—

"परमार्थावस्थायां कुत एव वा सृष्टिः" ?—

When we come to truly realise the unity of Brahma as untouched and unaffected by the evolving changes, we will then look upon the world and all the changes evolving therein as mere *means, medium, symbols*, through which Brahma is realising its own nature—is expressing itself. Everything will appear as incorporated in Brahma as its necessary *expressions*. This is the correct interpretation of the passage under notice, in the light of Sankara's entire theory. No other view is possible. One who has declared Iswara to be eternally existent (नित्यसिद्ध) cannot declare him to be *unreal*.

That this is the case will appear also from the illustrations [1] recorded by Sankara which we now desire to explain. To express the idea of the letters, we employ certain points, lines, dots, etc. The letters do not themselves pass into or become actually converted into these points, lines, dots. These merely express the nature of the letters. These are merely symbols standing for the letters which find their expression in them. Such is the case also with the numbers. The numbers—one, two, three, etc.—are expressed through certain lines and points. They do not actually pass into, or are converted into, these lines and points. These are merely symbols which are employed to express the nature of the numbers. *Separated* from the numbers which find expression in them, and taken as independent things,—the lines, points, etc., lose their value and become unreal.[2] So long as they are taken *in connection with* the numbers which they express, they have their value. But sever them off from the numbers, they at once become useless. Such is the case with the created elements, and Brahma. As soon as they are *separated* from the underlying Brahma which expresses itself through them, they lose their value and are quite useless. Hence these cannot be regarded

Illustrations in proof of the above position.

---

[1] "यथा एकप्रभृत्यापराई-संख्यास्वरूप-परिज्ञानाय, रेखाध्यारोपणं कृत्वा.... एकेयं रेखा, दशेयं शतेयं इति याद्दयति, अवगमयति संख्यास्वरूपं केवलं; न तु संख्याया रेखात्मत्वमेव। यथा च अकारादीनि अक्षराणि विजिगाद्दयिषुः, पवमसी-रेखादिसंयोगोपायमास्थाय, वर्णानां सतत्त्वं आवेदयति; न पद-मस्याद्यात्मकतामक्षराणां याद्दयति। तथाचेह उत्पत्ति-स्थिति-लयादनेकोपायमास्थाय, एकं ब्रह्मतत्त्वमावेदितं" इत्यादि (ब्र०भा०,)

[2] "तथा अकारादिसत्याक्षरप्रतिपत्ति दृष्टा, रेखादृताक्षर प्रतिपत्तेः" (वे०भा०, 2.1.14).

as something independent—अन्य—self-sufficient and complete in themselves ; but they are अनन्य to (*i.e.*, not really *other than*) Brahma underlying them. This term, *i.e.*, अनन्य has been unfortunately translated into English as—"identical." In the third chapter of this book we have tried to expose the incorrectness of this translation. We need not repeat here the arguments used there. It will suffice to say that "The first part of the Sankara's causal theory implies that the causal reality is *distinct* from its effects or its successive manifestations, because it has a 'nature,' a स्वरूप, a स्वभाव (swarupa or swavāba) of its own, and it cannot therefore be resolved into, or identified with, the effects or the changes emerging from it. Sankara expresses this idea in———

"न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वं" (वे०भा०, 2.1.9)।"

"The second part of the theory implies that the cause is no doubt distinct from, and independent of, its effects or the emergent changes; but the effects cannot be *separated* from their underlying cause and regarded as independent and self-sufficient 'things' (वस्तु), each complete in itself. The effects must therefore be regarded as *ananya* (अनन्य) to their cause; *i. e.*, the real 'nature' of the cause expresses itself gradually, or becomes realised in, these successive effects. The latter are therefore mere symbols, means, instrument or medium for the realisation of the nature of the cause which underlies them. It is not therefore possible to *separate* any of the effects from the underlying cause which expresses itself in them. Separated from it, they would lose their value and become useless."

We find therefore from the illustrations quoted above that the successive changes are *inseparable* from their underlying cause which gradually realises or expresses its own nature in and through them. The underlying causal

reality has not actually passed into, or converted into, these evolving changes,—thereby becoming something else *other than* its own nature (अन्य).

Finite individuals and their responsibility for their works.

7. It follows from this exposition that what gradually expresses its inexhaustible nature in its changes, cannot exhaust itself in them and so become *identical* with them. Yet as we have seen, translating the word *ananya* (अनन्य) as "identical," Sankara's theory has been reduced to a kind of 'Pantheism' which he took so much pains to refute in various parts of his commentaries.

Taking Sankara to be a Pantheist, it has also been supposed that he has in his theory, abolished or negated the 'Individuality' or the 'personality' of the finite individuals, making them merely *parts* of an all-inclusive abstract whole; *viz.*, Brahma;—"ascribing to this Brahma alone the agency of all works." Many critics of the Sankara's theory believe that in the Adwaita philosophy as expounded by Sankara, the finite individuals are *not responsible* for their works, that all activities proceed from the agency of Brahma alone.

There are valuable arguments by which Sankara has established the 'individuality' of the selves which we have discussed elsewhere. Here in this chapter, we shall content ourselves only in examining the position whether the individual beings are not responsible for their works in this system of philosophy, so far as the 'theory of creation' is concerned.

Differences in experiences prove differences in individual 'natures.'

We find in our daily observation that the *experiences* of one individual man differ in their character from the experiences of another individual. Your experience and mine are not of the same character. Even the

individuals born and brought up under similar circumstances develop different experiences, exclusively belonging to each. If Brahma—the only Individual—be reduced to the relations of the world, he alone can be held responsible for this unequal distribution of the experiences or fortunes of different individuals, and the finite individuals would thereby be absolved from their share in the responsibility for their experiences. Sankara appears to remark in the Vedanta-bhasya (II. 1. 34) that for the inequalities of the experiences, the *works* of the individuals are to be held responsible. A hasty idea has been formed from this remark that as in this system there are no real individuals at all, these *actions alone* constitute the so-called individuality of men. A western writer has thus written about the Sankara's theory—

> "Its *resolution* of human life into *a series of acts mechanically related* keeps it at what we must describe at a low level."

That in the Sankara-system, the actions are but the responses made by the individual to the external environment with which there is an interaction, and that the source of this response is the 'nature' of the individual which underlies these actions, and that this nature cannot be resolved into these activities—all these points can be proved without much ado from the pages of the Sankara's commentaries.[1] We shall record in this place only one argument employed in the Vedanta-bhasya to expose the absurdity of the position held by the critic above referred to, which will suffice for our present purpose.

---

[1] *Vide* my paper on "Is not 'Pure Self' active in the Vedanta System?"—published in the "Sir Asutosh Silver Jubilee Volumes," Vol. III, Part II.

Every individual self, Sankara remarks, has two-fold mode of existence—substantive (स्वरूप or विशेष्य) and adjectival (सम्बन्धि-रूप or विशेषण).[1] In his substantive mode, he exists *for himself*, he belongs to himself. In his adjectival mode, he is related to others, he exists *for others*. His substantive existence or स्वरूप cannot be resolved into the adjectival existence; for, the individual is always *more* than his mere relations. His स्वरूप (Swarupa) is permanent and transcendent (कूटस्थ); but his सम्बन्धि-रूप, *i.e.*, his relations with others depend on the things with which he comes into interaction, and these relations therefore are always liable to changes. Thus, there is a Swarupa (स्वरूप) belonging to each individual being which underlies the relations or the activities elicited from this स्वरूप (Swarupa) through its relation with other objects.

Individuals—their substantive and adjectival modes of existence.

8. How is it possible, in the face of such clear arguments, to come to the conclusion that the sytem of Sankara has left no place for the 'individuality,' and that the individuals are mere aggregate of their actions or relations? It follows irresistibly from this discussion on the subject

'Nature' of individual selves cannot be resolved into mere relations or works.

---

[1] " एकत्रेऽपि स्वरूप-बाह्यरूपापेक्षया, अनेकशब्दप्रत्ययदर्शनात्। यथा एकोऽपि सन् देवदत्तः, स्वरूपं सम्बन्धि-रूपञ्च अपेक्ष्य, अनेकशब्दप्रत्ययभाक् भवति.....मनुष्यः ब्राह्मणः.....युवा स्थविरः.....पिता भ्राता जामाता इति "।

" यथा एकापि सती रेखा, स्थानान्यत्वेन निविशमाना, एक-दश-शत-सहस्रादि-शब्दप्रत्ययभेद-मनुभवति "।

" द्रव्यस्यैव तेन तेन विशेषणेन प्रतीयमानत्वात्, न द्रव्य-गुणयोर्भेदप्रतीतिरस्ति " (वे०भा०, 2.2.17).

in question that when Sankara apparently makes the *works* of the individuals responsible for their inequalities, he really makes the underlying 'natures' or स्वरूप (swarupas) of each individual responsible for the special character of the works issuing out from him. This will be evident, if we consider the character of the collateral arguments used by Sankara in this very place (वे०भा०, II. 1. 34). He illustrates his position here by showers of rain and the germination of distinct kinds of crops from their respective seeds. The peculiar and the distinct nature inherent in each class of *seeds* is the true cause, says he, for the visible inequalities in the development of different plants, each distinguished from each class;—though the general and common cause for the growth and germination of all crops must be held to be the showers acting upon the seeds.[1] It is well-known that Sankara has used the term 'seed,' *i.e.*, बीज with reference to the four different types of individuals distinguished from one another in their nature and character. We would transport our readers to a passage in the Bhasya on the Chandogya Upanishad where this line is to be found—

"तेषां खल्वेषां भूतानां बीजान्येव 'बीजानि' भवन्ति,
——अण्डजं, जीवजमुद्भिज्जमिति। (जीवजं
——includes स्वेदजं and जरायुजं)।" (छा०भा०, 6.2.1.)

---

[1] "यथा हि पर्य्यन्ते व्रीहीयवादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति। व्रीहीयवादिवैषम्येतु तत्तद्बीजगतान्येव असाधारणानि सामर्थ्यानि कारणानि भवन्ति। एवमीश्वरो देवमनुष्यादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति। देवमनुष्यादिवैषम्ये तु तत्तज्जीवगतान्येव असाधारणानि कर्म्माणि कारणानि भवन्ति" (वे० भा०, 2.1.34). *Cf.* परायत्तेपि हि कर्तृत्वे, करोत्येव जीवः।.....ईश्वरस्य च अत्यन्तानपेक्षत्वे...पुरुषकारस्य वैयर्थ्यं") वे०भा०, 2.3.42).

The seed (बीज) therefore includes in it the living 'natures' of the individual selves, each distinguished from the other class.[1] The difference in experiences therefore is to be accounted for by the difference in the respective 'natures' or स्वरूप of the individuals. The result reached here will be far more evident if another passage is considered in this connection. In the Vedanta-bhasya (III. 2. 9), a discussion runs to the effect whether, when a man wakes up after a deep sleep, it is the same identical individual who had slept has now waken up or it is a different individual. It is shown here that it is the same identical individual to whom both the *past* and the *present* belong. Among other arguments used to prove this fact, we should like to refer to only two arguments given there. The first is about the works done by the individual and the second is the fact of recollection. To prove the identity of the same individual both before and after his sleep, Sankara argues that otherwise the man waking up could not have begun again the same works which he had left unfinished before he went to sleep. Here we would respectfully request our readers to carefully examine the nature of this argument employed by Sankara to establish the identity of the individual. If the idea of Sankara were, as our opponents hold, really to resolve the individual self into his actions or works, how, we ask, could he employ this argument; and how could the argument establish the

---

[1] "बीज is what *grows* and hence *permanent*. "बीजं प्ररोहकारणं... न हि अबीजं किञ्चित् प्ररोहति। नित्यञ्च प्ररोहदर्शनात् बीज-सन्ततिर्नश्येति इति गम्यते" (गी०भा०, 9.18). 'Seeds' (बीज) in the Sankara system mean those which have living individual *selves behind* them, and hence they grow. *Cf.* बीजं मां सर्व्वभूतानां") (7.10) गी० and "भूतानां जीवाधिष्ठितानां" गी० (10. 32).

identity of the Soul? The works the man had left off when he fell asleep, are a thing of the past. Those works have vanished already because they belonged to a *past time*. How can the man who now wakes up begin again the works which are *now* non-existent? What is the link here to connect the past work with the present? It must be, therefore, the Sankara's inner purpose to show that it is the identical inner 'nature' of the man to which both his past and present works must belong, which 'nature' must be the underlying link here, connecting the works. This line also brings into light what was really working in the mind of Sankara when he wrote this commentary—

"न च अन्येन सामिकृतस्य कर्म्मणो, अन्य: शेषक्रियायां प्रवर्त्तितुमर्हति"—

i.e., A piece of work half done by one man, cannot be brought into completion by a different man.

Again, Sankara speaks of 'memory' (स्मृति) here. The man exercising his memory, recollects where he left off his past work and where he is to begin now. The works themselves cannot exercise the memory.[1] It must be the underlying self which does it and recollects his past work and connects it with the present. It is therefore to this self that both the works must belong, aud it is not the *works* themselves which can recollect *themselves*. Here again, by the phrase—

"अकृताभ्यागम and कृतप्रणाश"

---

[1] स्मृति (memory) is the distinguishing characteristic attribute (धर्म्म or स्वरूप) of the self. "प्राणचेष्टाचैतन्यस्मृत्यादयश्च आत्मधर्म्मत्वेन अभिमता: आत्मवादिनां" (वे०भा०, 3. 3. 53).

Sankara makes the underlying self *responsible* for his works. By holding the individual man responsible for his works done by him (or left undone by him), Sankara clearly establishes the fact that behind the works done, there is the underlying 'nature' or स्वरूप (Swarupa) of the man which is really accountable for its works. Otherwise, if the man be simply an aggregate of his works, then his present work being the necessary outcome of his antecedent work in time and predetermined by it,—you cannot make *the man* responsible for his present works.

Human responsibility for works.

It may not be out of place here to refer, in this connection, to the arguments used by Sankara in the Vedanta-bhásya, which will also show that difference in the works or activities really implies difference in the deeper 'natures' which underlie the works or activities. The argument is originally used to expose the absurdity of the theory of *Ashad-kárjya-bàda*. It is everywhere observed that certain *definite* changes or activities are invariably accompanied by a *definite* 'nature' behind them. Certain *other* definite changes or actions are invariably accompanied by *another* definite 'nature,' which is utterly distinct and different from the 'nature' mentioned above. In all the successive transformations or changes of मृत्तिका (say, a clod of earth), the 'nature' of मृत्तिका is seen behind them (but not the nature of a *tree*). Again, in all the successive transformations or changes of a tree, the nature of the tree—but not the nature of the *earth*—is seen behind them. Why, it may be asked, is such the case everywhere in connection with all kinds of

Every individual has a distinct 'nature' of its own.

definite changes or activities ?[1]—Simply because, these definite changes or transformations are determinations of the *nature of the earth*, and not of *any other nature*. This proves the fact that definite changes or actions belong to definite 'natures,' and these natures are distinguished, one from the other.[2] A similar argument, slightly changed, is given elsewhere. If a man wants to produce an earthen vessel, he must collect some *earth* for the purpose. But *milk* must be collected, if he wants to produce curd. The collection of earth will not serve his purpose in the latter case. Thus, definite 'natures' only, can produce definite works or changes. If there are not definite natures actually present in the world, anything could be made to produce any work indiscriminately. There would have been no *difference* in the works at all. For, there would be nothing to distinguish one kind of work from another.[3] These arguments very clearly prove that every finite individual possesses a definite *nature* of his own which cannot be resolved into the works or activities produced from

---

[1] "न च सदन्विता: शरावादयोभावा:, तन्त्वादिविकारा: केनचिदभ्युपगम्यते। सदिकारानेव तु सदन्वितान् भावान् लोक: प्रत्येति।...बीजादेव अङ्कुरो जायते, क्षीरादेव दधि=इत्येवंजातीयक: 'कारणविशेषाभ्युपगम:' अर्थवान् स्यात् ...सर्व्वस्य च वस्तुन: 'स्वेन स्वेन रूपेण' (*i.e.*, स्वरूपेण=Their own natures) भावात्मनैव उपलभ्यमानत्वात्" (वे०भा०, 2. 2. 26).

[2] *Cf.* गवादिभ्यश्चान्योऽश्वं, मत्तश्चान्येगवादय:" इत्यादि, (गौ० भा०, 18. 66).

[3] "दधिघटरुचकाद्यर्थिभि: प्रतिनियतानि कारणानि क्षीर-मृत्तिका-सुवर्णादीनि उपादीयमानानि दृश्यन्ते। न च दध्यर्थिभि: मृत्तिका उपादीयते, न घटार्थिभि: क्षीरं। अविशिष्टे हि प्रागुत्पत्ते:, सर्व्वस्य सर्व्वत्र असत्त्वे, कस्मात् क्षीरादेव दधि उत्पद्यते, न मृत्तिकाया: ?" (वे०भा०, 2 1. 18) [Does not the expression —'प्रतिनियतानि कारणानि' imply the different *grades* of Individuals ?]

it. We fail to understand how Sankara's system can be held to negate the individualities.[1]

"The creation," according to Sankara, "is but the gradual manifestations of diverse *sámányas* (सामान्य) with the *visheshas* (विशेष) produced from them."[2] The term samanya (सामान्य) is used in the Vedanta-bhásya to denote the deeper 'natures' of the individuals, and the visheshas (विशेष) to denote the states and activities produced respectively from these 'natures' through interaction with the environment (कारकव्यापार).[3] The readers should remember that in his Theory of Causality as explained by Sankara (वे० भा०, 2.1.14-20) the term sâmânya stands for the causal reality; and the term visheshas stand for its effects or qualities, which are but its modes of acting in which the causal reality reveals its nature.—

"सामान्याद्धि विशेषा उत्पद्यमाना दृश्यन्ते,
मृदादेर्घटादयः"[4].....

वेदा० भा०, 2. 3. 9.

---

[1] Besides the arguments given in this chapter, there are other valuable arguments used by Sankara to prove the existence of the 'nature' of different individuals.

[2] "सामान्य-विशेषवानर्थो नामव्याकरणवाक्ये विवक्षितः" (वे०भा०,).

[3] "कार्याकारेण कारणं व्यवस्थापयतः 'कारकव्यापारस्य' अर्थवत्वं उपपद्यते" (वे०भा०, 2. 1. 18.)

"अपास्तविशेषं सामान्यात्मकं कारणं विशेषवदवस्थान्तरमापद्यमानं" (वे०भा०, 2. 2. 15.)

[4] *Vijgana-bhikshu* very clearly explains these terms and agrees with Sankara entirely in this respect. He explains—

"सामान्यं स्वरूपशब्देन परिभाषितं। स्वरूपपरिभाषा च स्थिरतामादेण।

("स्थिरस्वभावानां...कारणभावदर्शनात्"...वे०भा०, Sankara also says 2. 2. 6.)

विशेषा हि आगमापायितया, न द्रव्यस्य स्वरूपाणि।"

("विशेषस्तु विक्रिया"...तै०भा०, Sankara also says).

That the causal reality (*i.e.*, सामान्य) is *active* points to something beyond it with which it interacts. The term Kâraka-Vyápára (कारक-व्यापार) stands for this *interaction* which elicits the effects or visheshas (विशेष) or activities.

"न हि कारकमन्तरेण क्रिया सम्भवति"।

"सर्व्वत्र हि कारकसाध्या क्रिया"।.....

ब्रह्म० भाष्य।

Elsewhere in this connection Sankara has written that—

> "There are in the world diverse sâmânyas with their visheshas,—both sentient and insentient. All these sámányas, in their graduated series (पारम्पर्य्यगत्या), are included and comprehended in one great Sámánya, *i.e.*, in Brahma's nature or स्वरूप (swarupa). It is Bhahma which connects with it all these individual beings."[1]

Now, it is perhaps clear that in the Sankara-system, the different 'natures' or स्वरूपs of the individuals have not been denied. It is in this way then that the difference of experiences or works implies difference in the deeper 'individual natures' which underlie them.

The above discussion shows that in the Sankara-Vedanta, Brahma is absolved from any share in the differences or inequalities of the works for which the different inner 'natures' (स्वरूपs) of the different individuals

---

"अनेके हि विलक्षणाचेतनाचेतनरूपाः सामान्य-विशेषाः। तेषां पारम्पर्य्यगत्या एकस्मिन् महासामान्ये अन्तर्भावः प्रज्ञानघने" (ब्र०भा०, 2. 4. 9.)।

"मयि सर्व्वमिदं-भूतानि मयि ईश्वरे अनुस्यूतानि" (गी० भा०, 7. 7.)।

We have seen before that भूतानि=बीजानि=Living individuals (जीवाः)। भूतानि जीवाधिष्ठितबीजानि" (10. 32 and 7. 10).

are solely responsible,—Brahma being looked upon as a general controller or director of all the activities set a-going in the world. It proves also that Brahma has a distinct 'nature' (स्वरूप) of its own which cannot be resolved [1] into the evolving changes, and neither can the individuals be treated, in this system, as mere *parts* of an all-inclusive abstract whole. We have found from Sankara's writings that Brahma is a Reality which maintains its unity and identity *in* the multiplicity of the ever-changing but inseparable, elements of the universe,—which cannot therefore be taken as a "difference-less, empty pantheistic void."

Brahma's 'nature.' —It is self-conscious and self-determining power.

9. We shall now proceed to show how Sankara has characterised the 'nature' of Brahma. In many parts of his commentaries, Sankara has made a very valuable observation which, we regret to note, seems to have escaped the attention of many critics of his Adwaita theory.

He has repeatedly stated, and drawn our special attention to, the important truth that 'unity' and 'multiplicity' cannot *both* be held to be equally true in respect of the same thing. If a particular object be 'one,' it cannot also be held to be its opposite, *i.e.*, 'many.' Because, 'one' and 'many' are of opposing characters and contradict one another. One cannot be put as a rival to the other; for, the claims of both cannot be adjusted. If a thing be possessed of several qualities or states, it cannot also be devoid of all qualities.[2] Brahma is a 'unity' and,

---

[1] "एकस्य अनेकात्मकत्वानुपपत्तेः; यथा समुद्र इति एकत्वं, फेन-तरङ्गाद्यात्मना अनेकत्वं" (वे० भा०)।

[2] "न हि एकस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामधर्मकत्वं, तद्रहितत्वञ्च शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुं" (वे०भा०, 2. 1. 14.)

as such, it retains that character, throughout, under all circumstances.[1] It cannot be reduced to the multiplicity of the transformations which are produced out of it. Such being the case, the multiplicity which is working in the world indicates the *presence* of a unity behind it and this unity cannot be phenomenalised. For, it is the presupposition of the 'many,' and its presence and operation are necessary to connect the 'many' to it.[2]

The multiplicity of transformations issuing out of the 'unity' is not, therefore, of *equal* value, though inseparable[3] from it. The 'many' are the expressions or manifestations of the 'one,' without which the real nature of 'unity' could not have been comprehended. Such being the view of Sankara, Brahma cannot be "an abstract intelligence divorced from action." It is the subject—the knower—from which the cognitive states have issued *in* which the knower[4] realises itself.

"विशिष्टशक्तिमत्त्व-प्रदर्शनं, विशेष-प्रतिषेधश्च—इति विप्रतिषिद्धं" (गी०भा०, 12.1)

"न हि एकं वस्तु परमार्थतः कर्तादिविशेषवत्, तच्छून्यञ्च—उभयथा द्रष्टुं शक्यते" (ते०भा०, 1. 11).

"न निरवयवेषु अनेकात्मकता शक्यते कल्पयितुं एकस्य" (ब्र०भा०, 4.3.30): "ननु एकत्वं नानात्वञ्च—उभयमपि सत्यमेव ? नैवंस्यात्" (वे०भा०, 2.1.14).

[1] "यद्धर्मको यः पदार्थः प्रमाणेन अवगतो भवति, स देशकालावस्थान्तरेष्वपि, तद्धर्मक एव भवति" (ब्र०भा०, 2.1.20).

[2] "सामान्यं हि विशेषान् आत्मस्वरूपप्रदानेन बिभर्त्ति।" "अन्वयिद्रव्यमेव सर्व्वत्र कारणं भवति——सर्व्वेषु विकारेषु अन्वयविच्छेददर्शनात्"। "न हि कारणोपलम्भमन्तरेण अविस्रंसामानं कार्य्यस्यातुमुत्सहते"।

[3] "सामान्ये हि तद्विशेषाः प्रोताः" (गी० भा०, and ब्र० भा०)। "यस्य च यस्मादात्मलाभोभवति, स तेन अप्रविभक्तो दृष्टः, यथा घटादीनां मृदा" (ब्र० भा०)।

[4] "अयमेव दोषो यत्तेव-विज्ञातृत्वं ? न च ; विज्ञानस्वरूपस्येव अक्रियस्य 'विज्ञातृ'त्वोपचारात्" (गी०भा०, 13. 2)। "यथा ज्ञेयं घटादिलक्षणं ज्ञानेन ज्ञाता

The activities manifested to us have behind them a unity which must be the *source*, of which they are the visible products ; and this source or power is realising itself *in* these activities.

Sankara's arguments in proof of Brahma as a seat of power are well-known. They are :—

(*a*) Where regularity (नियमेन प्रवर्त्तनं) and adaptability (रचना)—are visible in any action, these marks indicate the presence and operation of a Director (अन्तर्यामी).

(*b*) Where a combined activity (संहननं) for a common purpose (एकार्थवृत्तित्वेन) is visible, it is to be inferred that a purposive power (स्वार्थ) is present and operative behind such activity—which (power) has combined the elements and directs them for its own purpose.[1]

In the Kena-Bhasya, the true self is proved to be a *prajoktá* (प्रयोक्ता) or *prerayitá* (प्रेरयिता), and throughout this

---

व्याप्तुमिच्छति, तथा ज्ञानमपि ज्ञानान्तरेण ज्ञातव्यमाप्तुमिच्छेत् ? नचैतदस्ति। अतः अत्यन्तप्रसिद्धं ज्ञानं, 'ज्ञाता'पि अतएव प्रसिद्ध एव" (गी०भा०, 13.50). "सर्व्वप्रत्ययदर्शी चिच्छक्तिस्वरूपमात्रः" (केन० भा०, 2.4.1 "देहादिलक्षणान् रूपादींश्च एतेनैव देहादिव्यतिरिक्तेनैव विज्ञानस्वभावेनात्मना'विजानाति'—कठ०भा० 4.3 "नान्यद्द्वारमस्ति आत्मनो विज्ञानाय"।

[1] (*a*) "अग्नि-वायु-सूर्य्यादिकं जगत् अस्मादेव ब्रह्मणो बिभ्यत्, 'नियमेन' स्वव्यापारे प्रवर्त्तते इति.....ब्रह्म ।...एजयितृत्वमपीदं परमात्मन एव उपपद्यते, न वायुमात्रस्य" (वे० भा० 1.3.39),

(*b*) "नहि एषां 'परार्थानां' संहत्यकारित्वात् जीवनहेतुत्वमुपपद्यते। 'स्वार्थेन' असंहतेन 'परेण' केनचिदप्रयुक्तं संहतानामवस्थानं न दृष्टं। ...संहतविलक्षणेन तु सर्व्वे संहताः सन्तो प्राणादयः जीवन्ति' (कठ० भा०, 5. 5).

"ऐन्द्रियिकाश्चेष्टाः संहतैः कार्य्यकरणैः निर्व्वर्त्त्यमाना दृश्यन्ते।—तत्र 'एकार्थवृत्तित्वेन' संहननं नान्तरेण चेतनमसंहतं सम्भवति" (तै० भा०, 2.7) "नहि मृदादयः... अचेतनाः.....चेतनैरनधिष्ठिताः विशिष्टकार्य्याभिमुखप्रवृत्तयः दृश्यन्ते" (वे० भा०, 2.2.2)। "संहतत्वाच्च पारार्थ्योपपत्तिः प्राणस्य" (बृह० भा०, 2.1.15).

Upanishad, the real underlying self is regarded as a purpose—a will-power—the Supreme End.[1]

It is very hard to believe how such broad and clear facts have escaped several writers who have, unjustly, exhibited Sankara's Brahma or the self as a mere "abstract intelligence" to the learned world.

Sankara's Brahma is a self-conscious Knower and a Directive or purposive power. So also his individual self.

The purpose or end of the creation.

10. We cannot conclude this chapter without recording Sankara's views on the purpose of the creation of the universe as stated by him in his commentaries. It has been shown above that in the System of Vedanta, it is held that Brahma has a 'nature,' a स्वभाव, a स्वरूप, of its own; and this nature cannot be resolved into anything else. This nature (स्वभाव) is constant and does not vary under any circumstances. This nature remains identical, even in its relation with the things of the manifested world (उपाधियोगादपि). An object, Sankara remarks,[2] must have always *one* nature and one nature alone; it cannot

---

[1] "संघातव्यतिरिक्तस्य स्वतन्त्रस्य 'इच्छामात्रेनैव' मन-आदि प्रेषयितृत्वं—इत्यस्य प्रदर्शनाय 'केनेषितमित्यादि विशेषणद्वयमुपपद्यते"। And this purpose cannot be *resolved* into the activities of the organs, manas, body, etc. etc. किं यथा प्रसिद्धमेव कार्यकरण संघातस्य प्रेषयितृत्वं ?---इत्यादि"। Prán is the root cause of all kinds of activities and the Soul is the power *behind* this pran in activity. The source of all activities must itself be a Power. This Upanishad is invaluable, for it holds the Soul to be will-power.

[2] "एकस्य अनेक-स्वभावत्वानुपपत्तेः" (वे०भा०, 3. 2. 21).

"न तावत् स्वतएव परस्य ब्रह्मणः उभयलिङ्गत्व मुपपद्यते।...नहि उपाधियोगादपि अन्याद्दशस्य वस्तुनः अन्याद्दशः 'स्वभावः' सम्भवति" (वे० भा० 3. 2. 11).

POST GRADUATE COUNCIL IN ARTS

have more than one nature. Otherwise, it would be impossible to recognise the object. Brahma is always a unity and it does not vary in its relation to any place, time, object or circumstances.

The diversities of the changing náma-rupas (नाम-रूपs) which have evolved and are still continuously evolving point, Sankara observes, to something beyond, as their *cause*; they cannot but indicate the presence of some conditioning activity which must have produced them—

"शुङ्गमुत्पतितं नेदममूलं भविष्यतीति" (ऋ०, भा० quoted in वे० भा०, 4. 3. 14).

Again, these emerging changes point to some *final End* (उदर्क), towards which they are moving; they indicate the final stage, the complete realisation, of the purpose which has created them—

"उदर्कं तस्यैव जगन्मूलस्य 'विज्ञेयत्वं' [1] दर्शयति"।

It is thus that Sankara states here the fact that the created world—the emerging changes—always carry with them the idea of a purpose *as yet unrealised* [2]. The readers are requested to carefully mark the arguments employed by Sankara to establish this important position. He speaks of 'ज्ञेय' *i. e.*, Brahma (to be realised), as the *final end* of realisation—

"ज्ञानफलं भवति"।—

that is to say, Brahma is *completely* realised in the *final*

"उपाधिनिमित्तस्य च 'वस्तुधर्मत्वा'नुपपत्तेः" (वे० भा०, 3. 2. 15)

[1] The term विज्ञेय used here and elsewhere means the End (as contrasted with the *means*). It is explained in the Gita-bhasya thus—

"ज्ञेयमेव ज्ञातं सत् ज्ञानफलं (End) भवति" (गी०भा० 13. 17).

[2] "नैवमुत्पत्त्यादिश्रुतीनां निराकाङ्क्षार्थत्व-प्रतिपादनसामर्थ्यमस्ति" (वे०भा०, 4. 3. 14)

stage, and that is the final purpose or end of the created world. [1]

This truth is very distinctly explained in the Gita-bhasya—

" मया अध्यक्षत्वेन हेतुना चराचरंजगत्
विपरिवर्त्तते सर्व्वासु अवस्थासु "। (9. 10)

What do these emerging changes—परिवर्त्तनs—परिणामs of the world imply? Whatever has been manifested in the world—all its व्यवहारs, *i. e.*, all its states, activities, the objects, in fact, everything of the world—all these are for—

" आत्मावगत्यवसानार्थत्वात् सर्व्वव्यवहारस्य "...

i.e., " all these move towards the *final* realisation of the Atma. Brahma is the final End (अवसान), for the realisation of which, these changing manifestations are perpetually moving on. [2]

This is the purport, Sankara goes on to point out, of the creation mentioned in the Sruti-texts. When the

---

[1] *Vide* Gita-bhasya, 13. 17—" ज्ञेयमेव ज्ञातं सत् ज्ञानफलमिति 'ज्ञान-गम्य'मुच्यते "। Brahma is the फल, *i. e.*, the final End. Hence it is that in Vedanta, it is called as पर्य्यन्तं *i. e.*, the last or final End. " अवगति पर्य्यन्तं ज्ञान', नात:परं किंचित् ज्ञातव्यमस्ति "। When this End is realised, there remains no further end for realisation, and our desires and aspirations get their fulfilment (वे०भा० 1. 1. 1)। " नात:परं किंचित् आकाङ्क्षामस्ति " (2. 1. 14). It is the *goal* where our higher and higher aspirations are finally fulfilled.

[2] The same idea is expressed in " आत्मावगत्यवसानार्थत्वात् सर्व्वव्यवहारस्य " (गीता भा०, 18. 50). All our actions (प्रवृत्तय:) being परार्थ, they are for the realisation of the Power behind them—which is their अवसान, final End.

CENTRAL LIBRARY

final stage is reached, then and then alone the changing náma-rupas (नाम-रूपs) will reach the complete realisation of the purpose working behind them. Hence this आकाङ्क्षा *viz.*, this realisation of the final end or purpose is inherent —interwoven—into the structure of the created elements of the world. The creation is meant to show this important truth in the Sruti. It is *not* meant to show that the underlying 'Brahma is *identical* with the world, as if Brahma has no nature' of its own to realise.

We had occasion to point out above that in the Vedanta-System, we find mention of the four *typical* classes of Bijas (बीजs); and that these are characterised by growth and development, and this characteristic feature marks them out to be living individuals (जीवs).[1] In the Gita-bhasya, it is stated that they are continuous. This description of the Bijas (बीजs) clearly indicates that by them the different grades of finite individuals from the lowest to the highest are meant. Now, these continuously evolving higher and higher grades of the individuals are all interwoven in the Infinite Self (Brahma) which is always present behind them.[2] In the lower finite individuals, the Infinite is realised unconsciously.

---

[1] "बीजं प्ररोहकारणं प्ररोहधर्म्मिणां ।...नहि अबीजं किञ्चित् प्ररोहति । नित्यञ्च प्ररोहदर्शनात्, बीज-सन्तति र्न व्येति इति गम्यते" (गी०भा०, 9. 18)।

This term बीज is synonimous with the term भूत in the Gita; and the भूत are described as जीवाधिष्ठितानां in 10. 32. cf, "बीजं मां सर्व्वभूतानां" (7. 10). It is clear therefore that बीजs = भूतs = जीवs.

[2] "सर्व्वमिदं.....सर्व्वाणि भूतानि प्रोतमनुविद्ध मनुस्यूतं मयि परमेश्वरे" (गी०भा०, 7. 7)। *Cf* also: "सर्व्वे प्राणाः.....सर्व्व एते आत्मानः..... यस्मात् व्युच्चरन्ति...यदात्मकञ्चवर्त्तन्ते" (बृ०भा०, 2. 1. 20))। Also बृ०भा०, 2. 5. 15.

It is only in man that the Infinite is present and is being realised consciously.

According to Sankara then, this realisation of the Infinite in the world and in the finite human beings in higher and higher forms until the final stage is reached—is the purpose of the creation [1].

---

[1] Such is the 'nature' or स्वभाव of Brahma—..." स्वभावादेव सम्भवन्ति " (वे०भा०, 2. 1. 33-34)। " परिपूर्णशक्तिकन्तु ब्रह्म...अनपेक्ष्य बाह्यं साधनं...स्वयमेव परिणमते " (वे०भा०, 2. 1. 24)।

CHAPTER II

The Pure Ego as Active Power.

The view that the Ego is not active,—how arose ?

I. The individual ego as depicted in the Adwaita philosophy has given rise to several controversial points, as regards its nature and character, in certain quarters. Among other points, the most important controversy has gathered round the question of the 'activity' of the pure Ego. An idea prevails that in the Sankara system the Individual Ego, like Brahma, is merely an "abstract intelligence destitute of activity." How the idea arose we shall try to collate. It was found out from the Bhásya that Sankara has raised a clear voice of warning against ascribing the objective qualities to the subject; that as soon as it acquires an objective content, the "I" passes over into the *Me*. The Ego or subject is that through which we know all; it follows from this that it cannot itself become an object of knowledge. And because the self cannot be known, Sankara treats it as an "abstract concept, as pure knowledge or intelligence." This idea was strengthened and received an additional force when it was discovered that there were sentences in the Sankara-bhásya itself which unmistakably refused to allow 'agency' to the Pure Ego. Take for instance such sentences as the following :—

"न स्वाभाविकं कर्तृत्वं आत्मनः सम्भवति, अनिर्मोक्ष-
प्रसङ्गात्। कर्तृत्वस्वभावत्वे हि आत्मनो, न कर्तृत्वा-
न्निर्मोक्षः सम्भवति ; अग्नेरिव औष्ण्यात्"—

वेदा° भाष्य. 2. 3. 40.

i.e., The self cannot be an agent; it is not active. If there be agency in the nature of the self, it can never free itself from it—no more than the fire can free itself from its heat. The activity does not really belong to the self, and if we could only realise this, we gain a true conception of the individual self.

Now, the natural consequence of these discoveries in the Sankara-bhâsyas was not slow to make its appearance. The conclusion which the critics of the Sankara system drew from these, resolves itself into such train of thoughts as this :—

"The idea of intelligence dissociated from the idea of activity is an idea which passes from the subjective order to the objective order. The self thus conceived merges necessarily in the universal and it disappears into a panthiestic void..... We can only be sure of this pure Ego, not as an object, but as a subject *persistently active* so long as we have experience. But this activity Sankara denies to the self."

But the self which the critics of the Sankara-system has found out is not the true self at all according to Sankara as we shall presently see. Sankara is reluctant to call this a self at all; he rather wants to call it a non-Ego—अनात्मा[1]

Sankara not only refuses to allow *agency* to *this* self, but he has refused to allow it *knowledge* also. For, all the elements which constitute this self are not *free* in their activities; the next term being given by the preceeding

---

[1] "चलनात्मकस्य कर्म्मणः—अनात्मकर्त्तृकस्य—'अहं करोमी'ति प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात" (गी° भा°, 18. 66)। "देहादिसंघाते 'अहं' प्रत्ययो मिथ्या"...*Ibid.* It is called अनात्मा because it is the product of interaction with the non-Ego. "चलिक्रियातु प्राणस्यैव मन-आदिषु" (के° वा° भा, 1.1)।

which determines its action.[1] And the states constituting this self have borrowed their consciousness from the *true conscious self* which is present *behind* them.[2]

The empirical, actual self and the transcendental, true self : The transcendental self is the true 'agent.'

2. We propose in this chapter to consider carefully the view if in Sankara's system, he regards the Pure Ego merely as an "abstract intelligence," and whether it is active or not. It is needless to say that there is hardly any justification for this belief in the writings of Sankara himself. Let us now proceed to consider what evidence the Bhāsyas themselves offer which show that the individual Ego has ever been regarded by Sankara as "dissociated from activities."

The finite self is *ordinarily* regarded as a self-contained entity existing on its own account. It is merely a bundle of passive feelings and states, and possesses a fund of impulses and passions which constitute the source of its physical and mental movements or activities. It is continuous with, and a part of, the external nature which has equipped it with its organs of sense and the nervous system. When the organs of sense come in contact with the external environment (विषयेन्द्रिय-सम्पर्क), the latter elicits certain states and activities in the former, and these actions

---

[1] "विक्रियावती हि अन्यैः संहननं सम्भवति ; संहत्य वा 'कर्तृत्वं' स्यात्। न तु अविक्रियस्य आत्मनः केनचित् संहननमस्तीति, न सम्भूय 'कर्तृत्व'मुपपद्यते" (गी° भा°, 18. 17)।

[2] "अन्तर्गतेन नित्यविज्ञानस्वरूपेण···स चाद्यो बुद्ध्यात्मा अनित्यविज्ञान आत्मा अमुप्रपगतः" (केन भा°, 1.4)। "देहादिसंघातस्य शब्दादिस्वरूपत्वाविशेषात् विज्ञेयत्वाविशेषाच्च, न युक्तं 'विज्ञातृत्वं'। तस्मात् देहादिलक्षणान् विज्ञानस्वभावेन आत्मना 'विजानाति' (कठ° भा°, 4. 3)"।

and reactions constitute the self.[1] This is the actual empirical self. According to Sankara, it is not the real self; and he calls it—

" कर्त्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्व विशिष्ट जीव: "

and

" आत्मा अपरमार्थ: " ।[2]

The *agency* disclosed in its activities is not the true agency at all; for, all the elements constituting this agency (कर्त्तृत्व) determine, and are determined by, one another in an unbroken series of mechanical causality.[3] What this self does at the present moment is but the necessary outcome of his motive and character (प्रकृति) and habit formed in the past—

" एषणा...काम:, येन प्रयुक्त: अवश इव···बहिर्मुख:,
न स्वं लोकं प्रतिजानाति "

(ब्रह्म० भाष्य, 1.4.17) ।

---

[1] " श्रोत्रादीनि इन्द्रियाणि···मावा: । मावाणां स्पर्शा:—शब्दादिभि: संयोगा: । " (गी० भा०) । " विषयेन्द्रियोपाधि-सम्बन्ध-जनितेन अन्त:करणगता'भिव्यक्त-विशेष-विज्ञानेन' विज्ञानमयस्तां बुद्धिं व्याप्नोति" (ब्र० भा०, 2. 1. 17). " शब्देन विषयेण श्रोत्रमिन्द्रियं दोष्यते···गन्धादिभिरपि घ्राणादिषु अनुगृहीतेषु...मनसि...प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्त्यादयो भवन्ति " (ब्र०, 4.3.6) ।

[2] Sankara calls this self as " भूतमावासंसर्गजनित: " and " मनोमयादि-पञ्चकोषविशिष्ट: " । This is regarded by him as *passive* self, and the real self is what underlies it. " करणानि हि मन-आदीनि नियमेन प्रवर्त्तन्ते ; तत्, न असति चेतनावति अधिष्ठातरि उपपद्यते " (केन० वा० भा०, 1.1) ।

[3] " चक्षुरादीनि एव दर्शनादिक्रियाकर्त्तृणीति चेत् ? न । भिन्नकर्त्तृत्वे प्रतिसन्धानानुपपत्ति: । मनसोऽपि विषयत्वात् (ज्ञेयत्वात्), द्रष्टृत्वाद्यनुपपत्ति: ।... तस्मात् अन्त:स्थं 'व्यतिरिक्तं' ज्योति: (*i.e.*, true Átmá)" (ब्र० भा०) ।

i.e., he is a slave of impulses and instincts which move in him and sway him hither and thither; these impulses move him to act in the direction of their guidance. He has no eye to look to the *other path*.

This self is not free to choose the *end* of his life—

" पुरुषार्थसाधनप्रतिपत्तौ असामर्थ्यं परवशीकृतचित्तस्य " ।

(ब्र० भा०,

But, Brahma indwells and is revealed in man in the form of infinite " ज्ञानैश्वर्य " hidden in him—in the form of infinite ideals of truth, beauty and goodness.[1] These indwelling ज्ञानैश्वर्यs—these Ideals—are gradually being revealed in man in higher and higher forms and they are carrying the man to infinite possibilities in future. The infinite Brahma is thus immanent in man and it is for this presence that we do not feel content with our actual situation (विषय-विरक्ति) and seek higher and higher ends.

Brahma is revealed in man as infinite ideal—infinite ज्ञानैश्वर्य—and it is the moving power.

The ज्ञान-शक्ति-सौन्दर्य, etc., as we *actually* find them manifested in human nature are all imperfect, broken and fragmentary. But the ज्ञानैश्वर्य—which lies hidden deep behind in man is infinite and inexhaustible, and hence the two cannot be identified. Yet we identify the two, and the indwelling infinite ज्ञानैश्वर्य which constitutes the *real self* and which is the moving force within us becomes concealed, and the actual human nature as expressed in

---

[1] " जीवस्य ज्ञानैश्वर्य-तिरोभावः, देहेन्द्रिय मनोबुद्धिविषयवेदनायोगात् "

(वे० भा०, 3.2.6)?

" स्वरूपस्य अनपायित्वात्,···उपाधिकृतस्वरूप-तिरोभावात् " (वे० भा०,

CENTRAL LIBRARY

deeds and words is all-in-all to us, and future possibilities are shut out.[1]

But the pursuit of knowledge more and more, the quest of beauty in higher and higher forms which no finite objects can perfectly satisfy, our infinite capacity and work for higher and higher ends, our dissatisfaction with mundane goods—all these prove the presence of Brahma in us in a newer way, such that it was never present in the lower animals in the same manner. Sankara points out—

> "The supreme self is *revealed* in the spirit of man in a higher and superior form. It is for this presence that man ever wants to *know* more and more, and by mundane means ever to reach what is supra-mundane. By his higher and higher *works* and pursuits, he desires to realise higher and higher *ends*, until all his pursuits are directed to the realisation of the Supreme End."

> "प्राधान्यात्। किं पुनः प्राधान्यं पुरुषे ?—कर्म्म-
> ज्ञानाधिकारः। पुरुष एव हि शक्तत्वात्, अर्थित्वात्,
> अपर्य्युदस्ताच्च—अर्थी, विद्वान्, समर्थः···
> पुरुषेत्वेव आविस्तरामात्मा। स हि प्रज्ञानेन
> सम्पन्नतमः विज्ञानं पश्यति श्वस्तनं···मर्त्तेन
> अमृतमीक्षति [2]। अथ इतरेषां पशूनां
> अशना-पिपासे एव अभिविज्ञानं"।—
> (तैत्ति० भाष्य, 2. 1.)

---

[1] No one of its *actual* expressions can fix the infinite *possibilities* of the self in a rigid form. The Gita has condemned the idea of fixing or identifying the infinite possibility with actual expressions—as—
तामसिक। "यत्ज्ञानं कृत्स्नवत्,···'एतावानेव आत्मा ईश्वरो वा नातः परमस्तीति'··· तामसानामेव ईदृशं ज्ञानं दृश्यते" (गी०, 18-22).

[2] The implication of the term श्वस्तनं is that you cannot keep a man satisfied with the knowledge of *to-day*, he will seek the knowledge of *to-morrow* and so on. मर्त्त्येन अमृतं—implies, he will seek the supra-mundane End, through the mundane means;—you cannot keep him content with what is mundane only. We have translated the passage accordingly.

Then again—

"पूर्व्व-पूर्व्व-प्रवृत्तिनिरोधेन, उत्तरोत्तरापूर्व्व-
प्रवृत्तिजननस्य प्रत्यगात्माभिमुख्येन प्रवृत्त्युत्पादनार्थत्वात्"।—
(गी० भाष्य, 18. 66).

And he further adds that—

"to other animals, their knowledge and action are limited to present eating and enjoyment."

Brahma thus indwells in us as Ideal or End, and this End is the 'higher self'—the real 'nature' of man. This 'nature' underlies all his manifested states and activities. This End or Purpose lying hidden in man carries the man to infinite possibilities in future. To quote a typical illustration from the Vedanta—

As मृत्तिका (a clod of earth) moves to realise its future ideal घट (the earthen jar), which lies hidden in its nature; so the ideal which is inherent in man's nature gradually works out its end;—

this end is thus the moving force or the *real agent* in man—

"सर्व्वप्रवृत्तीनामात्मावगत्यवसानार्थत्वात्"[1]

i.e., the realisation of Brahma in our self—the ब्रह्मात्मैकत्व—is the पुरुषार्थ or the final end of our life.

Now, this 'higher self' or the End is our real self-lying behind our states and activities. It is present as Purposive

---

[1] *Cf.* also,—"अन्त्यमिदं प्रमाणं.....नातः परं किंचित् 'आकाङ्क्ष' मस्ति"
(वे० भा०, 2.1.14).

"ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः, 'अवगतिपर्य्यन्तं' ज्ञानं" (1.1.1).

"नहि एकत्वाद्यवगतौ सत्यां.....पुरुषार्थसमाप्तिर्बुद्धौत्पन्ने:" (4.3.14).

This is called 'पर्य्यन्त' *i.e.*, the final End. "ज्ञेयमेव ज्ञानं सत् 'ज्ञानफलं' भवति" (गी० भा०)।

Power or End of our life.[1] It is not a slave like the empirical self, but is the true determining agent. It is not in time-series, but above it. It can introduce a new elament or a difference in the time-series. Its actions are not determined by antecedents in time. It can direct the natural courses of the functions of its organs and lead them to the realisation of its own 'purpose'—

"स्वाभाविकात् कार्य्यकरणप्रवृत्तिगोचरात्
विमुखीकृत्य, प्रत्यगात्मस्रोतस्त्वया प्रवर्त्तयति"।
(वेदा० भाष्य, 1.1.4)।

"काय-करण-संघातस्य स्वभावेन सर्व्वतः
प्रवृत्तस्य—सन्मार्गे एव निरोधः"।
(गी० भा०, 13.7)।

Distinction between स्वार्थ and परार्थ—between self and not-self. Every individual is a स्वार्थ or a 'purpose' or End.

Here in this connection, we should like to invite our readers' attention to an invaluable opinion of Sankara which occurs frequently in his Bhásyas. We mean how Sankara has drawn out the distinction between the respective characteristics of the sentient self (चेतन) and the insentient elements of nature (अचेतन). The readers would do well to bear these characteristic features carefully in their minds. Sankara has characterised the चेतन or the Self as स्वार्थ (*swártha*), that is to say—it exists *for itself* and it has the *purpose* or the reason of its existence in itself. The चेतन is always described as स्वत सिद्ध or नित्यसिद्ध,—*i.e.*, it is self-existent and self-sufficient and does not depend for its existence on any other thing. In

---

[1] These states and activities cannot *really conceal* it.
"संघातव्यतिरिक्तस्य स्वतन्त्रस्य इच्छामात्रेण व मन-आदिप्रेषयितृत्वं...संहतानां परार्थत्वात्" (केन भाष्य, 1.2)।

contrast with this characteristic mark of the चेतन, he has called the अचेतन or the insentient elements as परार्थ (*Parártha*),—*i.e.*, existing and working *for something else* which is distinct from them in its nature; or in other words, which work and exist for the good of something *other than* these elements. Sankara has pointed out the fact that the अचेतन has no purpose of its own—

"अचेतने स्वार्थानुपपत्तेः।"

He has thus described the nature of 'purpose' inherent in Brahma's nature—

"स्वात्मनोऽनन्याः कामा"।[1]

i.e., Brahma is *purpose* itself.

As *our* desires and purposes are dependent on their stimulating causes beyond them; as these, when elicited, control us;—such, he says, is not the *purpose* of Brahma, which is अनन्य (*ananya*) to its nature, *i.e.*, not distinct or separate from the nature of Brahma. And this purpose is entirely dependent on Brahma, and it is Brahma which directs or controls it.

Now, the manifested nature and its elements, being परार्थ, are not self-sufficient and independent at all, but are constantly dependent on the sentient self whose purpose they serve. They have only an instrumental value;—they are mere means or medium through which the purpose of the self is realised. If you deny this, "what are really

---

[1] "यथा अन्यान् परवशीकृत्य कामादयः प्रवर्त्तयन्ति, न तथा ब्रह्मणः प्रवर्त्तकाः कामाः। कथं तर्हि? सत्यज्ञानलक्षणाः, स्वात्मभूतत्वादिग्रहाः।...यथा अन्येषामनात्मभूताः...निमित्तापेक्षाः...स्वात्मव्यतिरिक्ताः...साधनान्तरापेक्षाश्च, न तथा ब्रह्मणः। किं तर्हि? स्वात्मनोऽनन्याः" (तै० भाष्य, 2.6)।

Thus the *Purpose* is no other than Brahma's 'nature' itself.

परार्थ in their nature would themselves become स्वार्थ and would be meaningless "—

"स्वार्था: सर्व्वा: प्रवृत्तय: व्यर्था: प्रसज्येरन्"

(गी० भा०, 18. 50).

"Pleasure and pain and the like would, in that case, work and exist for the sake of pleasure and pain and the like"—

"न च देहाद्यचेतनार्थत्वं शक्यं कल्पयितुं।
न च सुखार्थं सुखं, दुःखार्थं वा दुःखं"।

From these observations of Sankara, it irresistibly follows that the world and the differentiations working in the world are merely to be regarded as a means or medii or instruments for the realisation of the purpose of Brahma; that His purpose is realising itself gradually through the differences or stages of nature. All the elements within the organisms also exist and work together for the realisation of the purpose of the self which controls them.[1]

The important truth just noted may also be gathered from Sankara's comment on the Vedanta-sutra (4. 3. 14). In this commentary, Sankara shows Brahma to be the supreme goal or end. When this goal is reached, all desires are satisfied and no further desire arises beyond this—

"न भूय: काचित् आकाङ्क्षा उपजायते,
पुरुषार्थसमाप्ति-बुद्ध्युत्पत्ते:"।

---

[1] We invite our reader's attention to the Bhásya on the Kena-Upanishad, Sloka 1. Sankara here distinctly calls the real self as Purpose or End or Ideal which directs our impulses, organs, *manas*, etc., etc., for the realisation of itself "स्वतन्त्रस्य इच्छामावेशेन मन-आदि-प्रेषयितृत्वं—इत्यादि"। Throughout this Upanishad and its Bhásya, this self is described and proved as प्रेरयिता, *i.e.*, a directive or purposive Power. "सर्व्वं हि कार्य्यकरणजातं 'पारार्थ्येन' संहतं नामरूपात्मकमेतावदेव" (प्र०भा०, 4.8).

Here, in Brahma,—the *end* of human life gets its final satisfaction. Thus the चेतन ब्रह्म and the human self are both called Purpose or End.

But he observes in the same commentary that it is otherwise with the created world—

" नैवमुत्पत्त्यादिश्रुतीनां निराकाङ्क्षत्व—
प्रतिपादनसामर्थ्यमस्ति "

that is to say, the idea of End, the idea of final realisation —is not to be met with *within* the sphere of nature and its elements. For, this idea lies *beyond* them. As nature is progressively moving to the final goal which lies *beyond* it, no one of its elements can give you the *final* satisfaction. This remark implies that nature is परार्थ (*parártha*)—a *means* for the realisation of the final goal or end ; for, it gives rise to the idea of something whch lies as its *source* and which, also lies as its final *goal* to which it is moving.[1]

The above discussion clearly brings home to our mind the fact that in as much as the self is held by Sankara to be purposive Power (स्वार्थ), and all other objects and elements besides the self are regarded a means (परार्थ) for the realisation of the purpose of the self, it follows that we must *use* the actions of our organs, passions, impulses in a way that our highest purpose may be realised through them.[2] It is therefore the *true agent.*

---

[1] " नैवमुत्पत्त्यादिश्रुतीनां नैराकाङ्क्ष-प्रतिपादनसामर्थ्यमस्ति। तथाहि... नेदममूलं भविष्यति इति उपन्यस्य, उदकें सतएव एकस्य जगन्मूलस्य 'विज्ञेयत्व" दर्शयति" (वे० भा०, 4. 3. 14) | *i.e.*, The manifested or created elements invariably involve the idea of a Purpose or End (विज्ञेयत्वं) *beyond* them, which has not been realised *as yet.*

[2] " आत्मनोऽपकारकस्य कार्य-करण-संघातस्य, स्वभावेन सर्वतः प्रवृत्तस्य— सन्मार्गे एव नियोगः" (गी० भा० 13.7).

Every individual possesses a 'nature' (स्वरूप) of its own. Contrast between this nature and its states and activities.

3. To every careful reader of the Commentaries of Sankara one fact cannot fail to stand out prominently. We mean the fact that a finite individual, be it a thing or a self, possesses a distinct 'nature' of its own. It is impossible for an attentive reader to escape this fact. This *nature* Sankara holds to be permanent or नित्य in the sense that it maintains its unity and preserves its identity in the successive changes of its manifested states and activities which it underlies. This nature, Sankara is careful to point out, is not at all dependent on anything beyond, or external to it; neither is it produced, like its states or activities, by an external stimulus or the environment with which it is put into relation.[1] It not only retains its unity in its changing states, it continues to live in each of its successive states evoked from it. But such is not the case with its states and activities. These are transient and impermanent; these are produced on the occasion of the action of the environment.[2] But they are not produced out of nothing असत्; there must be something underlying them, out of which they are produced or manifested.[3] This underlying *nature* is called by Sankara

---

[1] "नहि सोऽस्ति लोके परमार्थतः, योनिमित्तवशात्भावान्तरमापद्यते, नित्यश्चेति। न च पारमार्थिकं वस्तु कर्त्तुं निवर्त्तयितुं वा शक्यते" (ब्र० भा०, 1.4.13)। "नहि अग्नेः उष्णत्वाभाव्यं अन्यनिमित्तं, उदकस्य वा शैत्यं"। "अविक्रियत्वात् नित्यः...अकर्तृसम्बन्धी" (4. 4. 23)--इत्यादि।

[2] "यत् कदाचित् अभिव्यज्यते...अनात्मभूतं तदिति, अन्यतोऽभिव्यक्ति-प्रसङ्गः; तथाच अभिव्यक्ति-साधनापेक्षता।...इदन्तु आत्मभूतमेव....नित्याभिव्यक्तत्वात" (ब्र० भा०, 4. 4. 3)। "नहि यस्य यः 'स्वभावो' निश्चितः, स तं व्यभिचरति कदाचिदपि" (2. 1. 15)।

[3] "उत्पत्तिश्च नाम क्रिया, सा सकर्तृकैव भवितुमर्हति, गत्यादिवत्। क्रिया च नाम स्यात्, अकर्तृका चेति विप्रतिषिध्येत" (वे० भा०, 2. 1. 18)।

स्वरुप (swarupa) or धर्म्म (Dharma) or स्वभाव (Swa-vába). Sometimes the word सामान्य (Sámánya) is used to denote this nature. Throughout his system, the term कारण or cause invariably refers to this nature. As it transcends its states, it is sometimes called कूटस्थ (Kutas-tha).

Here is how he describes this nature, and contrasts it with its states :—

> "The Real in a thing is that which does not depend on any other thing and which is permanent. It does not change its character under any circumstances but maintains it. What appears or is produced by an external operative cause and is thus dependent on it is not the *nature* of the thing"—

"द्रव्यस्य हि तत्त्वमविक्रिया—परानपेक्षत्वात्। विक्रिया न तत्त्वं—परापेक्षत्वात्। न हि कारकापेक्षं वस्तुनस्तत्त्वं। सतो विशेषः—कारकापेक्षः; विशेषस्य—विक्रिया। यद्धि यस्य नान्यापेक्षं स्वरूपं, तत् तस्य तत्त्वं। यदन्यापेक्षं, न तत्तत्त्वं, अन्याभावे अभावात्[1]। तस्मात् 'स्वाभाविकत्वात्' .....सुषुप्ते न विशेषः"—

(तैत्ति० भाष्य, 2. 8).

---

[1] In the Gita-bhasya, Sankara employs similar argument, and uses the term सत् (sat) for the "nature" or स्वरूप, and असत् (ashat) for the changing states. "यद्विषया बुद्धिर्न व्यभिचरति, तत्—'सत्'। यद्विषया व्यभिचरति, तत्—'असत्'—इत्यादि (गी० भा,० 2. 16).

"न तु पुनः पदार्थाः...देशान्तरे कालान्तरे वा स्वं स्वं स्वभावं जहति" (केन० भा०, 3. 12). "स्वाभाविको द्रव्यस्वभावत एव सिद्धा..स्यापि न कालान्तरे व्यभिचरति देशान्तरे वा।" (मा० का० भा०, 4. 9).

Sankara's elaborate discussions in his Vedanta-bhásya (2.1) on the relation between the cause and its effects brings into prominence these important truths. The कारण or the *nature* of the individual things or beings maintains its identity and continues to live in their successive effects brought about by the action of the external stimulus (कारक-व्यापार). These effects or states or activities do not touch or affect the nature of the cause—

"अवस्थात्रय-साक्षी एकः अव्यभिचारी,
अवस्थात्रयेण व्यभिचारिणा न संस्पृश्यते"।
(वेदा०भाष्य, 2. 1. 2.)।

The underlying 'nature' cannot be resolved into its activities.

The changing states or activities cannot, Sankara takes particular care to observe, constitute the 'nature' of things. For, these are always changing and transient, but the underlying nature is not liable to change.[1] Among other arguments used by Sankara to prove this nature, the following may be specially noted here. Sankara points out—

> Every individual object, every individual self, exists *for itself*, as well as *for others* (स्वरूप and सम्बन्धि-रूप). In other words, each individual has a substantive and adjectival

---

[1] "स्वभावश्चेत् क्रिया स्यात्, अनिर्मोचित एव स्यात्; न तु स्वभावः; अतो विमोक्ष उपपद्यते" (ब्र० भा०, 4. 3. 15)।

"न च स्वाभाविकोधर्म्म एव नास्ति पदार्थानां इति शक्यं वक्तुं...न च स्वभावात् अन्यत् नित्यं कल्पयितुं शक्यं"। "न हि क्रियानिष्टत्तः अर्थः नित्योदृष्टः" (ब्र० भा०, 4. 4. 6).

"या प्रकृतिः – स्वभावः – तस्या अन्यथाभावोनास्ति। (सांख्यादिभि)र्वादिभिः तस्या अन्यथाभावः कल्प्यते – कारणमेव कार्य्याकारेण परिणमते इति" (मा० का० भा०, 4. 10-11.)।

existence. The one, Sankara observes, cannot be reduced into the other. But an individual, in order to exist for others, must first of all exist for itself. If an individual does not exist for itself—has no *nature* of its own—how can it come into relation with others and how can others elicit from it its states and activities? You cannot say that finite individuals exist only by reference to something beyond them. Things cannot be merely adjectival to one another. The same identical *Devadatta* (देवदत्त) comes to be designated differently in relation to different objects with which he comes into connection, but Devadatta does not, says Sankara, lose his own nature, does not abandon his identity, when he is thus designated differently.—

"एकस्यापि स्वरूप-बाह्यरूपापेक्षया अनेक-
शब्दप्रत्ययदर्शनात्। एकोऽपि सन् देवदत्तः,
स्वरूपं सम्बन्धि-रूपञ्च अपेक्ष्य, अनेक-
शब्दप्रत्ययभाक् भवति"————etc., etc.

(वेदा० भाष्य, 2. 2. 17.)

Making his position thus secure, Sankara now goes on to argue that the *nature* of the individual cannot be resolved into its states and activities, in as much as the nature maintains its identity and continuity in its changing and successive states and activities. He observes that—

"An individual, simply because a new difference has emerged,—certain particular states and

activities have been produced in it,—does not lose its own character and becomes something else."—

"न हि विशेषदर्शनमावेण वस्त्वन्यत्वं
भवति.....स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्"

(वेदा० भाष्य, 2. 18.)।

Elsewhere, he teaches that—

" You will never meet with any particular successive states which are not interwoven in and sustained by the underlying continuity of their real '*nature*'—

"सामान्याननुविद्धानां विशेषाणामदर्शनात्"

(ब्र० भा०)।

Yet, such is the perversity of the ordinary human mind that it forgets or ignores the presence and operation of the true self which underlies its successive states and takes the self to consist entirely in its mutually exclusive states and activities connected by a mechanical causal law. Sankara says that this is done by the influence of *avidya* or our natural ignorance. The aggregate of these states and activities is the empirical self of the ordinary ignorant people and this is the *only* self to them. This self is stated by Sankara as the—

"कर्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्व-विशिष्ट जीव"।

The *nature* or the underlying स्वरूप of the individuals, as we have shown above, is the *real* self and it is transcendental or कूटस्थ, to which its states and activities belong as to a centre. It is *free* in its activities, because it is *above* time and it has no antecedent in time to determine its actions. This *agency* is the true agency in the system

of Sankara. Out of its own resources which are inexhaustible, this real self can introduce an entirely new element in time, and it can chalk out a new path for itself, and initiate a new movement. Its vision is kept confined to its future infinite possibilities, and it is moving on and on in the direction of its Divine goal, for which reason it is called by Sankara as ब्रह्मात्मक (*i.e.*, it is *essentially* Brahma in its nature).

Wherever Sankara denies agency to the self, it is always the *passive* agency (if such term can be used) of the empirical self, because all its manifested activities are, as shown above, mechanically determined in an unbroken series in time. Sankara never denies anywhere the free active agency of the underlying real self.[1]

The underlying 'nature' is a seat of power.

(*a*) It is revealed in sensitive and intellectual activities.

4. We shall now proceed more particularly to show that Sankara regarded the real self as an *active power*, and its activity is "reflected in all our sensitive, ideational and in other aspects of our experience." The following discussion will bring out the two-fold sense, in the Sankar's system, in which the term 'agency' has been used, and will, we also hope, bring into prominence the fact that the Pure Ego is an active power, when it gains the perception of the external world.

---

[1] Sankara denies movement or change to the real self. He calls such activity as चलनात्मक *i.e.*, in which the sense-organs, body, *manas*, *budhi*, etc., etc., actually *move*. Such activity he keeps confined to the empirical self. "चलनात्मकस्य कर्मणः अनात्मकत्व-कस्य 'अहं करोमीति' प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात्" (गी० भा: 18.66). These movements he calls अनात्मा—Non-Ego, object. For, these are really *objects* to the true self which underlies these and connects these to itself as their 'subject.'

Sankara thus describes—

"Whenever *any* of our organs functions, there are always two kinds of *activities* simultaneously present there. Of these, the one is visible and the other invisible; one is transitory and dependent, and the other is permanent and independent; the one works in time, the other is beyond time. There are *two visions*—

"द्वे दृष्टी—दृष्टिरिति द्विविधा भवति,

लौकिकी, पारमार्थिकी च"——

The first kind is an action evoked in the mind through the affection of the organ of eye. This activity is transitory in its character; it appears, it disappears. It is a change produced, when the eye is stimulated into activity by an external object with which it has come into contact; and it vanishes when the contact ceases to operate. But underlying this activity here, there is an eternal and permanent vision of the self, and this vision or activity constitutes its real nature,—as heat and light constitute the nature of the fire. This vision of the self cannot be said to be produced, neither can it be said to be liable to disappear. The former vision of the eye, as soon as it is produced, is found to be invariably *permeated or pervaded* by the latter vision or the permanent activity of the self which is constantly present and operative behind it.[1] Thus the two kinds

[1] Cf. also: "लौकिक्या दृष्टेः कर्मभूतायाः द्रष्टारं स्वकीयया नित्यया दृष्ट्या व्याप्तारं न पश्ये?"—ब्र० भा०, 3.4.2.

"अयमपि आत्मा अविपरिलुप्तस्वभावया दृष्ट्या नित्यया दृष्टेति उच्यते... न तु आत्मनोऽन्यः दर्शन प्रकारोऽस्ति"—ब्र० भा०, 4.3.23.

of vision or activity appear *blended* together, and the ignorant unable to discriminate the one from the other, are liable to misrepresent the activity of the self as actually produced and as actually disappearing, with the appearance and disappearance of the changing activity of the eye. Hence, although the activity of the self is eternal and unchanging, it is held to be seeing when the vision of the eye is excited, and to be not seeing when the vision vanishes. This is also the case with the functions of the other organs of sense."

(*Brih. Bhasya, 3-4-2 and Ait. Bhasya*, 2).

Now, what do these remarks show? They unmistakably bring to light the important fact that in the perception of the external objects what really perceives is the true self and that it is this self which exhibits its real *agentship* (कर्तृत्व) in its activities of comparison, discrimination and assimilation. Sankara holds that there can be no perception of a definite object unless there is an active comparison of similars and dissimilars—

"निष्कृष्य समानासमानजातीयेभ्यो...'इदं तत्' इति निर्दिश्यते"—

(तैत्ति० भाष्य 2. 6.)

In the Brihadaranyaka and in the Vedanta Bhasyas also, Sankara thus briefly describes the activity of the underlying self in the act of perception :—

"I happen to receive two distinct kinds of sense-impressions when somebody touches me by his leg and next by his hand. There is as yet no discrimination, until the self energetically sets to work to compare one kind of sensation with the other, and

differentiate one from dissimilar other sensations. These activities of comparison, reflection, discrimination and assimilation are all operations of our intellect (बुद्धि) which is a mere *instrument* in the hands of the self ; for, all these activities are indeed my present changes ; but these activities *discover* or *reveal* the active self as the subject from whom they issue. An activity which distinguishes, an activity which carries the work of comparison and raises the sense-presentations to the level of *discriminative* consciousness cannot be a mere item of passive feelings. By these activities the Ego is *discovered* as the energetic *source* from which the actions issue—

"त्वङ्मात्रेण कुतो विवेक-प्रतिपत्तिः ?"

Then again, so long as the self does not direct its *attention* to the changes received, they can never become the *objects* of our knowledge. It is for this that Sankara remarks—

"अन्यचनना अभूवं, नापश्यम् etc. etc."

All these *reveal* the presence and operation of an *active* self underlying these feelings and activities, which maintains its identity in its constant movement [1] among similar and dissimilar elements, and to which both the past

---

[1] Cf. also : "चक्षुरादीनि एव दर्शनादिक्रियाकर्तृणीति चेत् ? न; भिन्नकर्तृकत्वे प्रतिसन्धानानुपपत्तेः। मनसोऽपि विषयत्वात् (ज्ञेयत्वात्) द्रष्टृत्वाद्यनुपपत्तिः। तस्मात् अन्तःस्थं व्यतिरिक्तं ज्योतिः'" (ब्र० भा०, 4.3.2. etc.)

CENTRAL LIBRARY

and the present belong. We find Sankara remarking—

"नहि अन्यदृष्टं अन्यः स्मरति, प्रतिसन्धाति
वा"। "तेनेदं सदृशं—तेनेति दृष्ट-स्मरणं
——इति द्वयायत्तत्वात् सादृश्यस्य·····
सदृशयो र्द्वयो र्वस्तुनोः ग्रहीतु रेकस्य
अभावात्, सादृश्यनिमित्तंप्रतिसन्धान मिति
मिथ्याप्रलाप एव स्यात्"

(वेदा० भाष्य, 2. 2. 25).

The *identity* of the self which persists through its changing states is implied in any exercise of memory. "To know a flower by scent, we must remember a prior experience of it and discriminate it from other appeals to the same sense."

"अहमदोऽद्राक्षं इदंपश्यामीति च,—
पूर्व्वोत्तरदर्शिनि एकस्मिन्नसति कथं
प्रत्यभिज्ञा-प्रत्ययःस्यात् ?"

These observations of Sankara prove that to him, the real character of the Pure Ego is not merely "a being," or "a knowledge"—but an "active power" and a *source* of activities. And this source cannot be phenomenalised; for, in its absence there would be no perception at all.

In connection with this subject, we crave our reader's indulgence for the liberty of quoting a few other passages bearing on this important point.

(b) It is revealed in ideational activites.

In the Gita (Chap. XIII, 12-13), Brahma's nature is described as neither *sat*, nor *asat*—apparently possessing no definite characteristics. Now, the question arises—Is *átmá* to be regarded, then, as a mere

nonentity, a non-existent something? For, if there is no positive mark to characterise its nature, it is as good as a non-existent *asat*. Now, we invite our reader's attention to the reply which Sankara suggests to this very pertinent question.—

> "No, you can not say that Ātmá is non-existent or *asat* (असत्). For, there are *indicative marks* by the help of which we are enabled to infer—we are assured of—its nature. What are these indications? To prevent the supposition that the Atmá (आत्मा) must be a mere void or non-entity (शून्य) the Gita proceeds to teach that the Ātmá exists as—(1) the inner self (प्रत्यगात्मा) and as—(2) the *source* of *all activities* of the senses and the like."

Sankara points out—

> "Krishna proves, by way of inference, the existence of Atmá as the inner self thus :—There must be self-conscious principle (power) behind the insentient elements *in activity*, such as the physical body and the senses; for, we invariably find self-conscious principle underlying all insentient objects *in activity*, such as carriage in motion. Hands, feet and the like constituting the limbs of all bodies in all places, *derive their activity* from the *energy inherent* in the knowable (आत्मा) and, as such, they are the marks of its existence and operation."[1]

---

[1] That which is the *source* of these activities must—itself be an *active power*. Sankara calls it प्रयोक्ता। "संहतानां श्रोत्रादीनां परार्थत्वादवगम्यते श्रोत्रादीनां प्रयोक्ता। "मनआदीनां च अचेतनानां प्रवृत्तिर्दृश्यते। तद्धि लिङ्गं चेतनावतोऽधिष्ठातुरस्तित्वे" (को० वा० भा०)

Sankara also says—that "the Atmá (आत्मा) reveals its nature through the *upādhis* (उपाधि) of external and internal senses, through the *functions* of all the senses, *viz.*' determination, thoughts, desires, hearing, speech, etc., etc., *i.e.*, the knowable (आत्मा) *functions as it were* through the functions of the senses. But does it *actually* function? The *Sruti* implies the knowable has the power to accommodate itself to the varying functions of all the senses.....not that it *actually possesses* swift motion and such other activities." This is shown also by Sankara elsewhere by his remarks—

"सत्तामात्र एव कर्तृत्वं, न तु व्यापृततया"।

It does not imply that the self is to be regarded as merely '*a being.*' It does not mean that the self is not a power. It simply implies that this power can not be phenomenalised or reduced to its manifested activities. This expression has been chosen to guard against the supposition that the self is subject or liable to transcient changes or विकारs, and to show that it is a निर्व्विकार power.[1] This power is constantly *present* and *operative* behind the activities, as their free active *source* or *seat*—of which these are but partial manifestations, and these manifestations can never exhaust this inexhaustible source. These manifested activities are the indicative marks of their underlying power. In the Cchandogya-bhasya, the nature of the self is actually called ''सामर्थ्य' or the source of power (8. 12. 4). And it is characterised as—

"करणव्यापरेषु अव्यापृतः, तद्विलक्षणः"

(गौ० भा०, 13. 22)

i.e., the source can not be resolved into the activities of the senses and the like, but is present and operative in and

[1] "विक्रियादिविशेषरहितस्य आत्मनो मन-आदि प्रवृत्तौ निमित्तत्वं"

(कैन० वा० भा०, 12.)।

through them, and is above them. This important truth is expressed in the Vedanta-bhásya by the expression—

"न कारणस्य कार्य्यात्मत्वं"

that is to say, the underlying power (cause) can not be reduced to, and identified with, its manifested, actual activities (effects), because this *source* is inexhaustible and, as such, no one of its manifestations can fix it in a rigid form and be regarded as final.

It is the influence of *Avidyā* alone which, as Sankara tells us, is responsible for this erroneous identification. If the cause can not be resolved into, or identified with, its effects; if the true *nature* of the individual self maintains its identity through its successive changes; if it is by *avidyā* that we confound the underlying unity with its multiple states and activities;—it follows, as the night follows the day, that all activities which we find in the phenomena must be traced to their underlying self or the unity—as their *source*. Had Sankara reduced, like the Pantheists, the Causal Reality into its successive activities and states, then of course, for the source of these activities we must seek the phenomena alone. But Sankara has repeatedly remarked that when an individual being or thing assumes different forms or phases in consequence of its connection with the things outside it, it does not lose its identity—it does not become something else entirely different from its own nature—

"नहि विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति

.....स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्"

(वेदा० भाष्य)।—

It still maintains its unity, preserves its identical nature in and through these successively changing phases or differences. We must therefore look for the *source* of all phenomenal activities, according to Sankara, to the

nature of the individual thing or the self which underlies these activities, and continues to operate through them unaffected by them.

(c) It is revealed in ethical and religious activities.

5. As in the intellectual, so also in our *moral* experience, the operations of an active underlying self can not be abolished or negated. We, here, briefly describe the Sankara's method in the selection of the ends in our moral sphere.

In the Katha-bhāsya, Sankara explains this method thus :—

> In his system, Brahma is both transcendent and immanent. If it be of purely transcendental nature, all possibility of comprehending Him would be shut out for man. He would be a remote and abstract being. But, fortunately, He is also immanent in nature and in man, and through this revelation, man can comprehend His 'nature' to a certain extent. Man seeks the realisation of the End inherent in his own nature. But if he seeks this end merely in the external mundane order, he will not find it there—
>
> "योहि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्त्तते पुरुषः, इष्टं मे
> भूयादनिष्टं मे माभूदिति ; न च तत्र आत्यन्तिकं
> पुरुषार्थं लभते" ।
>
> (वेदा० भा०, 1. 1. 4) ।—

For, outward nature, as it is, can not be regarded as complete and self-sufficient. The rational and ethical human being seems to be the goal of outward nature.

Sankara teaches—

> "विषयस्यैव.....स्वाभयाहकत्वेन
> संस्थानान्तरं करणं नाम"— (ब्रह्म० भा०, 2.4.11)

The outward nature has supplied man with his senses and the nervous system, by which he is put into relation with the world [1]. The more his organs and his mind are developed, he is able more and more to realise the grandeur of the universe. He must therefore seek his end within his own nature. The infinite Divine ज्ञानैश्वर्य (the Ideal of truth and beauty etc.) is revealed in man, and man is endowed with the capacity to realise it. But if man seeks the ज्ञानैश्वर्य as it is found *actually* present in the human beings, and regards this as the final end, he will be disappointed. For, the indwelling ज्ञानैश्वर्य, शक्ति-सौन्दर्य is transcendental and it cannot be identified with the actual ज्ञानैश्वर्य as is working in the human beings. He must therefore seek the अनन्त-शक्तिसौन्दर्य in the future possibilities of man. It is progressively revealing in man and will reach perfection in future.

> "Two Ends," Sankara writes,—"one mundane and the other transcendental—come to man indiscriminately for his choice. All men are propelled by these two goods according as one wishes for mundane prosperity, or the supreme happiness. These two are opposed and conflicting in their nature to each other. It is therefore not possible to be pursued by the same individual at the same moment. Among these, one who pursues the mundane good and regards this as the true end of his life, misses the true end of man. These two are not easily distinguishable by persons of poor intelligence

---

[1] "भूतानां शरीरात्मकत्वेन उपकारात्...तदन्तर्गतानां तेजोमयादीनां करणत्वेन उपकारात्" (ब्र० भा०, 2.5.1) "कार्यकरणैः सूर्तैः संश्लेषः मूर्तस्य; सतु क्रियाहेतुर्दृष्टः" (४।२ etc. etc. fis.) "संसर्गाभावे ह्यविशेषविज्ञानस्य अभावः" (वै०, 1.4.22.

and of irresolute mind. The truly wise man examines both the pleasant and the good—the mundane and the supra-mundane ends ;—as a flamingo separates milk and water, and having considered in his mind the relative weight of the two courses, divides them both and selects only the supreme end as preferable to the mundane ends. But the man of poor intelligence incapable of such discrimination, pursues the lower good, such as—cattle, sons, poistion, wealth etc., for the purpose of gratifying his pleasures of sense."

(Katha bhas.)

Here again, the discrimination between the higher and lower goods, comparison of the relative worth of the two courses, the rejection of the one and the selection of the other and pursuing of the same until the supreme end is perfectly realised—all these activities distincty *reveal* the presence and operation of an energetic self, not as a "mere being," or a "mere knowledge"—but as an active power.

In spite of such clear expression of his views, is it not doing a great injustice to the Sankara's system to hold that Sankar's pure Ego is not a persistent activity ? We shall further speak on this supreme end later on.

(d) It is revealed in the construction of plant organisms and animal organisms.

6. Plants and trees are looked upon in the school of Sankara as a kind of lower *organisms*. This school admits the existence and evolution of four kinds of organisms, viz. :—" स्वेदज, अण्डज, उद्भिज्ज and जरायुज " [1]

Now, within even the organism of the plants, says

[1] *i. e.* Those born in perspiration etc., that which is born from the egg, that which is born from seed or which shoots out; and that which is born from the womb.

Sankara, is the constant operation of an *active* self (जीव) and its *Power is to be inferred* from the incessant movement of the sap (रस) within the body (*i.e.* its plasticity), of the plants and from the gradual growth and development of the plant through its successive stages, till the full development of the tree is reached.[1]

Sankara in his commentary on the Chandogya Upanishad and in other places has distinctly expressed his views as to the impossibility of regarding any of the stages of the plant development as *separate* and selfsufficient (अन्य) from the process of development of the plant as a whole. The stage of sprout (अङ्कुरावस्था) is seen to arise after the destruction or disappearance of its antecedent stage, *viz.*, the stage of seed (बीजावस्था); but that does not, Sankara tells us, prove that non-existence or असत् is the cause of the sprout (अङ्कुर). The future possibility of the tree which is the *final end* [2] is present in its seed-stage and other subsequent stages and this it is which is the *real cause* which has successively operated in bringing the plant to its final stage or full development. In the Brihadaranyaka bhasya (1. 2. 1), he explains his theory of causality with the help of the illustration of मृत्तिका (a clod of earth) and its successive developments into

---

[1] "जीवेन च प्राणसंयुक्तेन अशितं पीतञ्च रसतां गतं जीवच्छरीरं वृक्षंच वर्द्धयत् रसरूपेण—जीवस्य सद्भावे लिङ्गं भवति।.....वृक्षस्य रससवण पोषणादिलिङ्गात् जीवत्त्वं.....चेतनावन्तः स्थावराः" (छा० भा०, 6.10.2) "यत्र रसस्तत्र चित्तमनुमीयते"—ऐत० आर०, अङ्कुरभाष्य।

[2] That it is present as a *future end* has been expressed by Sankara in the phrase—अनागतार्थि प्रवृत्तेश्च (ब्र० 1. 2. 1)। अर्थ is the end, towards which the अर्थी (*i.e.*, the causal substance, मृत्तिका in the present illustration) strives. For, the potter for the purpose of constructing घट, gave the मृत्तिका its successive shapes. [We shall further elaborate the idea in the next chapter].

घट (Jar). This is to be regarded as a typical illustration which holds good in all cases of causal development, in the light of the rules given in the Brahma-Sutras, II. 1. 14—20

"स्वेन भविष्यद्रूपेण घटो विद्यते" ।···
"घटस्य प्रागभाव इति, न घटस्वरूपमेव
प्रागुत्पत्तेर्नास्तीति" ।——
(ब्रह्म० भा०, 1. 2. 1).

In this way, the *end* is present in the cause from the very beginning and it is this end which gradually carries th real *nature* of the cause through its successive stages, until it is fully realised in the last stage. He says—

"असती अपि तया प्रवृत्तिर्न दृष्टा" ।——
(*Ibid*)

To realise this end or the *purpose*, the movement of the causal substance had begun in the past and this continues in the present, until it reaches its final realisation in future.[1]

If we keep this teaching before our view, we shall be able to comprehend the real significance of the fact as to why in Sankara's system, the effect or the end is stated to be अनन्य (*i.e.*, no other than) to its cause. To understand the true nature of the cause, we must see it realised successively through all its stages of manifestation up till the final stage, and no one of its stages can, therefore, be *separated* from it and regarded as something अन्य (*other than* that 'nature').

---

[1] *Cf.* "यथा कारणं ब्रह्म त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति, तथा कार्यमपि जगत् त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति। एकञ्च पुनः सत्त्वं" (वे० भा०, 2.1.15).

7. In the human organism also, in the similar manner, it is the self as an active power which, for the realisation of its *purpose* inherent in it (पारार्थ्येन निमित्तभूतेन), has built up the body. It has brought into being certain elements within it and combined and organised them in such a way that one and all co-operate to realise a common purpose—

(e) It is revealed in the construction of human organisms.

" ऐन्द्रियिकाश्चेष्टाः संहतैः कार्य्य-करणैः
निर्व्वर्त्त्यमानाः दृश्यन्ते । तच्च एकार्थवृत्तित्वेन
संहननं, नान्तरेण चेतनमसंहतं सम्भवति । "

(तैत्ति० भाष्य, 2.7).

In the Katha-bhasya, similar observations are found—

" ' स्वार्थेन ' असंहतेन परेण केनचित्
अप्रयुक्तं संहतानां (*i.e.*, परार्थानां)
अवस्थानं न दृष्टं ।
यस्य असंहतस्य 'अर्थे' प्राणापानादिः
सर्व्वं व्यापारं कुर्व्वन् वर्त्तते,
संहतः सन्, स ततोऽन्यः । " [1]

(कठ०, 5. 5).——

that is to say,—the self which is स्वार्थ (self-existing and self-working and having the 'reason' or 'purpose' of its being in itself) and which is अन्य (*i.e.*, which transcends) to these elements,—has combined them with a view to realise its own purpose through them, and thus the organism has been built up.—

The elements and the senses (and their activities) are called परार्थ, because these are the means or media or mere

---

[1] The terms स्वार्थ (Swartha) and परार्थ (Parartha) have been explained before, in the beginning of this chapter. Sankara has laid

instruments through which the purpose of the self is realised.

"देहेन्द्रियादीनां यत् स्वरूपधारणं.....
पारार्थ्येन निमित्तभूतेन...तत् चेतन्यात्मकृतमेव।"
(गी० भा० 13.22.)

पारार्थ्य is the निमित्त here ; that is to say, the realisation of its final end is the निमित्त or the impelling *occasion*, and the building up of the body and its successive developments are चैतन्यात्मकृतमेव, *i.e.*, are brought about by the *agentship* of the self.

Can a clearer exposition of the theory go further ? That the self is an active power is thus everywhere shown by Sankara.

Brahma—a seat of power revealed as prime-mover of Prana, in which it is realised *to be*.

8. In the Vedanta-Sutras and in the Upanishads, Brahma is described as प्राणस्य प्राणः (*i. e.*, it is the Prāna of the prāna). That is to say,—Brahma is the underlying power of Prána (प्राण), it is the controlling and directing power which underlies the Prāna Sakti (प्राणशक्ति). This Prāna-Sakti (प्राणशक्ति) in the Sankara's system, has been held to be the first manifestation of Brahma's nature. Held by the underlying power and sustained by it, this Prāna has differentiated itself into the form of the objects of the world and this differentiation is always going on. Brahma, in the Sankara's system, is not a characterless being ; it has a distinct *nature*, a character, a स्वरूप (swarupa), स्वभाव (swavāba) of its own, and this nature underlies the differentiations of

---

down this as a general rule that wherever there is a combination and combined activity, there must be an underlying power which has combined the elements for the realisation of its purpose. "स्वार्थेन असंहतेन परेण कैनचित् अप्रयुक्तं संहतानामवस्थानं न दृष्टं" (कठ० भाष्य)।

the Prān-Sakti (प्राणशक्ति), untouched and *unaffected* by them—

" नामरूपाभ्यामसंस्पृष्टं," " नामरूपाभ्यामन्यः,"

" नामरूपाभ्यांविलक्षणं . . . तथापि तयोर्निर्वोढृ "—

all these refer to the same truth.

As Brahma is both a transcendental and immanental principle, it is revealed in the world as the differentiations of Prān, but still it is not *identified* with them but maintains its own unity or its own nature in them. This has been beautifully expressed in a passage in the Ishā-bhasya-

> 'Held and sustained by the underlying Brahma—a चेतन power—the *Prān* has differentiated itself—externally as the activities of heat, light and exhibited by the objects—the sun, the fire, etc., and internally as the physical and mental activities of the sentient beings.'[1]

Elsewhere, the underlying principle of *Prān* is called Antarjāmi (अन्तर्यामी) *i. e.*, the sustaining power which controls and directs the Prān-Sakti and its differentiations.

In the Vedanta bhāsya, one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Atmā is stated as प्राणचेष्टा, *i. e.*, the control and direction of the Prān, or which sets Prān to work.[2]

---

1 " तस्मिन्नात्मतत्त्वे नित्यचैतन्यस्वभावे (स्वयमविक्रियमेव यत्), मातरिश्वा . . . . यदाश्रयाणि कार्य्य-करण जातानि . . . . यत्सूत्र संज्ञकं . . . प्राणिनां चेष्टालक्षणानि, अग्न्यादि-पर्ज्जन्यादीनां ज्वलनदहनाभिवर्षणादि-लक्षणानि विभजति। सर्व्वाहि कार्य्य-करणविक्रिया, नित्यचैतन्यात्मस्वरूपे सर्व्वास्यदभूते सत्येव भवन्ति।"

"मत्तएव विक्रियारूपं सर्व्वंजगत् प्रवर्त्तते" (गी०भा०, 10, 8)।

2 "'निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं एकमद्वयं . , . . सर्व्वसाधारणाव्याकृत-जगद्बीज-' प्रवर्त्तकं ' नियन्तृत्वात् अन्तर्यामि-संज्ञं भवति" (ऐ०भा०, 3. 3.)। " द्यावापृथिव्यौ

It is difficult to understand how the charge of "Pantheism" could be brought upon the theory of Sankara and how Brahma could be regarded as a "Pantheistic void." In various places of his commentary—both on the Vedanta—Sutras and on the Upanishads, Sankara has criticised the theory of Pantheism held by one Vrittikára and his own theory stands as a monumental refutation of that Pantheism.

Vrittikára reduced the unity entirely into the differentiations of nāma-rupa (नाम-रूप). Sankara argues that when the differences emerge, the underlying unity does not become reduced into them. The unity does not, as the nāma-rupas arise—as the differentiations emerge—become something else, losing its own nature in them—

"न हि विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण वस्त्वन्यत्वं
भवति . . . . स एवैति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ।"

It retains its unity, its own character, behind these differences. In criticising the Vrittikára's view he shows that when the unity is thought to be entirely reduced to multiplicity, the former cannot retain its distinct character; for it is now to be found present in the form of many. Hence, he argues, both the unity and the multiplicity cannot be held to be real in this view. If 'one' is real, 'many' must be false and if 'many' be real, the 'unity' must be false.

But in Sankara's own Theory, no such faults can ever arise. The underlying unity is real and it retains its

---

. . . . एतस्य अक्षरस्य प्रशासने . . विधृते तिष्ठतः . . . तस्मात् सिद्धमस्य अस्तित्वमक्षरस्य । अन्यभिचारिहि तल्लिङ्गं, यद्द्यावापृथिव्यौ नियते वर्त्तेते ; चेतनावत्तं प्रशासितारमन्तरेण नैतत्युक्तं " (ब्र०भा०, 3. 8. 9.) । 'तत्कृतंहि प्राधस्य, प्राक्तनसामर्थ्यं " (के०भा०, 1.2.) ।

distinct nature *in* the differences which emerge out of it. The differences are *stages*, in and through which, that nature gradually realises itself. The emergent differences or changes (विकारs) are not therefore something *different* from it; for, they cannot be separated from it and regarded as if they are independent 'things'—existing on their own account.—

" न हि 'वस्तुतन्त्रेन' विकारीनाम कश्चिदस्ति "

(वेदा० भा०, 2.1.14.)

Sankara remarks in the Chhándogya-bhásya that the *Naiyayikas* regard the changes or differences which emerge successively, as so many 'independent things' complete in themselves.[1] But it is not the correct view of the case. The changes are all interwoven into the underlying unity which realises itself in them—

" सामान्य हि विशेषान् आत्मस्वरूप-प्रदानेन
विभर्त्ति।—— सामान्याननुविद्धानां विशेषाणां
अदर्शनात्।" (छ० भा०, 1·6·1.)

i.e., each change or विशेष is 'woven' into the *Sámánya*, *i.e.*, the underlying unity which pervades them all and works in them all.—

" चैतन्यान्यतिरेकेणैव हि कला: जायमाना-
स्तिष्ठन्त्य: सर्व्वदा लक्ष्यन्ते "। (प्रश्न०भा०)।

The underlying cause is revealing itself, is making itself *to be*—in the successive changes.

Sankara's other remarks on this point are of supreme importance and we desire to briefly state them here.

---

[1] " यथा सतोऽन्यदस्वतन्त्रं परिकल्प्य, पुनस्तस्यैव प्रागुत्पत्तेः असत्वं प्रध्वंसाच्च ऊर्द्धं असत्वं ब्रुवते तार्किकाः, न तथा अस्माभिः "—इत्यादि।—(छा०भा०, 6.2.2)।

CENTRAL LIBRARY

Empirical resolution of this Power impossible.

Relation between 'one' and 'many.'

Individuals can not be absorbed as *parts* in the whole.

The changes, he says, which will appear in the future stages—the changes that are *to be*—are not unreal or असत् (*asat*). They exist in the cause as *future ends*—

"स्वेन भविष्यद्रूपेण घटीवर्त्तते"
(बृ० भा०, 1.2.1.)

The change is a *relation* between two terms. In order to be related, the two terms of the relation must be *real*. The change is therefore a relation between something present and something future, *i.e.*, which is going *to be*. If you say the *future* is unreal, is nothing,—then the *Cause* or Brahma would itself become unreal.[1] The future (घट) therefore operates in the present (*i.e.*, in the मृत्तिका); and the present becomes thus connected with the future. Hence, the cause is really the future End or Power which is realising itself in all the changes. It is therefore this power which underlies, and works in, all changes. It gives continuity to them and is above them all. It is realising itself through all successive changes which cannot, therefore, be separated from it.[2] Sankara illustrates this idea thus—

"As a player, taking on successive
characters upon himself, enacts
on the stage the parts of each of these

---

[1] In the Mándukya, 6, Sankara says—

"यदि हि असतामेव जन्मस्यात्, ब्रह्मणो ग्रहणद्वाराभावात् असत्व-प्रसङ्गः।"
Ánanda-giri elaborates the passage thus—"द्वयायत्वत्वात् सम्बन्धस्य। कार्येण हि लिङ्गेन कारणब्रह्मज्ञानार्थं सृष्टिश्रुतीनां। तच्चेदसद्भवेत्, न तेन तस्य कारण-सम्बन्धधीरिति असदेव कारणमपि स्यात्।"

[2] Sankara has noted that the changes cannot be *separated* from the underlying cause, nor can they be separated from one another as

characters in succession, but yet
retains his *own distinct* character;
so the underlying causal unity,
retaining its own distinct identity,
realises itself successively in each
of the changes produced." [1]

That neither Brahma, nor the individual pure self—is mere *abstraction*, the following criticism by Sankara of the Pantheistic view held by the Vrittikára will, we hope, conclusively prove. Sankara criticises the view in this strain :—

(*a*) "If 'one' is changed to 'many' *both* cannot be real. But as you hold both of them to be real, there is mutual contradiction, there is—

"विरुद्धधर्म्म समवायित्वं ;
एकस्यैवात्मन: अशनायाद्यतीतत्वं,
तदत्त्वञ्च"———— (ब्र० भा०, 3.5.1)।

that is to say,—one and the same self cannot be regarded as—possessed of qualities (many) and also devoid of all qualities (one). Yet such absurd supposition [2] would be the irresistible

---

independent 'things,' because the cause itself holds them all by its own power (स्वरूप) and realises itself in each of them successively. "आत्मस्वरूपप्रदानेन सामान्यं, विशेषान् धारयति" and "सामान्ये लब्धसत्ताकानामेव कर्म्मणा स्फुटीकरणं" (ब्र० and छा०)।

[1] "मूलकारणमेव आ—अन्त्यात्कार्य्यात्, तेन तेन कार्य्याकारेण, नटवत् सर्व्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते" (वे० भा०, 2.1.18)।

[2] "विशिष्टशक्तिमत्त्वप्रदर्शनं, विशेषप्रतिषेधस्य—इति विप्रतिषिद्धं" (गी० भा० 13.12) "नन् अनेकात्मकं ब्रह्म...यथा समुद्रात्मना एकत्वं, फेन-तरङ्गाद्यात्मना नानात्वं, अत: एकत्वं नानात्वञ्च—उभयमपि सत्यमेव ? नैवं स्यात् ;—(वे० भा०, 2.1.14.)

consequence of your theory—you who regard *both* to be real. But this absurdity does not at all touch our position, since the 'unity' we regard to be of one type, and 'many' to be of a different type." [1]

Then Sankara goes on to expose another absurdity of his opponent's pantheism. He points out—

(*b*) "If 'one' is changed to 'many,' then everything of the world would be equally divine and equally perfect. There would be *no distinction* between Brahma and Nature. Hence 'many' must be held to be unreal; since there is only one Reality. But in our case, 'many,' as such, cannot be unreal.[2] Because, these qualities (many) are the manifestations of the underlying

---

[1] "न मयेदं एकस्मिन् धर्म्मिनि अभिहितं। त्वयैव इदं विरुद्धधर्म्मत्वेन, एकं वस्तु परिगृहीतं भान्त्या; न तु मयोक्तं" (ब्रह्म० भा०, 2.4.13)। Sankara's reply is—the self is not really changed to its qualities or states. The states are elicited by the interaction of the self with the environment. The underlying real self maintains its unity in these states. Hence the self is distinct from its states and has a 'nature' of its own. "यद् यद् परः आत्मधर्म्मत्वेन अभ्युपगच्छति, तस्य नामरूपात्मकत्वाभ्युपगमात्; नामरूपाभ्याञ्च आत्मनोऽन्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्" (ब्र० भा०, 2.1.20)।

Hence both are of different types, of different levels.

[2] Cf. "नामरूपोपाध्यस्तित्वे, 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं' 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन' – इत्यादि श्रुतयो विरुध्येरन् इति चैत्? न; सलिलफेनह्रदादिदृष्टान्तैश्च परिहृतत्वात्, मृदादिदृष्टान्तैश्च"—इत्यादि (ब्र० भा०, 3.5.1)। *Cf.* "क्रिया-कारक-फलभेदस्य लोकप्रसिद्धस्य सत्यतामसत्यतां वा नाचष्टे, न च वारयति श्रुतिः" (2.1.20)

"यदि हि अद्वैतार्थत्वमेव आसां, ग्रामपशुस्वर्गाद्यर्थत्वं नास्तीति ग्रामपशुस्वर्गादयो न गृह्येरन्, गृह्यन्ते तु कर्म्मफलवैचित्र्यविशेषाः" (3.2.1)

'nature' of the self and they gradually reveal that nature.[1] When erroneously *separated* from the underlying self, they become *unreal*; but under no circumstances can these changes or differences remain *separated* from the self; because the self realises itself gradually through them."

Here is how Sankara has expressed this valuable fact—

(*I*) "The differentiations existing in the underlying self (Brahma) unfold in all situations, without abandoning the nature of the self and without being *separated* or divided from Brahma either in space or in time."

(*II*) "All differentiations or states are produced from the self without being separated or detached from it, and they appear always being permeated by it."

(*III*) "All created beings—moveable and immoveable—have their source in Brahma; during their sustenance also they live in Brahma—as *apart* from the clay, the jar has no existence."

---

[1] This is the renowned 'Sat-karjya-bad' (सत्कार्य्यवाद) of the Vedanta Philosophy. The effects or changes produced—reveal the nature of the cause. In the Mándukya-bhásya Sankara has told us that it is the manifestations which throw light on that which is manifested. The nature of the underlying reality is to be read in the manifestations. If, therefore, what is revealed is taken to be *unreal*—non-existent—then it can come into no *relation* with the underlying Reality. For, to be related there must be two terms (इयायत्तत्वात् सम्बन्धस्य) which must be *both real* (न सदसतोरसतोर्वा). Otherwise, the

(*IV*) "A product is always seen to arise from its underlying cause not separated, detached or divided from it."[1]

Such, in fact, is the tenour of the criticism which runs in various parts of his commentaries by which Sankara seeks to deal a death blow to the doctrine of Pantheism.

Can a man, we submit, who has taken particular care to show that the created, emerging changes (विकारs) can never be *separated* from their underlying cause, and that the underlying cause also can never be resolved into these changes,—look upon the underlying Brahma, or the individual selves as '*mere abstractions*'?

Sankara has also clearly shown that the Individual selves cannot be mere *parts* (अवयव) of the all-inclusive *whole*; for, in that case, the whole, *i. e.*, Brahma would be affected by the pleasure, pain and other experiences of the *parts*, and the finite individuals will have to lose their own

---

causal Reality would, as आनन्दगिरि explains the idea, itself prove to be unreal, and thus Brahma would be an unreality. "कार्येन हि लिङ्गेन कारणब्रह्मज्ञानार्थत्वं सृष्टिश्रुतीनां। तच्चेदसद्भवेत्, न तेन कारणस्य सम्बन्धीरिति—असदेव कारणमपि स्यात्"।

For this, Sankara has said—"सतोर्हि द्वयोः सम्बन्धः, न सदसतोरसतोर्वा', (वे० 2.1.18).

Hence, the future effect (end) *exists* in the cause. In the theory of Sankara therefore,—'one' is not *reduced* into 'many,' but one *contains* many which cannot be *separated* from it. But 'many' is not something independent (अन्य), but is merely its revelations and hence 'many' is अनन्य to 'one,' *i.e.*, incorporated (अनुविद्ध or प्रोत) as its elements or expressions in the 'one.'

[1] (i) "यदा आत्मस्थे नाम-रूपे व्याक्रियेते, तदा नामरूपे आत्मस्वरूपापरित्यागेनैव, ब्रह्मणा अप्रविभक्तदेशकाले, सर्वावस्थासु व्याक्रियेते" (तै० भा०, 2, 6).

(ii) "चैतन्याव्यतिरेकेनैव हि कलाः जायमानाश्चिष्टन्यः प्रलीयमानाश्च सर्वदा लक्ष्यन्ते" (ब्र० भा०, 2. 6).

स्वरूपs, *i.e.*, 'natures'; and Brahma itself will have to come down here to become a mundane jiva (जीव).[1] Thus, the Pantheism would, says Sankara, land us upon such absurd difficulties.

Before we conclude this part of the subject, we should like to place on record here in this connection two other arguments found in the Vedanta-bhasya from which it would appear that the idea of absorption of the individuals (जीवs) in the Infinite whole and treating them as mere phases of that whole—was far from the mind of Sankara.

(*a*) We shall *first* invite our reader's attention to the passage where Sankara is considering the relation between the Infinite (ब्रह्म) and the finite individuals (जीवs). The relation is thus expressed—

"प्रतिषिध्यते एव तु परमार्थतः सर्व्वज्ञात् परमेश्वरात्
'अन्यो' द्रष्टा श्रोता वा।— परमेश्वरस्तु---
विज्ञानात्माख्यात् 'अन्यः'।" (वेदा० भाष्य० 1. 1. 17)।—

Sankara argues that the individual self (जीव) cannot be *separated* from the Infinite which is present in him, and treated as a self-contained, independent entity (अन्य). The individual *Jivas* are always to be regarded as अनन्य (really *not other than*) to the Infinite from which they have derived their knowledge, action, everything. Neither can they be

---

(iii) "स्थावरजङ्गमलक्षणाः सर्व्वाः प्रजाः न केवलं सन्मूला एव, इदानीमपि स्थितिकाले सदायतना एव। न हि सदमनाश्रित्य घटादेः सत्त्वं स्थितिर्वा अस्ति" (छा० भा०, 6. 8. 4).

(iv) "यस्य च यस्मादात्मलाभः भवति, स तेन अप्रविभक्तो दृष्टः, यथा घटादीनां मृदा" (बृह० भा०, 1. 6. 1).

[1] "अथ अनेकद्रव्यसमाहारस्य सावयवस्य परमात्मनः एकदेशविपरिणामो विज्ञानात्मा.....अथ नित्ययुतसिद्धावयवानुगतोऽवयवी परमात्मा, तस्यैव एकदेशो विज्ञानात्मा संसारी?—तदापि सर्व्वावयवानुगतोत्वात् अवयविनएव, अवयवगतो दोषो

taken as a *mere phase* of the Infinite, because the Infinite is (अन्य) to them ; *i. e.*, because the Infinite has a being of its own and is thus *distinguished* (अन्य) from the individuals. As Brahma is transcendent, there is no necessity for suppressing the individualities of any one of these.

(*b*) We shall now come to another passage where the individual Jivas are described as the "reflections" (आभास) of the true self behind them.

> "आभास एव चेष जीव: परस्यात्मन:, जलसूर्यकादिवत्।
> न स एव साक्षात्, नापि वस्त्वन्तरं"। (वेदा०, भा०, 2. 3. 50.)

We all know that the reflected image of the sun is bnt an imperfect and partial manifestation of the sun in the sky, of which—

> "it is a reflection. And the image shows that there is something behind it—the original sun in the sky—whose reflection it is. In this way, the actual individual *Jiva* is but a partial and imperfect [1]

गुणो वेति.....विज्ञानात्मन: दोषेण परमात्मा संबध्यते—इयमपि अनिष्टा कल्पना" (ब्रह्म० भा०, 2. 1. 20). Similar observations occur in the Gita-bhasya also सर्वेषु एतेषु पक्षेषु (जीवस्य).....'स्वरूप—नाशप्रसङ्ग:" (वेदा० भाष्य, 4 3. 14).

"यस्मात् परामार्थाकाशस्य घटाकाशो न विकार:, नापि अवयव:...तथा नैव आत्मन: परस्य महाकाशस्थानीयस्य घटाकाशस्थानीयो जीव:, यथोक्तदृष्टान्तवत्, न विकार: नापि अवयव:" (मा० का० भा०, 3, 7).

[1] *Cf.* "न केवलं अध्यात्मोपाधिपरिच्छिन्नस्य ब्रह्मणोरूपं त्व 'मत्थं'वेत्थ; यदपि—अधिदेवतोपाधिपरिच्छिन्नस्य अस्य ब्रह्मणोरूपं वेत्थ त्वं, तदपि नूनं 'दभ्र'मेव वेत्थ"।—केन० पद-भाष्य, 2, 1. *Cf.* also—"मन-उपाधिकत्वाद्धि मनस: संकल्पधृत्यादि-प्रत्ययै"रभिव्यज्यते ब्रह्म" (4.5).

revelation of the Infinite true self which is behind him. This Infinite cannot be reduced to the individual self, as the sun in the sky cannot be reduced to the reflected image. For this reason, Sankara says—

"न स एव साक्षात्, नापि वस्त्वन्तरं"।—

i. e. neither can the individual Jivas be *identified* with Brahma, nor can they be regarded as something *other than* Brahma.

CHAPTER III.

On the Falsity of the World.

I. A charge has often been brought against the Adwaita system of philosophy to the effect that in this school the world has been treated merely as an appearance and as an illusion; that the objective world, in this system, is an "unsubstantial pageant" having no "stuff of reality" in it. And this, they say, finds an appropriate and admirable support in the short but significant line of the old Vedantic Professor Gourapâda—

Contributory causes of the widely current opinion about the falsity of the world.

"ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या, जगद्ब्रह्मैव केवलम्"।

The current belief in this respect is that the Sankara's theory of Adwaitabad unmistakably teaches us the falsity of the world,—that Brahma being considered to be the only Reality, everything else we find in the world must needs be unreal and false. From a frequent use in the commentaries of Sankara, of the terms 'Mâyâ' and 'Avidyâ'—it has been hastily concluded that everything of the universe must be Mâyâ-maya—illusory. The employment of some similes, in the works of Sankara, such as the similes of the Juggler and his Jugglery, of the celestial city in the sky conjured up by a magician, of the desert and the mirage, and the like has lent no inconsiderable help in corroborating the idea thus formed

of the multiplicity (नानात्व) in the world as unreal and a mere appearance. It has not been felt advisable to carefully examine the terms and the contexts in connection with which they occur. No need has also been felt to scrutinise how Sankara himself has explained these terms and similes. Now, we feel it incumbent upon us to test the ground with caution, upon which such dogmatic assertion about the falsity of the world and its diversities of nâma-rupas (नाम-रूप) has been founded and to see also if the alleged unreality finds any real support from the writings of Sankara himself.

Three classes of objects: Analysis of their fundamental and distinctive features does not favour the idea of falsity.

2. Those who care to go through the commentaries of Sankara will find out that he has mentioned three distinct classes of objects, each possessing characteristic features which distinguish each class of objects from the other class. This important classification can be very easily gathered from various portions of his Bhâsyas and it has a most valuable bearing upon the question of the falsity of the world which has gained such a notorious currency in his name.

(*i*) The first class includes in it such objects as are generally known as—rabbit-horn (शश-विषाण); barren-woman's son (वन्ध्या-पुत्र); and sky-flower (आकाश-कुसुम)[1]—and the like.

We find Sankara employing the term *alika* (अलीक), *i.e.*, 'false,' 'non-existing,' and the general term *asat* (असत्), *i.e.*, 'unreal' in connection with these objects.

---

[1] These are all imaginary objects conjured up by diseased fancy.

(*ii*) The objects falling under the second class are generally known as such things as—रज्जु-सर्प (a rope appearing as a snake); शुक्ति-रजत (an oyster appearing as silver); मरु-मरीचिका (desert-mirage); and गगन-मालिन्य (the sky appearing as blue) and the like.

The term (*asat*) असत्, *i.e.*, 'unreal' is sometimes applied to such class of objects.

(*iii*) Then comes the last class which comprises the created phenomenal objects of the world, *i.e.*, the *nāma-rupas* (नाम-रूपस), *i.e.*, the changes (विकारs) in all their diversities which we find in the world.

After enumerating these three classes of objects, Sankara points out the respective characteristics of each of these groups of objects.

Sankara tells us that the objects designated under the first claas, *viz.* :—the शश-विषाण, etc., etc., have a peculiar nature of their own. They form a separate class distinguished from the two other classes of objects. For, these objects are of such a character that they do not *work* at all in the world, that do not serve any practical purpose of men. We cannot put these objects to any practical use at all. Why? Because, Sankara observes, the things which have nothing to take their stand upon, which have no permanent ground to sustain them and which are not supported by any underlying ground—must be *false*; since such things can serve us no practical good; they would break down, they would not work—in our varied experiences of the world—

"न हि 'निरात्मक' किञ्चिद् व्यवहाराय अवकल्पते"।
"न हि शश-शृङ्गिकादयोऽपि 'निरात्मका' भवन्ति"॥

In respect of these objects, Sankara's remarks run to this effect :—

> The objects like शश-विषाण, etc., etc., have no *prior* cause from which they are produced; neither these objects are sustained or supported at the *present* moment by any underlying cause or 'being'—these have no underlying ground upon which they stand at present. Again, when these objects disappear (in future), they will have nothing—no sustaining ground—in which they will merge. For these reasons, such objects must be pronounced as really false or अलीक. As there is no underlying 'being' (सत्ता or आस्पद) to support them, they must be 'non-existent' things. Hence they are not true; they are false.[1]

But such is not the case with the objects which are subsumed under the second class; *viz.*, the objects शुक्ति-रजत, रज्जु-सर्प, etc. We cannot, Sankara remarks, call these things false or अलीक in the same manner as we call the objects शश-विषाण, etc., etc., as false. Why? Because, Sankara argues—

> Such things as रज्जु-सर्प, शुक्ति-रजत, etc., cannot be said to have no permanent

---

[1] "असत: शश विषाणादे: 'समुत्पत्त्यदर्शनात्'—वैभाष्य। Again—
"वन्ध्या-पुत्रो न तत्त्वेन, मायया वापि 'जायते'—मा० का० भाष्य।
"न हि वन्ध्या-पुत्रो राजा बभूव, प्राक्' पूर्णब्रह्मणोऽभिषेकात्···इति मर्य्यादा करणेन, वन्ध्या-पुत्रो राजा 'बभूव,' 'भवति,' 'भविष्यतीति' वा"—वेदा० भाष्य।

ground to sustain them as long as they appear,—

"न हि मृगतृष्णिकादयोपि 'निरास्पदाः' भवन्ति"।— *i.e.*, none of these is निरास्पद; that is to say, the *prior* condition of the snake was the rope, *i.e.*, as the rope appears as a snake, the *prior* underlying ground which gave rise to the form or appearance of the 'snake' must have been the 'rope.' At the *present* moment too, the ground which sustains the appearance 'snake' is the 'rope.' Again when in *future* the notion of snake, on the dawning of the correct notion, will disappear, it will merge in its underlying ground, *i.e.*, the 'rope.'[1] It is evident, therefore, that these objects do not resemble the objects described above, *viz.*: शश-विषाण, etc., in respect of their 'unreality' or 'falsity.'

These objects, *viz.*, रज्जु-सर्प etc., cannot, therefore, be declared to be 'false' in the sense in which the objects शश-विषाण, etc., can be so declared.

Now, let us consider the character of the third class of objects enumerated above, *viz.*,—the empirical objects

---

[1] "रज्ज्वात्मना अवबोधात् 'प्राक्' सर्पः 'सन्नेव' भवति"। "सतोविद्यमानस्य वस्तुनो रज्ज्वादेः-सर्पादिवत् जन्मयुज्यते"—मा० का० भा०, 3·27.

न हि सर्प-रजत-पुरुष-मृगतृष्णिकादिविकल्पाः रज्जु-शुक्ति-स्थाणुधरादि-व्यतिरेकेण अवस्तुपदाः (स्थितिकाले) शक्याः कल्पयितुम्" (मा० आगम प्रकरण)।

"रज्जुरेवेति निश्चये सर्पविकल्पनिवृत्तौ (भविष्यति काले) रज्जुरेवेति" (मा० तृष्ण प्रकरण)।

(*i.e.*, the evolving changes (विकारs) or the nâma-rupas (नाम-रूपs). Sankara points out—

> these objects agree in an important respect with the objects described above as शुक्ति-रजत, रज्जु-सर्प, etc., etc. These changes (विकारs),—these empirical objects have a *prior* cause from which they are produced; during their sustenance at the *present* moment, the same identical causal reality underlies and sustains them; and in *future* also, they will merge in the same underlying ground which sustains them now.[1]

Thus, it will appear from a comparison of these three classes of objects with one another that, as regards the underlying sustaining ground, both the last-mentioned classes of objects agree with one another; but both of these differ from the first class of objects in this respect. It necessarily follows, therefore, that if you call the first class unreal or false (as Sankara has justly called them), the other two classes must, by implication, be *real*.

Now, what is the net result of this discussion? The objects known as शश-विषाण, आकाश-कुसुम, etc., are the only objects which may, as the above discussion shows, be designated, in the system of Sankara, as actually false or unreal. Why? Because, these objects are the only objects which, as has been proved by the above-mentioned arguments, do not even serve the practical concerns of

---

[1] " प्रत्यभिज्ञावलेन सर्व्वेषु विकारेषु 'अन्वय' विच्छेद-दर्शनात्, अन्वयिद्रव्यमेव सर्व्वत्र कारणं भवति, न पिण्डादिविशेषः अनन्वयात् अव्यवस्थानाच्च " (छा० भाष्ये)।

" कारणं ब्रह्म त्रिष्वपि कालेषु 'सत्त्वं' न व्यभिचरति, तथा कार्य्यमपि जगत् "—इत्यादि (वेदा० भा०)।

" सत्त्वोक्त्यैव सत्यत्वमुच्यते। यस्माच्च जायते किञ्चित् तदस्तीति दृष्टं लोके " (तै० भा०)।

our life, because they have no prior or present sustaining-ground upon which they stand.

Tested by this line of argument, even such objects as are known to us as शुक्ति-रजत, रज्जु-सर्प, मरु-मरीचिका, etc., cannot be regarded unreal or false, in the Sankara system. For, can the snake, as has been seen in the above illustration, remain *separated* from its underlying substratum, *viz.*, the rope? Can the mirage stand, even for a moment, *separated* from the surface of the desert? [1]

It follows therefore that the man who has, thus, taken pains to prove the *reality* of such things as रज्जु-सर्प, मरु-मरीचिका, etc., will never feel inclined to regard the actual changes in the world—the empirical objects—the námarupas (नाम-रूपs)—as unreal or false. But Sankara is not yet satisfied by mere comparison, by mere exhibition of the points of agreement and disagreement among the three classes of objects. He has gone further. He actually teaches in *express terms* the fact that the reality of the empirical objects is even more pronounced than the reality of such objects as the mirage, the *Sukti-rajata* and the like—

" मृगतृष्णिकाद्यपेक्षया, परमार्थोदकादि सत्यं " [2]। (तै०भाष्य, 2.6)।

Elsewhere too, while describing the created subtle and gross elements (मूर्त्तामूर्त्त पञ्चभूत) of the world, Sankara calls them—" सत्य " or 'reals,' and the underlying Brahma as—" सत्यस्य सत्यं " or 'the Reality of the reals.' [3]

---

[1] " न हि सर्प-रजत-पुरुष-मृगतृष्णिकादि विकल्पाः, रज्जु-शुक्ति-स्थाणुपुरादि-'व्यतिरेकेण' अवस्त्वास्पदाः शक्याः कल्पयितुं " (मा० भा०—आग० प्रक०)।

[2] *Cf.* also " सच्च—परमार्थोदकादि। असच्च—मरीच्युदकादि " (प्रश्न० भा०, ४।५)।

[3] " पञ्च भूतानां सत्यानां स्वरूपावधारणार्थमिदमारभ्यते " (ब्र०भा०, 2.31।) " नेति नेति शब्दाभ्यां—सत्यस्य सत्यं निर्दिदिक्षितं " (ब्र० भा०, 2.3.6)।

How can Sankara call the created empirical objects unreal or false? Because, he has laid down the principle that "what is produced from something, from a prior 'being' —cannot itself be a 'non-existent' thing. For, a 'non-being'.cannot be produced from a real 'being.'"[1] As we can know nothing of the Causal Reality (*i.e.*, Brahma) *apart* from its effects upon us, the effects or the products must be 'real.'

In this way, the empirical objects or the emergent changes have been regarded as *real* objects, in the system of Sankara's philosophy. Yet, most people have hastily concluded that the world is regarded false in this system.

It will be seen that it is only in comparison with the Absolute Reality (परमार्थ सत्य) which is none else but Brahma, that the phenomenal things may be designated *asat* (असत्) or 'unreal,' which therefore means—'relatively real.'[2]

It is to be regretted that the critics of the Sankara system have not cared to consider properly these weighty arguments to be found dispersed in the Vedanta-works; but they have, from the mere mention of the terms in the Bhásyas, like शश-विषाण, मरीचिका, etc., etc., jumped at once at the conclusion that the world is false in the Vedanta.

---

[1] "असत: शश-विषाणादे: ससुत्पत्त्यदर्शनात्, अस्ति जगतोमूलं। ..... यस्माच्च जायते किञ्चित् तदस्तीति दृष्टं लोके, सत्त्वोक्तेव सत्यत्वमुच्यते" (तै० भाष्य)। "कार्येण हि लिङ्गेन कारण-ब्रह्मज्ञानार्थत्वं सृष्टिश्रुतीनां" (मा० आ०)। "अयात्मैव तत्, असदेव आत्मतत्त्वं? तन्न; कार्यदर्शनात्" (मा०का०भा०, 3.27)।

[2] "सत्यमुक्तं सत्यत्वं विकाराणां—तत्तु न परमार्थापेक्षया। किं तर्हि? इन्द्रियविषयापेक्षया उक्तं।...सत्यस्य परमार्थस्य उपलब्धिद्वारं भवति" (छा०भा०,)। "सत्यञ्च व्यवहारविषयं ..... न परमार्थसत्यं। एकमेव हि परमार्थसत्यं ब्रह्म" (तै०भा०, 2.6)।

3. To another reason, the current belief in the falsity of the world may be traced. Sankara has, in more than one place in his commentaries, compared the experiences of our waking life with our dream-experiences. Finding this comparison, most people, without feeling any necessity to pause to weigh carefully the observations of Sankara recorded in these places, have run on with the idea that as the dream-experiences are known to everybody to be unreal—to have no objective reality—the waking experiences which have been likened to these, must be equally unreal.* But we beg to invite our reader's attention to the two most important passages wherein this comparison occurs and to request the readers to follow us, with a view to find out how Sankara has expressed his own views on the subject.

Our waking and dreaming-experiences compared: comparison does not suggest the falsity.

(*a*) First, we should like to transport our readers to the famous passage in the Brihadáranyaka—in the story of *Ajátasatru and Bálāki* where an elaborate description of the dream-state and its experiences occurs. And here also is recorded the Sankara's view of the sense in which he regards the waking and the dreaming experiences as 'unreal.'

If the readers be good enough to follow us patiently, it will be as clear as the day-light that Sankara never regarded the objects experienced by us to be unreal. What he looked upon as unreal is an altogether different matter.

Sankara thus observes—

> When a man falls asleep and happens to dream, he finds himself, say, to be a king

actually sitting upon a royal throne—surrounded by his people, ministers and servants ;—with the maids fanning him and himself enjoying various pleasurable and painful experiences. Now, the cognitions he receives, the activities he performs, the states and feelings he enjoys —these are all his dream-experiences. These belong to him as his soul's experiences. Are these experiences to be taken as constituting the actual 'nature' or स्वरूप (swarupa) of the self? or, is the real nature of self to be regarded as something which is *distinct* from these, and which maintains its *distinct* identity and unity in and through dreaming experiences? Is this स्वरूप (nature) to be regarded as the aggregate—the mere sum-total—of these experiences, or does it possess a nature—a 'Self-hood'—distinguished from these?

Sankara declares that these experiences cannot constitute the self ; the self cannot be resolved into and identified with them. What the real self is cannot be reduced into its states and activities ; for, these are not its स्वरूप or आत्मभूत। The real self is that which experiences these things, unaffected by them ; and hence it is the *subject* to which these stand as its *object*, and these are erroneously attributed to the subject as its 'nature' or स्वरूप। such is also the case with the soul's *waking* experiences.

Here towards the close of this discussion, Sankara has employed the term—"अविद्यमानाः" *i.e.*, 'non-existent,' and the term—"स्वाध्यारोपिताः" *i.e.*, 'falsely ascribed to the self'; and these two terms have been used in connection with the dream-experiences. These two terms are, we are afraid, the source of immense mischief created in respect of the idea of the falsity of our world-experiences!

But the readers will kindly see that Sankara never says here that what a man experiences in his dream is false. He says—

> "आत्मभूतत्वेन अविद्यमाना एव सन्तः"——
>
> That is to say, these experiences do not exist as his आत्मभूत, *i.e.*, as his स्वरूप or as the 'nature' of the self. These are falsely regarded as the nature or the *swarupa* (स्वरूप or आत्मभूत) of the self. The *experiences* of both the waking and the dreaming states of the man cannot be his आत्मभूत, *i.e.*, cannot constitute his swarupa. The 'nature' (स्वरूप) of the self is what is *distinct* from these experiences. And this nature underlies these experiences, without losing its own identity in them.

Here with a view to preclude any possibility for a mistake, Sankara records three reasons showing that the real nature of the self is *distinct* from its experiences and the latter cannot therefore be regarded as आत्मभूत of the self. The experiences are *his*; they are not *he*. Why?—

(I) दृश्यत्वात्—These experiences are the *objects* of the self. They are what the subject

experiences, to which the self directs its attention. The knower must be distinct from the objects known. Hence these known objects can not constitute the *nature* of the knower.

(II) व्यभिचार-दर्शनात्—These experiences are by their nature transient and changing. They appear, they vanish and they are succeeded by other experiences. Such being their character, how can they constitute the nature of the self which is permanent ?

(III) वस्त्वन्तर-सम्बन्ध-जनितत्वाच्च—These experiences are elicited from the nature of the self by the external or internal stimulating environment upon which they depend. But the underlying self is not dependent on anything and not produced by any stimulating object like " शब्दादि," *i.e.*, the sounds, touch, etc. etc.[1]

The self is therefore distinct from its experiences. We see, now, that the experiences of the world, as such, are never regarded by Sankara as unreal or false. The unreality only comes, when the self is entirely resolved

---

[1] " हित्वा स्वप्नं, यदा सुषुप्तः तदा 'स्वाभाव्यं' गतो भवति,···'अन्य-सम्बन्ध कालुष्य'-हिता।···तदा शब्दादेः 'सम्बन्धि वस्त्वन्तरं' किञ्चन न वेद" (ब्र०, 2-1-18—19).

Here *cf.* " न हि यस्य यत् स्वरूपं, तत्तेन अन्यतोऽपेक्षते। अनपेक्ष मेव सिद्धत्वात्। यद्धि अनपेक्षं, तस्यत एव सिद्ध" (केन भाष्य, 1-4). Also—"द्रव्यस्य हि तत्त्वमविक्रिया, परानपेक्षत्वात्। विक्रिया न तत्त्वं, परापेक्षत्वात्। न हि कारकापेक्षं वस्तुनस्तत्त्वं। सतो विशेषः कारकापेक्षः; विशेषस्य विक्रिया। यद्धि यस्य नान्यापेक्षं स्वरूपं, ततस्तस्य स्वरूपं। यदन्यापेक्षं, तत् न तत्त्वं—अन्याभावेऽभावात्" तै० भा०।

into these experiences, and when these are taken to be the nature (आत्मभूत) of the self.

(*b*) In a similar passage in the Chandogya Upanishad, where a similar comparison between the waking and the dreaming experiences occurs, Sankara very forcibly expresses his view saying that their apparent unreality lies in their *relativity*, *i.e.*, in relation to the dreaming experiences, the waking experiences may be called unreal and in relation to the latter, the former may be regarded unreal.

"जागद्विषयापेक्षं तदनृतत्वं, न स्वतः।"—

But the both kinds of experiences must be regarded *real* respectively *in their own spheres* (स्वविषये, स्वतः)।—

"स्वविषयेऽपि सर्व्वं सत्यमेव,
स्वप्नदृश्यादव.....इति न कश्चिद्विरोधः"। छा० भाष्य।

Doctrine of causality elaborated. Relation between unity and multiplicity, does not imply falsity.

3. The theory of causality as elaborated in the Vedanta Philosophy by Sankara which is known as the Sat-karjya-bada (सत्कार्य्यवाद) has not, it appears to us, received the attention which it deserves, and such scanty and superficial treatment of this celebrated Principle of Causality is, we fear, responsible, to not an inconsiderable extent, for the current views about the falsity of the world.

In a previous chapter we have given brief indication of this theory, and here we desire to elaborate the idea of causality further in the light in which it has been elucidated by Sankara himself.

Sankara, it will be seen, has, at the very commencement of his discussion, splitted up the theory into

two distinct parts and laid it down as a general rule that—

"अनन्यत्वेऽपि कार्य-कारणयोः,—
कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं, न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्व"।

वेदा० भा०

(I) The first part, *viz.*,—नतु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वं implies that the cause or the causal Reality is *distinct* from its effects or its successive changes or manifestations, because it has a 'nature,' a स्वरूप, 'selfdom' of its own; and it cannot therefore be *resolved* into, or identified with, the effects or successive changes emerging from it;—it cannot therefore be regarded, to use Sankara's own mode of expression, as becoming something other than its own nature (स्वरूप) when the effects emerge from it in succession—

"न हि विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति
.....स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्"

वेदा० भा०

If you violate this part of the teaching, a great fault will vitiate your theory, *viz.*, the causal reality would consist merely in its effects, *i. e.*, the sum-total of the effects (parts) would constitute the cause (the whole). In this case—Brahma would be all, and all would be Brahma.

(II) The second part of the theory, *viz.*—"कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्व"—implies that the cause is no doubt distinct from, and independent of, its effects or the emergent changes; but the effects (कार्य) or the successive

changes can not be *separated* from their cause and regarded as independent and self-sufficient 'things' (वस्तु), each complete in itself—

"यस्य च यस्मादात्मलाभो भवति, स तेन 'अप्रविभक्तो' दृष्टः, यथा घटादीनां मृदा"। And—"नहि 'वस्तुवृत्तेन' विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति। कारणात् 'व्यतिरेकेण' अभावः कार्य्यस्य"। [1]

The effects are called अनन्य to their cause. That is to say,—as the real 'nature' of the cause becomes gradually manifested or realised in these successive effects, the latter are mere *means*, medium, instrument—सर्व्वार्थकारित्वेन उपकरणभूतः—साधनभूतः"—for the realisation of the 'nature' of the cause. [2] It is not therefore possible to *separate* any of the effects from the underlying cause. For, these are merely the phases, or stages (संस्थानभेद मात्रं) assumed by the cause for its own manifestation. We cannot, therefore, regard any of the stages as something अन्य or independent and separate, as if existing on their own account.

"सामान्यस्य (The cause) ग्रहणेनैव तद्गताः विशेषाः (the effects) गृहीताः स्युः . . . . . न तत एव 'निर्भिद्य' गृहीतुं शक्यन्ते" [3]

In this way, the effects are called in the Vedanta as अनन्य (*ananya*) to their cause.

Dr. Paul Deussen and others have translated the term अनन्य, as "identical." This however, we regret to

---

[1] *Vide* वे०भा०, and also ब्र०भा०, 1.6.1.

[2] We have not here discussed the point that in the Vedanta the self is known as स्वार्थ, i.e., purpose, and everything else besides the self is known as परार्थ for the realisation of that purpose. This point the reader may find discussed in Chapter II.

[3] *Vide* ब्र०भा०, 2.4.11, etc., etc., etc., and वे०भा०, 2.1.14.

observe, is, to go directly against the Doctrine of Sankara. This translation makes Brahma *identical* with the world. Dr. Deussen has fallen into the same error, against which the *Tiká-kára* (टीकाकार) raised his voice of warning. The Tiká-Kára amplified the sense of the term अनन्य by stating—

" कारणात् पृथक्-सत्ताशून्यत्वं साध्यते, न तु ऐक्याभिप्रायेण " ।

The created world is not *identical* with Brahma—its underlying cause; but the world has no *separate being* which is apart from, or independent of, its underlying cause. That is to say, the world is entirely *dependent on* Brahma. No one of the successive changes can be separated from the underlying Causal Reality (*i.e.*, Brahma) which is constantly present behind each change, unaffected by it; and no one of its changes can be regarded as so many independent 'things'—

" न हि 'वस्तुतत्त्वेन' विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति " ।

" परमार्थतः कारणात् 'व्यतिरेकेण' अभावः कार्य्यस्य "—[वेदा०भाष्य] ।

Sankara has, in this way, explained and elaborated his celebrated Causal Theory in his Vedantabhásya and other places.

This view will, we hope, be brought into more prominence, if we briefly state here the arguments used by Sankara, in his criticism and refutation of the Pantheistic theory held by his opponent, one Vrittikara. Some indication of this criticism will be found in the other chapters of this work.

We give below a connected account of Sankara's criticism. He says to this effect:—

> The self has a distinct 'nature' (स्वरूप) of its own, and this स्वरूप is permanent and not liable to changes ('स्वरूपस्य अनपायित्वात्') ।

The qualities or states (*i.e.*, differences of nâma-rupa) are elicited from the self by the interaction of the self with its environment. When these differences emerge, the underlying स्वरूप does not become these, nor does it lose its identity.[1]

" न हि उपाधि-योगादपि अन्याद्दशस्य वस्तुनः अन्याद्दशः स्वभावः सम्भवति "।

" प्रत्युपाधिभेदं हि अभेदमेव ब्रह्मणः द्योतयति शास्त्रं "।—वेदा०भा०

It continues to maintain its unity—its nature (स्वभाव)—in these successively emergent changes or states. If, as you hold, 'unity' is entirely changed to 'multiplicity,' *both* cannot be real.—

" न तावत् स्वत एव परस्य ब्रह्मणः उभय-
लिङ्गत्व मुपपद्यते। न हि एकं वस्तु
स्वत एव रूपादिविशेषोपेतं, तद्विपरीतञ्च
——इत्यवधारयितुं शक्यं विरोधात् "। [वेदा०भा०, 3.2.11।]

But as you hold both to be real, there is mutual contradiction. One and the same self cannot be regarded as possessed of qualities (many) and also devoid of all qualities (one). Such absurdity does not at all touch our position, since 'unity' is of one type of object and 'multiplicity' is of a different type.[2]

---

[1] " आत्मा एतेषु अनुगतः, सर्व्वत्र अव्यभिचारात्, यथा सर्पधारादिभेदेषु रज्जुः। .....अव्यभिचारात् कल्पनावस्थायामपि अद्वयता शिवा "—मौ०का-भा०, 2.32.33.

[2] "न मयेदमेकस्मिन् धर्म्मिणि अभिहितं। त्वयैव इदं विरुद्धधर्म्मत्वेन एकं वस्तु परिगृहीतं भान्त्या, न तु मया उक्तं " [ब्र०भा०, 2.4.13]। " समुद्रात्मना एकत्वं फेनतरङ्गाद्यात्मना नानात्वं ; अतः एकत्वं नानात्वं उभयमपि सत्यमेव ? नैवं स्यात् ' [वे०भा०, 2.1.4]।

If 'one' is changed into 'many,' then there would be no distinction between Brahma and the world. Since, as you regard the world as Brahma, the world (many) must prove to be unreal. But in our case, 'many' is not unreal. Because, these qualities (many) are but the manifestations of the 'nature' or स्वरूप of the self and these gradually reveal this nature.

Only when they are erroneously *separated* from Brahma, they become *unreal*.[1] But as the self realises itself gradually through these, these changes or differences can never be *separated* from the underlying self.[2]

Now, we find, as the result of this exposition of the Vedantic theory of causality (almost Sankará's own utterances) that we are not to resolve the prior causal reality into its effect, *i.e.*, the created náma-rupas in their infinite diversities. If we do so, the causal Reality would lose its own unity or its *Swavába* (स्वभाव), and with the successive emergence of the differences or changes, it would itself become some thing *other than* its own nature (*i.e.*, अन्य).

---

[1] "सतोऽन्यत्वे अनृतत्वं ; सदात्मना तु सत्यत्वं एव। न हि सदमनाश्रित्य घटादेः सत्त्वं स्थितिर्वा सम्भवति" [छा]। "आत्मस्वरूपात्—'अन्यत्' वस्त्वन्तरं—स्वप्नमाया-मरीच्युदकसममसारं [ब्र०, 3.5.1]। "योहि ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत्व 'स्वातन्त्र्येन' लब्धसत्ताकं जगत्पश्यति, तं मिथ्यादर्शिनं, etc."—वे० 1.4.19.

[2] "सामान्यं हि विशेषान् आत्मस्वरूप-प्रदानेन धारयति" (ब्र०भा०, 1.6.1)। "यदा आत्मस्थे ..... नाम-रूपे व्याक्रियेते, तदा नाम-रूपे आत्मस्वरूपापरित्यागेनैव सर्व्वावस्थासु व्याक्रियेते" (वे०भा० 2.6)। "चेतन्याव्यतिरेकेणैव हि कला-जायमानास्तिष्ठन्त्यः प्रलीयमानाश्च सर्व्वदा लक्ष्यन्ते" [प्र०भा०, 6.2]. "कारणा-न्वयहीनं कार्य्यं न स्यात् सुतरां हते"—इत्यादि।

CENTRAL LIBRARY

Brahma would become the world, and both would be *identical*. Sankara calls such world *unreal*, *false*, असत्य. *Everywhere he has held the world and the changes* (विकारs) *to be unreal and false in this sense only*. He has not negated or abolished anywhere the world and its changing विकारs, as they are, as they stand. In the case of the identical self and its states and activities, the theory holds good equally. If the finite self is resolved into its successively emergent states and activities ;—the self will become *identical* with these and will thus become something *other than* itself ; such a self is unreal and false.[1]

The fact is that Brahma as well as the *Jivas* maintain their own nature or स्वरूप and preserve its unity and identity in and through its successive states or changes ; and these emergent changes or states are always to be considered as self-evident *stages* for the manifestation or realisation of their underlying स्वरूप, and consequently they cannot be separated and treated as something independent (अन्य).[2] When they are so treated, Sankara would at once call them unreal, false. In no other way, he is prepared to *label* the world and its experiences as false.

Certain terms, phrases and expressions examined. Examination does not favour falsity.

4. There is quite a large number of terms, phrases, and expressions, very widely made use of by Sankara which frequently occur in diverse places of the commentaries. These terms, phrases and expressions have, we are sure, contributed much to give currency to the idea of the falsity of the world.

---

[1] "अविद्याध्यारोपितसुखित्वादिविशेषप्रतिबन्धादेव आत्मनः स्वरूपेण अनवस्थानं, स्वरूपावस्थानञ्च श्रेयः" [मा०व्या-भा०, 2.33]।

[2] This idea of अनन्य, when perfected, has also been called by the phrase 'सर्व्वात्मभाव in the commentaries, "सतएव द्वैतभेदेन अन्यथागृह्यमानत्वात् नासत्यं कस्यचिद् वस्तुनः ब्रूमोवयं" (छा०भा० 6.2).

For, these phrases and expressions, when detached from the context in which they occur, convey the meanings which apparently may be taken to favour the idea of falsity. But fortunately, Sankara has, in every case, taken good care to give a clear exposition of these phrases and expressions, from which we can, if we feel so inclined, gather their right import. We now propose to present them to our readers with a view to show that a great injustice has been done to the writer of these phrases, terms and expressions in understanding them in a sense which was far from the mind of the author.

(*a*) Let us first of all take the expressions—

सर्व्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म—All this is Brahma ;
आत्मैवेदं सर्व्वं—All this is Âtma ;
इदं सर्व्वं यदयमात्मा—All this is what is âtmá ;

A superficial reading of such expressions as these cannot but leave in the mind of a reader an impression of the *identity* of Brahma with the world. But we would request our readers to turn their eyes to the three main places in the Vedanta-bhasya where Sankara himself explains these expressions ; *viz.*,—the sutra 1.1. 25, Sutra 1. 3. 1, and Sutra 2. 1. 14.[1]

[1] In fact, in the first section (commencing from aphorism 20), second section and the third section—in all these sections (पाद) of the first chapter of the Vedanta sutras, the readers will find that the real sense of such terms as प्राण, आकाश, ज्योति, गायवो, वायु, etc., has been discussed. It has been concluded that these terms are not to be mistaken for the mere phenomenal objects of nature. They are all *derived* objects ; have derived their existence and activity from Brahma —the causal Energy which lives in them and sustains them,—whose

Sankara's idea about these expressions may be summarised in his following observation :—

" विकारेऽनुगत जगत्कारणं ब्रह्म निर्दिष्टं – 'तदिदं सर्व्वमित्युच्यते,' यथा 'सर्व्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मे ति" । कार्य्यच्च कारणात् अव्यतिरिक्त मिति वक्ष्याम:" ।[1]

Sankara in these places, does not at all *identify* Brahma the causal Reality with its effects (विकार). The effects he takes in the relation of अनन्य (*ananya*) to the cause. We have already explained the sense of अनन्य from the standpoint of Sankara which we need not repeat here. Such being his explanation of the phrase— 'सर्व्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म,' we have no warrant to regard the world and all its changes (विकार), as mere appearances and Brahma as the only reality. The real nature of

---

purpose they serve (संहतानांपरार्थत्व' दृष्ट') Sankara has shown that these are all *effects*, and can have no self-sufficient *being* of their own, *apart* from the *being* of the causal Brahma which reveals in them.

[1] In Sutra 1. 3. 1 also, it has been shown that Brahma cannot be resolved into the changes of the world. Hence Brahma is to be regarded as a unity unaffected by its evolving changes.

" न कार्य्यप्रपञ्च-विशिष्ट: विचिच आत्मा...यथा अनेकात्मको द्रव्य:...एवं नानारसो विचिव आत्मा इति। 'सर्व्वं ब्रह्मे ति'च समाणाधिकरण्यात् आशङ्का सम्भवति ; तां निवर्त्तयितु माह " ।

In Sutra 2. 1. 14 also, the effects are shown to be अनन्य to their cause. 'ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्व्वं' 'आत्मैवेदं सर्व्वं,' ' नेह नानाऽस्ति किञ्चन '—all these are cited as examples of that theory. *The nature of the cause gradually finds its expression in the effects. Hence the effects cannot be separated from it and regarded as something* अन्य *or independent.*

Such is the sense, everywhere, of these phrases.

the cause is transcendental (कूटस्थ)[1]. in the system of Sankara, which underlies all its products. And it cannot, as we have already seen, be resolved into its products.

It is Brahma which realises itself in the form of the world. Hence the world cannot be *identical* with Brahma in the Sankara's philosophy. The world cannot therefore be looked upon as false or unreal. The world is simply to be taken as the medium or means through which the nature or स्वरूप of Brahma is being realised in a higher and higher form.[2]

(*b*) It is not infrequently that the infinite differentiations or the created *námarupa* (नाम-रूप),—the changes or differences that

---

= " कूटस्थात्...कारणात् कार्य्यमुत्पद्यते " [वे०भा०, 2. 2. 26.]।

" कूटस्थस्येति विशेषणात् " 2. 1. 4 इत्यादि।

Sankara has nowhere applied the term 'cause' to the mere *antecedent in time.* "नासावुपसद्यमाना पूर्व्वावस्था उत्तरावस्थाया: कारणमभ्युपगम्यते " (वे०भा० 2. 2. 21).

[2] "कूटस्थनित्यस्य एकरूपस्यापि उत्तरोत्तरमाविष्कृतस्य तारतम्य मैश्वर्य्यशक्ति-विशेषै: यूयते " [वे०भा०, 1.1.11]. Continuously higher and higher differences emerge in Nature, as an Inexhaustible (अव्यय) and perfect principle stands behind nature and is revealing itself through her. " आदित्यादिषुहि सत्त्वमत्यन्तप्रकाशं अतस्तच आविस्तरं ज्योति: [चैतन्यं], न तु तवैव ततधिकं।... तथा तुल्येऽपि मुखसंस्थाने...आदर्शादौ स्वच्छे स्वच्छतरे च तारतम्येन आविर्भवति तद्वत्।...सत्त्वाधिक्यादाविस्तरत्वोपपत्ते:" [गी०भा०, 15. 12.]।

' 'यद्यपि कार्य्यात्मना उद्रिच्यते—उदगच्छति, तथापि यत्पूर्णत्वं तन्न जहति,—पूर्णमेव उद्रिच्यते " [ब्र०, भा०, 5. 1. 1.]

are emerging in the world have been called in the Bhasyas as—

अविद्या-प्रत्युपस्थापित—brought about by Avidyâ ;

अविद्या-कल्पित—fancied or imagined by avidyâ ;

अविद्यात्मक—consisting of Avidyâ ;

अविद्याकल्पिते नामरूपे—(nama-rupas) imagined by avidyâ ;—and so on.

Now, these phrases, to all outward appearances, imply the illusory character or unreality or falsity of these changes—these emerging náma-rupas. But such meaning, if adopted, would militate against the entire theory of Sankara, as we shall presently see.

In the famous Introduction appended to the " Brahma-sutras," Sankara has, at the very commencement of his immortal work, discussed and given us the sense in which he will use the term Avidyâ (अविद्या) throughout his system ; and we take this opportunity to request our readers to recall into their minds the import of the term Avidya (अविद्या). The Introduction clearly points out that in whatever connection Sankara would use the word *Avidya*, he would always mean this that—under the influence of Avidya, the people forgets or ignores the स्वरूप or the *distinct nature* of the self or the causal reality, and it is entirely resolved into or *identified* with its emerging effects or states. And the states

or effects are erroneously looked upon as the 'nature' or स्वरूप of the self.[1]

The self is not a characterless being but it has a distinct nature of its own and cannot therefore be reduced into its states and activities. The self has been described by Sankara as transcending the external and internal elements of the body, but yet controlling and illumining them—

"कार्यकरणातीतं ; तथापि कार्य्य-करणावभासकं—आत्मज्योति:" । [ह०,

similarly he has described the Brahma's nature as transcending the náma-rupas (changes) and untouched by them, but yet controlling and directing the activities of these changing náma-rupas—

" नाम-रूपाभ्या मस्पृष्टं यदित्येतत् तत्ब्रह्म, नामरूप विलक्षणं नामरूपाभ्यामस्पृष्टं . तथापि तयो: निर्व्योढ़ । एवं लक्षणं ब्रह्म " । [छा०भा०, 8. 14. 1.]

Hence we find that neither Brahma, nor the individual selves can be resolved into its manifested changes. The changes stand to the underlying reality in the relation of *ananya* (अनन्य),—*i.e.*, they cannot be separated from it and regarded as something *independent*; but they are to be taken merely as a *means* for the gradual

---

[1] To express snch ideas, Sankara has used the term माया (Maya) also.

"मायामात्रं हि एतत् यत् परमात्मनोऽवस्थात्रयात्मना अवभासनं" [वे०भा०, 2. 1. 7.]

" मायया भिद्यते...न परमार्थत:, निरवयवत्वादात्मनः । सावयवंहि अवयवान्यथात्वेन भिद्यते " [मा०का०भा०—अद्वैत०प्र०, १९] ।

manifestations of the nature of the underlying cause—

" उत्तरोत्तर मविष्कृतस्य " ।

" ज्ञानशक्त्याद्यभिव्यक्तिः परेण परेण भूयसी भवति " । [वेदा० भाष्य] ।

How can the changes, then, be regarded as false or unreal, in the view of Sankara? It is only when under the influence of *Avidya*, we forget the *distinct* being of the underlying cause and *identify* it with its evolving changes (विकारs), as if the causal reality has become something *other than* its own nature,—that the changes become false, unreal.[1] This is done under the influence of Avidya. It is in this sense alone that the diversities of the changing náma-rupas in the world are regarded as false or unreal, in Sankara's system.

---

[1] *Cf.* "अन्यदिव आत्मनो वस्त्वन्तरमिव अविद्यया प्रत्युपस्थापितं भवति···अन्यत्वेन ब्रह्मणः परिकल्प्यमानानि अन्यानि " [ब्र०भा० 4. 3. 21—23]

"अविद्याकृतं भूतभावोपाधि-संसर्गजं 'अन्यत्वावभासं' तिरस्कृत्य—इत्यादि" (5. 1. 1)

The changing states and activities are all elicited from our underlying 'nature', through interaction with the external environment भूतभावासंसर्गजं; सर्व्वाभूतभौतिकभावाः अस्यासंसर्गकारणभूता विद्यन्ते (4. 3-9)] When these are produced, we erroneously *identify* ourselves with these; and these become the only self to us. But this Self is *false*. The real self is what underlies these states and activities and to which these are referred as to a centre. Such is the case with Brahman also. This identification is due to the fault of our *intellect*. But how can there be *identification?* Sankara says— "अविद्याकल्पितेन दोषेण पारमार्थिकं वस्तु न दूष्यति।—न च मिथ्याज्ञानं परमार्थवस्तु दूषयितुं समर्थं "[गो०भा०, 13-2] Sankara does not call the *object false*; he calls *identification* false. "स्वरूपेण अकल्पितस्य 'संसृष्ट'रूपेण कल्पितत्वमिष्टं" [मा०का०भाष्य, ३।३२]।

(*c*) Now, let us consider such expressions as—

नेह नानाऽस्ति किञ्चन—The diversities or the differences exist not in the world ;—यस्य सर्व्वमात्मैवाभूत्·····तत्केन कं पश्येत् ?—*i.e.*, the man who sees the Atma everywhere, cannot see other things in the world. These phrases seem to imply, apparently, that there are really no diversities,—no náma-rupas—no changes—nothing—in the world ;—that these are all mere appearances and unreal.

But let us see how Sankara himself has explained these expressions. We draw our reader's attention in this connection to Sutras 2. 1. 14 and 3. 2. 22, where Sankara himself has quoted these phrases and explained them.

He first raises the question—If the 'unity' is reduced to 'multiplicity,' can it retain its unity—and decides in the negative. He points out—as 'one' and 'many' oppose each other, *both* cannot be true in respect of the one and the same thing. The pantheists of his time looked upon 'unity' and 'multiplicity' *both* as true. The pantheistic unity is merely अनेकात्मक, *i. e.*, it is the unity of mere collection. It is an abstract whole—a mere aggregate of parts having no substantial being outside of and *apart* from its parts which constitute it.

But Sankara shows here that Brahma cannot be both एक and अनेकात्मक। Brahma is

a true unity ; it has a 'being,' *outside* the world—

"उभयसत्यतायांहि कथं एकत्वज्ञानेन
नानात्वज्ञानमपनुद्यते इत्युच्येत ?" —*i. e.*

as Brahma has a 'nature' of its own, how can it be *resolved* into many and become अनेकात्मक ?[1] Hence his conclusion is that the 'unity' retains its unity in all circumstances and it is the only Reality. The diverse changes—नामरूपs —the differences which emerge from it are not independent things *equally* true and real with the unity ; but they are *means, stages* [द्वारभूतानि] —for the gradual manifestation of the 'nature' of Brahma which is present behind them and is realising itself through them.

Now then, the line—

"यत्र त्वस्य सर्व्वमात्मैवाभूत् . . . . तत्केन कं पश्येत ?"—

—and the line—

"नेह नानाऽस्ति किञ्चन"—

Such lines, such expressions—do not mean that there are *not* things in the world, that all are non-entities. They mean that the things in the world will no longer appear to us in the same light in which they appear to the ordinary *ignorant* people. They would not appear as so many *independent* things—a tree there,

---

[1] न हि अद्वये परमार्थसत्यात्मनि प्राणादि संसारजातमिदं जगत् 'नाना'—वस्त्वन्तरभूतं भवति। "न हि प्राणाद्यात्मना इदं विद्यते कदाचिदपि"। यथा रज्जुस्वरूपेण निरूप्यमाणो न नानाभूतः कल्पितः सर्पोऽस्ति, तद्वत् " (मा॰का-मा॰, 2.34)।

a cow here ; a river there, a man here. They would appear only as higher and higher *stages* through which Brahma is progressively revealing its own 'nature,' is realising itself—[1]

"तत्स्वरूप-'व्यतिरिक्त' 'अन्यद्वस्तु' किमिच्छन्

. . . . . आत्मनो 'व्यतिरिक्तस्य' कस्य कामाय" ?

(बृह०भा०, 4-1-12.)

Everything would, now, be looked upon as only further and further revelations or realisations of Brahma ; nothing would, now, be looked upon as 'व्यतिरिक्त' or 'अन्य' from the underlying Brahma.[2]

This is the conclusion which we have gained from a discussion of the Sankara's celebrated Doctrine of Causality. Now it stands clear that there arises no question for the *abolition* of the diverse objects in the world, in the system of Adwaita Philosophy.

---

[1] "स्थावरत्वादारभ्य उपर्युपरि आविस्तरत्वमात्मन: . . . . . आत्मप्रकाशनाय" [ऐ०भा०, 21-3.]।

"यथा मनुष्यादिस्तम्बपर्य्यन्तेषु ज्ञानैश्वर्य्यादिप्रतिबन्ध: परेण परेण भूयान् भवन् दृश्यते, तथा मनुष्यादिष्वेव हिरण्यगर्भं पर्य्यन्तेषु ज्ञानैश्वर्य्याद्यभिव्यक्तिरपि परेण परेण भूयसी भवति " [वे०भा०, 1-3-20.] ।

" एवं पूर्व्वस्या: पूर्व्वस्या भूमे: उत्तरस्यामुत्तरस्यां भूमौ . . . शतगुणेनानन्दोत्कर्ष: उपपद्यते ।—मनुष्यगन्धर्व्यादुत्तरोत्तरभूमिषु शतगुणोत्तरोत्तरोत्कर्षेण यावद्धिरण्यगर्भस्य ब्रह्मण: आनन्द: —इत्यादि" [तै० भाष्य, 2-4 also बृ० भाष्य]।

"सत्त्वाधिक्यादाविस्तरत्वोपपत्ते: । आदित्यादिषु सत्त्वमत्यन्तप्रकाशं···अतस्तत्रैव आविस्तरं·····नतु तत्रैव तत् अधिकं ।...यथा आदर्शादौ स्वच्छे स्वच्छतरे च तारतम्येनाविर्भवति—तुल्येऽपि मुखसंस्थाने—तद्वत्" [गी०भा०] ।

[2] "न हि कारणव्यतिरेकेण कार्य्यनाम वस्तुतोऽस्ति यत:कारणबुद्धिर्विनिवर्त्तेत" [तै० भा०, 2-1].

(*d*) There is still a phrase used in the Vedanta which demands our consideration and attention. We mean the phrase known as—विशेष-निराकरण or विशेष-प्रतिषेध।—*i.e.*, the repudiation or rejection of the particular determinant *qualities* we find in the world. The qualities are universally existent; and although they belong, in a sense, to the one Reality ब्रह्म as a whole, still they belong definitely to a particular reality as its determinations and not of others. The qualities are but the activities of the individual things or individual beings. The phrase विशेष-निराकरण may appear at the first sight to mean that Sankara has denied the existence of the qualities—that these are mere appearances;—that they do not really exist. But, let us assure our readers this was far from the mind of Sankara. The explanation of this विशेष-निराकरण which he himself gives in the Vedanta Sutras—4-1-14 and 3-2-22 conclusively shows that he has denied nothing, repudiated nothing, rejected nothing.

The purport of his explanation is briefly this:—Suppose a quality emerges; if you identify the underlying Brahma (Causal Reality) with this quality, Brahma becomes entirely reduced to this quality and hence it becomes something *other than* its own 'being'; whereas all the time Brahma maintains its unity in and through this quality;—and so on with other successively

emergent qualities in the world. Sankara's idea is that Brahma is to be regarded always as a unity, unchanging in its own nature; and it cannot therefore be regarded as—गुणविशिष्ट or धर्मविशिष्ट, *i.e.*, *identical* with the qualities—as if its nature is not one but composed of the qualities (अनेकात्मक)।

"अनेकशक्तित्वं ब्रह्मण इति चेत्? न।
विशेष निराकरणश्रुतीना मनन्यार्थत्वात्."

Sankara next concludes—

"प्रपञ्चमेव 'ब्रह्मणि कल्पितं' प्रतिषेधति,
परिशिनष्टि ब्रह्म"[1]—— (वे०भा०, 3-2-22.)

i.e., By विशेष निराकरण, the *qualities*, as such, are not repudiated or negated; but Brahma if regarded as *composed* of the qualities is repudiated or negated.
The 'nature' (स्वरूप) of Brahma is *present* behind the qualities evolved in the world and this nature cannot be resolved into or identified with them. It is present *unaffected* by these changing qualities. Sankara has elsewhere pointed out that all the changing and emergent qualities are

---

[1] "कल्पित-रूपप्रत्याख्यानेन—'स्वरूपा'वेदनं" (कल्पितं=अविद्यया आरोपितं)। *Cf.* "स्वात्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानेन मरीच्युदक-रज्जुसर्प-गगनमलानीव, मरीचि-रज्जु-गगन-स्वरूपदर्शनेनेव कृतकृत्योभवति" (कठ भा०, 3-14.)। "रज्जुद्रव्येन सता 'अयं सर्प इति, धारेयं, दण्डोयमिति वा'—रज्जुद्रव्यमेव कल्पते, एवं प्राणादिभिरनृतैः।...सर्व्वेषु एते आत्मनि अध्यारोप्यन्ते...आत्मा एतेषु अनुगतः, सर्पधारादिभेदेषु यथा रज्जुः" (मा०का०)।

interwoven into the underlying Reality which reveals its nature through them—.

"सामान्याननुविद्धानात्' विशेषाणामदर्शनात्" (ब्र०भा०)

It is wrong therefore to identify the underlying reality with these qualities. This *identification* is repudiated, as it is due to our intellectual error (बुद्धिदोष or अविद्या): and therefore such identification must be *false, unreal.*

This is the purport or sense of the विशेषनिराकरण or of the repudiation or rejection of the qualities. Sankara has established this position in another way thus—

These qualities are definite relations into which one individual is brought with other individuals or things. But these relations cannot exhaust the individuals. I am brought into a particular relation with you, but yet I am something *more* than this relation. In this way every individual self is a part of another individual self, yet he belongs to himself. Sankara points out that an individual has a substantive (स्वरूप or विशेष्य) and an adjectival (सम्बन्धिरूप or विशेषण) mode of existence. He exists by himself and this is his substantive mode; yet he is related to something beyond him and this is his adjectival mode of existence. A man, say, Deva Datta, may come into different relations with different people and he is designated differently. But yet the same Deva Datta does not lose his own स्वरूप in

these relations.[1] Every individual therefore maintains his own identity in the various relations into which he is brought with others. Brahma, in the same way, maintains its own identity in these variously interconnected relations or qualities.[2]

If you identify the underlying Brahma with these relations, Brahma would become 'many'—अनेकात्मक, नानागुणविशिष्ट। Sankara has not denied the relations or qualities as such. He only denies Brahma or the individual self being regarded as अनेकात्मक। Such self or Brahma must be unreal, false, in the Sankara-system.[3] The relations are but a means, or medium for the expression of the *swarupa* of the underlying unity and hence they are अनन्य to the *swarupa*.

---

[1] "एकत्वेऽपि स्वरूप-वाह्यरूपापेक्षया अनेकशब्दप्रत्ययदर्शनात्। यथा एकोऽपि सन् देवदत्तः, स्वरूपं सम्बन्धिरूपञ्च अपेक्ष्य, अनेक शब्द प्रत्यय भाक् भवति—मनुष्यः बालः युवा···पिता भ्राता जामाता इति" (वि०भा० 2-2-10.)।

"शुक्लः कम्बलः, रोहिणी धेनुः, नीलमुत्पलं—इति द्रव्यस्यैव तेन तेन विशेषणेन प्रतीयमानत्वात्, द्रव्यात्मकतागुणः"

(वि०भा०, 2-2-17.)

[2] "सर्वगतः (*i.e.*, immanental) परमेश्वरः—एकः स्वतन्त्रश्च (*i.e.*, transcendental)"——कठ-भाष्य। The qualities are but the responses made by the individuals to the *Pran-spandan* which is the active common medium or environment which elicits the responses. The qualities are thus 'inter-connected relations.'

[3] "न हि उषरदेशः वडवत्-प्राण्यध्यारोपितोदकफेनतरङ्गादिमान्, तथा नात्मा अबुधारोपितक्लेशादिमलैर्मलिनो भवति" (मा०का०भा०, 3·8)।

A typical illustration analysed: cause strives towards future end which is real power present and realised in the changes which are inseparable. Inseparability proves their reality.

5. We should like to conclude this discussion by calling the attention of our readers to an important typical illustration given by Sankara with a view to clearly illustrate the steps of his own doctrine of causality as expounded by him in his Vedanta-bhāsya. We find this typical illustration admirably explained in the Brihadāranyaka-bhāsya. This powerful exposition of the theory makes it impossible, once for all, for us to look upon the world and its evolving changes (विकारs) as unreal or false. We have therefore to recognise this illustration as one fact of capital interest and importance to the student of the Adwaita philosophy which will make clear in a different way the problem, the solution of which we are seeking in this chapter; and will prove helpful in coming to a decision about it. We have therefore thought it fit to re-emphasise this illustration to which reference was made in a previous chapter.

Sankara explains here the idea of the cause and the effects which emerge in succession from it by an illustration of a clod of earth (मृत्तिका) and its successive transformations until its *last* transformation—the Jar (घट)—is reached. The ultimate future end is present, he says, in the real nature or स्वरूप of the causal substance. It is impossible to hold it to be non-existent in the cause. To deny this presence is to make the passage clearer for the easy entrance of that undesirable guest—*Asat-karjya-vada* (असत् कार्यवाद). Until it is completely realised, the End—though future—must be held to be present in the nature of the cause.[1]

---

[1] "प्रागुत्पत्तेरपि सदेव कार्यं। तस्मात् घटाद्यभिव्यक्त्यर्थिनो नियत एव कारकव्यापारोऽर्थवान्।...एवञ्च सति, घटस्य प्रागभाव इति—न घटस्वरूप मेव प्रागुत्पत्तेर्नास्तीति।...स्वेन हि भविष्यद्रूपेण घटो वर्त्तते"।

The potter, Sankara observes, with a view to produce this end, *viz.*, घट (jar) collects the मृत्तिका (clod of earth) and continues giving it its successive shapes (in the form of चूर्ण, पिण्ड, कपाल, etc.). You cannot, Sankara goes on, deny this striving on the part of the potter towards this future end.[1] He says that, it is necessary, for an end to realise itself completely, to pass through certain antecedent transformations or stages.[2] It follows therefore that the future end is present throughout the successive stages of the मृत्तिका—though not in actual form ("वर्त्तमानतारूपेण"), but still it is present throughout in the form of future possibility [3] in the nature of मृत्तिका।

Now, we must apply this typical case of मृत्तिका and its final realisation in the form of घट, to all the individual changes in the world. We come then to learn from the Sankara's exposition just stated that—

> in the real nature or स्वरूप of an individual being, the future *end* is present, and this end works in it.
> And in order to have its final realisation, this end will necessarily have to pass

---

[1] "अनागतार्थि-प्रवृत्तेश्च। न हि असती अर्थितया प्रवृत्तिर्लोके दृष्टा।... असंवेत् भविष्यद्दृटः, ऐश्वरं भविष्यद्दृटविषयं प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं मिथ्या स्यात्"।

[2] "कारणे वर्त्तमानं कार्य्यं कार्य्यान्तराणामावरणमित्यवोचाम। ... पिण्ड-कपालाद्यवस्थयो विद्यमानमेव घटादिकार्य्यं ..... घटादिकार्य्यार्थिना ..... घटाद्युत्पत्तौ ... यत्नः कर्त्तव्यः"।

[3] "स्वेन हि भविष्यद्रूपेण घटो विद्यते। न हि पिण्डस्य वर्त्तमानता, कपालस्य वा घटस्य वा भवति। ... तस्मात्कुलालादिव्यापारे वर्त्तमानतायां, प्रागुत्पत्तेर्घटोऽस्तीति न विरुध्यते (*i.e.* घट is not present *actually*, but as a *future* possibility.)" ... "किञ्च, प्रागुत्पत्तेः प्रभावभूतस्य घटस्य स्वकारणसत्ता-सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेः, क्रियायत्तत्वात् सम्बन्धस्य" (*i.e.*, the change being a *relation*, must have two terms of relation—the present and the future. The future cannot therefore be non-existent or असत्।

through its preceding successive transformations or stages, until at last it becomes finally realised in its last stage.[1] This last stage is therefore the *end* of the individual being and this end is therefore a future possible power, present in the individual; and it works in all the changes as its *purpose*. This end (or purpose) is the *real cause*; for it reveals itself more and more through the successive transformations or stages and completes itself in the last stage.

Is it possible, then, to *separate* any of these *changes* or stages from the underlying स्वरूप (swarupa) of the individual and to treat them as independent things (अन्यवस्तु)? For, how is it possible to know the real nature of the cause until it reaches, and fully reveals itself in, its last change or stage [2]?

"न तु 'वस्तुवृत्तेन' विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति"।
....."परमार्थतः स्वरूपात् 'व्यतिरेकेण'
अभावः कार्य्यस्य"।

For this reason, Sankara has repeatedly remarked that no effects can be treated as something *distinct* and *different* from their underlying cause. For, it is the cause which is revealing or realising itself *in* these changes. The effects are therefore nothing but the necessary *expressions*

---

[1] "It has been noted that the underlying cause must be present up to the time the *last* effect is produced" "हेतुस्वभावस्य फलकालावस्थायित्वं" and "हेतुस्वभावानुपरक्तस्य फलस्य अदर्शात्" (वे० भा०, 2.2.15 and 20). For it is seen everywhere that the *last* effect (फल) is always accompanied and coloured by the underlying cause.

Cf. the expression—"एकविज्ञानेन सर्व्वविज्ञानं भवति"।

(संस्थानमात्रं) of the cause which is present and operative behind them.

Is it then possible for Sankara, who gives such description, to deny the effects or changes and to declare them to be false or unreal ? The falsity only comes in, if you regard the nature (स्वरूप) of the underlying cause actually *lost* in these effects emerging from it ;—if the स्वरूप is resolved into and thus *identified with* these changes—as if it has become something *other than* itself (*i.e.*, अन्य),—as if the underlying Brahma is actually working as the aggregate of the empirical changes.[1]

Sankara has, everywhere in his Bhasyas called the world unreal or false *in this sense alone.*

6. We have tried in the preceding pages, to find out the real intention of the Leader of the Adwaita school of thought in the Indian Philosophy, and examined carefully all possible cases which may produce in the mind some confusion about the unreality of the diversities of náma-rupa emergent in the world. It is, however, not necessary to push our examination any further and the considerations we have so far made will, we hope, clear away all misapprehensions which certainly exist about the problem of the unreality of the objective world of facts and we may fairly conclude that we are not committed to the universal nihilism in the Sankara's school of Philosophy. A few words

There is no conflict between परिणामवाद and विवर्त्तवाद। Multiplicity does not oppose unity --but is incorporated in it.

---

[1] " न कारणात् 'अन्यत्' कार्य्यं वर्षशतेनापि शक्यं निषेतुं ... एवं युक्तेः कार्य्यस्य प्रागुत्पत्तेः सत्त्वं अनन्यत्वञ्च कारणात्—अवगम्यते " (वे०भा०,
" न च विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण 'वस्त्वन्यत्वं' भवति ... स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् "—
" अनात्मदर्शिनस्तु तदतिरिक्तवस्त्वन्तरेक्षोः——'ममेदंस्यात्' 'पुत्रस्य इदं' 'भार्य्याया इदं'—इत्येवमीहमानः पुनः पुनः जनन-मरण-प्रबन्धारूढ ... ... । सर्व्वात्मदर्शिनस्तु (*i.e.*, अनन्यत्वदर्शिनः) तदसम्भव एव " (ई०भा०, 4.4.2.)

must, however, be added in regard to one point of primary importance, before we conclude this line of our enquiry.

We have said that Brahma (as well as the individual-selves) possesses a स्वरूप, a nature of its own. In order to realise this स्वरूप, Brahma has created and evolved the world [1] and the world is moving from the lowest to the highest stages.[2] This movement has become possible for the world, because behind each stage, that eternal principle (पूर्वसिद्धः आत्मा) is present, which is gradually expressing itself in and through these stages or changes.

The reader who has followed us thus far will now find that such is the position which Sankara has taken up in the Vedanta philosophy. Against this position, however, an objection may be urged to the effect that if the multiplicity of the changes is held to be *not false* or *unreal*, what would be the fate of the *Sruti* which insistently declares that—

> "there is only *one* principle Brahma which is *without a second*—secondless"—
>
> "ब्रह्म एकं अद्वितीयम्"।

There is thus a *conflict* between the statement of the *Sruti* and the position established by Sankara.[3] To this supposed objection, Sankara thus replies—

(*i*) To the ordinary ignorant people,—who under the influence of *avidyá*, resolves

---

[1] "पूर्वसिद्धोऽपिहि सन् आत्मा विशेषेण विकारात्मना परिणमयामास आत्मानं" (वे०भा०) "यच्च यदात्मना यत्र न वर्त्तते, न तत् तत उत्पद्यते; यथा सिकताभ्यस्तैलं" (वे०भा०)।

[2] "नामादि प्राणान्तानि उत्तरोत्तर-विशिष्टानि तत्त्वानि, अतितराञ्च तेषामुत्कृष्टतमं भूमाख्यं तत्त्वं" (छा०भा०, । "विकाराणां सदैव समाप्तिः अवसानं" (छा०भा०)।

[3] "नामरूपोपाध्यस्तित्वे,—'एकमेवाद्वितीयं' इत्यादिश्रुतयो विरुध्येरन—इति चेत्? न; सलिलफेन दृष्टान्तेन परिहृतत्वात् मृदादिदृष्टान्तैश्च" (ब्र०भा०, 3.5.1)।

the underlying unity (Brahma) into the multiplicity of the changes and thus identifies the two,—the multiplicity of the changes is the *only* Reality. Thus no question of conflict between the unity and the multiplicity can arise here.[1]

(*ii*) But those who have realised the truth that the underlying unity (ब्रह्म) is untouched (unaffected) by the evolving multiplicity of changes—do not regard these changes as something separate and apart (व्यतिरिक्त) from Brahma, do not look upon them as so many independent and self-sufficient 'things' (अन्य) complete in themselves.[2] To these people, the multiplicity of changes would appear merely as a *means* (उपाय, द्वारभूतानि), as a mere indicative *mark* (परिचायक लिङ्गानि), as an *expression* (संज्ञानमात्रं)—of the underlying Brahma.[3]

---

[1] "यदा तु स्वाभाविक्या अविद्यया ब्रह्मस्वरूपं ..... केनचिदस्पृष्टस्वभावमपि सत्, नामरूपकार्य्यकरणोपाधिभ्यो विवेकेन नावधार्य्यते—नामरूपोपाधिदृष्टिरेव भवति स्वाभाविकी,—तदा सर्व्वोऽयं वस्त्वन्तरास्तित्वव्यवहारोऽस्ति" (ब्र०भा०, 3.5.1)।

[2] "यदा तु परमार्थदृष्ट्या परमात्मतत्त्वात् ..... 'अन्यत्वेन' निरूप्यमाने नामरूपे ..... 'वस्त्वन्तरे' तत्त्वतो न स्तः, तदा 'एकमेवाद्वितीय' मित्यादि परमार्थदर्शनगोचरत्वं प्रतिपद्यते, अतो न काचन विरोधाशङ्का" (ब्र०भा०, 3.5.1)।

"स्वतन्त्रत्व-निषेधेन स्वतःसत्तानिषेधात्, न अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधः ..... नतु ऐक्याभिप्रायेण" (आनन्दगिरि०व्याख्या)। "कारणात् 'व्यतिरेकेण' अभावः कार्य्यस्य" (वे०भा०)।

[3] "नामरूपादि ..... सत्यस्य परमार्थस्य उपलब्धि-'द्वारं' भवति" (छा०भा०, 7.17.1 "विकार-'द्वारेणापि' ब्रह्मणो निर्देशः कर्त्तव्यः। ... तानि नामादीनि प्राणान्तानि निर्दिश्य, तद्'द्वारेणापि' भूमाख्यं तत्त्वं निर्दिष्यामि" (छा०भा० and ब्र०भा०)।

> The gradually evolving changes [1] would appear to these people, merely as an *instrument* (परार्थ) for the realisation of the purpose (स्वार्थ) [2] —of the underlying Brahma. Thus there is no possibility for a *conflict* (विरोध) between the unity and the multiplicity here also.

After establishing his theory in his commentary on the Vedanta, Sankara has expressly recorded his remarks thus—

> "The author of the *Brahma-Sutras* himself saw no reason for rejecting or negating the manifested changing world (कार्य-प्रपञ्च). The *Sutra-kâra* adopts the विवर्तवाद (*i.e.*, the principle of unity) as of supreme value ; but he has also *retained* परिणाम (*i.e.*, the fact of the multiplicity of changes) as of subordinate value and entirely dependent on the former."[3]
>
> In his commentary on the Mándukya-kârikâ, Sankara himself expressly tells us that there is really no *conflict* between

---

"पाणि-पादादय: ..... ज्ञेयसद्भावे 'लिङ्गानि'—गौ०भा०, 13-13"। "सत्-'संस्थान' मावमिदं सर्व्वं" (छा०, 6.2.2)। "सदेव संस्थानान्तरेण अवतिष्ठते," *ibid.*

"यत् जगदाकार परिणामित्वादि श्रूयते, तत् ब्रह्मदर्श'नोपाय'त्वेनैव विनियुज्यते" (वे०भाष्य)।

[1] "नामादि प्राणान्तानि उत्तरोत्तरविशिष्टानि तत्वानि, अतितराच्च तेषामुत्कृष्टतमं भूम्याख्यं तत्वं" (छा०भा०)—इत्यादि।

[2] "स्वार्थेन असंहतेन परेण केनचित् अप्रयुक्तं संहतानामवस्थान न दृष्टं ..... संहतानां 'परार्थे'त्वं दृष्टं" (कठ०भा०)।

[3] "सूत्रकारोऽपि परमार्थाभिप्रायेण 'तदनन्यत्व' मित्याह। अप्रत्याख्यायैव च कार्य्यप्रपञ्चं, परिणाम-प्रक्रियाच्च आश्रयति" (वे०भा०, 2. 1. 19.)।

the *Dwaita* (the Empirical world of facts) and the *Adwaita* (Non-Dualism, *i.e.*, the fact of unity)[1]—for the reasons advanced above.

Ânanda-giri also in elaborating the idea of Sankara has by an illustration shown that no *conflict* really arises between the two standpoints—the empirical truth and the transcendental truth.[2]

It will be seen that we have tried in this chapter, as well as in others, to present Sankara before our readers, as he reveals himself in his own writings; and we hope that our readers will agree with us in thinking that it is not possible to come to any other conclusion than that which we have sought to reach here, from a deep and careful reading of his commentaries. It is our firm conviction that a great injustice has been done to this great philosopher of India in respect of this most vital point upon which rests his great मायावाद—the Theory of Mâyâ.

---

[1] "तेनायं हेतुना अस्मत्पक्षो न विरुध्यते तैः, हेतैः। ... ... अस्मदीयोऽयं 'सर्व्वानन्यत्वात्' आत्मैकत्वदर्शनपक्षो न विरुध्यते तैः, यथा स्वङ्गुलपादादिभिः" (मा०का०भाष्य, 3-17-18)।

[2] "यथा पुरोवर्त्तिनि भुजगाभावमनुभवन् विवेकी—'नास्ति भुजङ्गो रज्जुरेषा कथं विभषीति' भान्तमभिदधाति। भान्तस्तु स्वकीयापराधादेव भुजङ्गं परिकल्प्य भीतः पलायते न च तत्र विवेकिनो वचनं मूढदृष्ट्या विरुध्यते। तथा परमात्मकूटस्थात्मदर्शनं व्यवहारिक-जनादिवचनेन अविरुद्धं" (मा०कारि० भाष्ये, 4-57)।

CHAPTER IV

Place of Ethics and Religion in Vedanta.

---

1. It is very widely believed that one of the fixed tenets in the Vedanta is that the work or कर्म is, after all, a bondage which ties a man to this metempsychosis or *Samsára* (संसार). One must try therefore to get rid of this bondage and secure his final release or मुक्ति from it. It necessarily follows from this that the Vedantic मुक्ति (Mukti) is equivalent to the emptying of the human soul, which directs all its energy to leave the human life devoid of all actions and thus to make it a barren desert. It is also generally held that human desires or कामना are condemned wholesale in this system of philosophy in no unequivocal language and unmistakable terms; and it is the desires which lie at the root of all works. To kill the desires outright is evidently the sole aim of the Vedanta and their total annihilation, it is thought, is enjoined in an authoritative tone, whose voice can be heard from every page of the Vedantic literature. In dealing with this subject, a writer has thus expressed his idea:—

Opinion prevails that *Vedanta* is opposed to Ethical Theism and is ante-theistic in religion. Its goal is—not enrichment but emptying of human soul.

> "The Indian Theism, because of its bondage to the Karma idea, has been unable to rise to a high conception of the Divine character. In making motive itself the

> fetter, instead of evil motive, it turned its back upon the ethical goal and suggested the endeavour to escape from the region of the ethical altogether.....The endeavour to get rid of desire is an endeavour to pass beyond the good, and ends in confounding the conscience with covetousness."

As the entire man is thought to be a mere sum-total of "desires and works mechanically related," and as his virtues and vices are all relegated to the empirical region and are described as false and unreal ;—it has been generally supposed that the destruction of the individuality which consists merely in the desires, works, pleasure, pain, *etc.*, is the aim of this philosophy which seeks absorption of one's being in the "difference-less pantheistic empty void" which it calls *Nirguna Brahma* (निर्गुण ब्रह्म) and such absorption is the मुक्ति which it teaches.[1] The healthy enrichment and expansion of the human soul by the acquirement and cultivation of moral virtues, it is seriously maintained, is out of place in this system of philosophy. And a philosophical system which, it is very justly concluded, can shed no wholesome influence upon the life and conduct of man and human society, has very little practical interest which it can evoke and so it stands condemned in its own teaching.

Such, in fact, are the ideas and conclusions which are to be found extensively gaining ground both in Europe and

---

[1] *Cf.*, "The method of attaining to the *Âtmá*, according to the teaching of the Upanishads, is that of *making the human spirit a desert.****The goal of effort is an absorption in which all difference is lost. Every movement of the mind and heart must be cast forth and stilled.

in India even among the best and the most sympathetic critics of the Adwaita philosophy.

We propose in this chapter to cautiously examine the validity of the assertions above referred to, and to see if such conclusions as have been drawn find any support from the writings of Sankara—the great interpreter and leader of this school of thought. We shall also try to discover what constitutes the real teaching of the Vedanta and to determine if Ethics and Religion do not form an integral and essential part of the Vedantic theory.

Man's impulsive nature or disposition (जैव-प्रकृति or स्वभाव).

2. Every man is born endowed with a psychological disposition which may be traced to the origin of the human race, and which constitutes the most essential heritage for him to which he has succeeded. In this disposition are to be found imbedded all his natural instincts and habits, his love and hatred, his pleasure and pain, his appetites and passions, and his entire stock of impulses and desires. It is the receptacle of all the race-experience, and his past impressions or संस्कारs lying deep in it in a latent form, ready to rise up to the surface at the slightest notice or call. Sankara would call this disposition—जैव-प्रकृति or स्वभाव or nature,[1] and man is *passive* (अस्वतन्त्रः, अवशः)

[1] *Cf.* Sankara's observations in the *Taittiriya-bhasya*—"जन्मान्तरकृतसंस्कारेभ्यो...जन्मनैव विरक्ता दृश्यन्ते केचित्; केचित्तु कर्मसु प्रवृत्ता अविरक्ता विद्याविद्वेषिणः" (तै° भा°, 1.11). *Cf. also* "दृश्यते च केषाञ्चित् कासुचित् क्रियासु चित्रकर्मादिलक्षणासु जन्मत एव कौशलं कासुचित् अत्यन्तसौकर्य्ययुक्तास्वपि अकौशलं। तथा विषयोपभोगेषु स्वभावतः एव केषाञ्चित् कौशलाकौशले" (ब्र° भा°, 4.4.2).

in respect of this स्वभाव (nature) which determines him and his actions, and which is revealed when he is born. It is owing to this disposition that man has likings and dislikings for particular sense-objects;—that some men are seen from their childhood evincing natural attachment to mundane objects of enjoyments, and others developing natural aversion to temporal pleasures.[1]

An idea of how this 'disposition' (जैव प्रकृति) has been described in the Vedanta-works can be formed from the following:—

(*a*) "Nature (प्रकृति) is the *Samskára* (the latent self-reproductive impression of the past acts of Dharma and a-Dharma) manifesting itself at the commencement of the present birth.....All living beings follow their own nature."

(*b*) "Nature स्वभाव is the tendency (Samskâra —Básaná) in living beings acquired by them in the past births, and manifesting itself in the present birth ready to yield its effects, and this 'nature' is the source of the *Gunas*, it being impossible for the *Gunas* to manifest themselves without a cause."

(*c*) "As regards all sense-objects, there necessarily arise in each case love (रागः) for an

---

[1] Sometimes, Sankara calls this 'disposition' as—"अविद्यादि-कामक्लेशाश्रयः" (गी° भा°. 8.18). Since, this disposition is the natural determinant of all our activities, and it is the root of our desires, pleasure and pain stimulated from it. The term *avidya* is used in its connection, because it is not the 'true' self but Sankara describes it as composed of 5 sheaths or "मनोमयादिभिः पूर्वपूर्वव्यापिभिरुत्तरोत्तरैः सूक्ष्मैरानन्द-मयान्तैः आकाशादिभूतारब्धैः...'आत्मवन्तः' सर्वे" (तै°, 2.3).

agreeable object, and aversion (द्वेष:) for a disagreeable object. When desire (काम:) arises, it rouses the *Rajas* and urges the person to action." [1]

This 'nature' or empirical character of the man is a gradual development in consequence of his education, association, society and the circumstances in which he is born and brought up. This is the unformed, undisciplined animal nature in man. Thus, man is born with a fund of animal impulses and inclinations which are the source of his movements or the tendency to activities. He is born subject to desires—love and hatred—राग-द्वेष—which colour his whole nature. Man is, at the beginning no better than an animal being. He is just emerged from nature; he is not yet a self-conscious being. He is simply 'aware' or 'conscious' of certain passive feelings aroused in him in consequence of his contact with the outward environment, and of certain impulses within, spontaneously rising and demanding their satisfaction—moving him towards, and repulsing him away from, the agreeable and disagreeable objects, as the case may be. In fulfilling his काम-क्रोध (impulses of love and hatred), he fulfils his life's entire purpose. These impulsive movements are always accompanied by pleasure and pain which leave their impression upon the mind. Mere idea of pleasure, thus, becomes the guide of his life and the sole guide of his movements and actions.

---

[1] (a) "प्रकृतिर्नाम धर्माधर्मादिसंस्कार: वर्त्तमानजन्मादावभिव्यक्त:.....तस्या: सदृशमेव सर्व्वो जन्तु: चेष्टते" (गी० भा०, 3.33).

(b) "जन्मान्तरकृत: संस्कार: वर्त्तमानजन्मनि स्वकार्य्याभिमुखत्वेनाभिव्यक्त: 'स्वभाव:'.....गुणप्रादुर्भावस्य निष्कारणत्वानुपपत्ते:" (गी० भा०, 18.41).

(c) "शब्दादिविषये इष्टे राग:, अनिष्टे द्वेष:,—अवश्यम्भाविनौ।.....कामो हि उद्रतो रज: प्रवर्त्तयन्, पुरुषं प्रवर्त्तयति" (गी० भा० 3.34 and 37).

> "Desire is the longing for a pleasure-giving agreeable object of experience when actually coming within the ken of our senses or heard of or remembered; and anger is the aversion for the disagreeable, for the cause of pain when being seen or heard of or remembered."
>
> (*Gītā-bhsāya*, 3, 23.)

Man is completely passive here and utterly at the mercy of these impulses. This is the empirical, actual self.

Sankara is reluctant to call this self a self at all. He is fond of calling it अनात्मा. There is *agency* in this self no doubt; but this is no real agency at all. For, all the necessary elements constituting the agency of this self are reciprocally determined by their antecedents and consequents in time. The actions involving movements of the body, sense organs, *manas*, etc., are necessarily mechanically determined by, and are the resultant of, their antecedent conditions in time——

> "चलनात्मकस्य कर्म्मणः अनात्मकस्यैकस्य
> 'अहं करोमीति' प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात्"
>
> (गी० भा० 18. 66.)

None of these actions can, therefore, be called 'free.'[1]

In such a life, there is no purpose, no end, no aim, no regulation.[2] As we are enslaved by these impulses and passions and blinded by their influence, we cannot discern

---

[1] *Vide* Chap. II of this book.

[2] "यो हि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्त्तते पुरुषः 'इष्टं मे भूयादिति'—न स आत्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं (End) लभते" (वे० भा०)। "कामक्रोधवशात्—कार्य्याकार्य्यविषय-विवेकायोग्यता अन्तःकरणस्य नाश उच्यते—नाशात् पुरुषार्थायोग्यो भवति" (गी० भा० 2. 63.) "करणानि हि मन-आदीनि नियमेन (Regulation) प्रवर्त्तन्ते, तन्नासति चेतनावति अधिष्ठातरि उपपद्यते" (के० 1. 1.)।

CENTRAL LIBRARY

our right path, we cannot choose our true End—our पुरुषार्थ—

> "परवशीकृतचित्तस्य असामर्थ्यं पुरुषार्थ-साधनप्रतिपत्तौ"।
> "To one whose mind is subject to the passions of desire and aversion, there cannot indeed arise a knowledge of things as they are, even of the external world. And it needs no saying that to such a man whose intellect is thus overpowered by passions of desire and aversion—इच्छा-द्वेष, there cannot arise a knowledge of the Innermost self." [1]

Actual man and possible man.

3. But is this the 'whole' man? Is man's environment without and his impulses within,—the sole determinant? Is there no other nature *higher* in man than this his 'animal nature'? Is there no स्वरूप—inner unity—underlying these manifold impulses and instincts which is the true source of his action?

What a man speaks and acts is not the whole man. All that flows from him—all his words, actions and movements cannot be the exhaustive expression of the man. It is wrong to identify the man with all these. What the man actually thinks and acts can never be equivalent to what the man is in his essence. What he *actually* feels, thinks and does—falls infinitely short of what is *possible*

---

[1] "इच्छा-द्वेषौ सुख-दुःखतद्धेतुसंप्राप्त्या लब्धात्मकौ भवतः यदा, तदा तौ सर्व्वभूतानां प्रज्ञायाः स्ववशापादानद्वारा परमात्मतत्त्वविषयज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धकारणं मोहं जनयतः।

नहि इच्छा-द्वेषवशीकृतचित्तस्य यथाभूतार्थ-विषयविज्ञानमुत्पद्यते बहिरपि। किमु वक्तव्यं ताभ्यामाविष्टबुद्धेः प्रत्यगात्मनि ज्ञानं नोत्पद्यते इति" (गी० भा०)। 7. 27.

for him to do.[1] He is not a mere sum-total of his feelings, impulses, habits gathered in the past. As much as he did express himself in his past records, and as much as he expresses himself in his present deeds and thoughts—fall far short of what properly constitutes his 'nature' or स्वरूप. These will always remain imperfect expressions of that inner 'nature' which these seek to express. It is because man is something 'more' than these. It is because Brahma, which is infinite and inexhaustible (अव्यय), is revealed in man and is present behind him.[2] It is for this reason that—no one of his expressions can fix the infinite and inexhaustible possibilities in man in a rigid and final form.[3]

Sankara has observed that infinite ज्ञानैश्वर्य (Infinite knowledge and power, etc.) lies concealed in man under the cover of his *actual* thoughts and deeds.[4]

---

[1] Such a life is swayed by each and every impulse as it is stimulated. How can there be unity and order in such life? The individual self is thus described—"That which first shows itself as the Inner most self (प्रत्यगात्मा) in the body, and turns out *in the end* to be identical with the supreme Reality—the Brahma."

प्रतिदेहं प्रत्यगात्मभाव: 'स्वभाव' :...देहमधिकृत्य प्रत्यगात्मतया प्रवृत्तं, 'परमार्थ-ब्रह्मावसानं'वस्तु—स्वभावोऽध्यात्मयुच्यते (गी० 8. 3.)।

[2] "सर्वेषु भूतेषु...एकं भावं—आत्मवस्तु अव्ययं पश्यति, तच्च भावं अविभक्तं (Indivisible) प्रतिदेहं—देहभेदेषु" (गी० भा० 18.20).

[3] It is wrong to restrict what is inexhaustible to its actual deeds and thoughts, as if these are its exhaustive expressions. In the Gita such idea has been condemned as a *támasa* idea. 'यत् कृत्स्नवत् (*i.e.*, यत् अव्ययं तत्.....एकस्मिन्नेव कार्ये सक्तं.....' एतावानेव आत्मा परमेश्वरो वा, नात:परमस्तीति'—ईदृशं ज्ञानं तामसानामेव भवति" (18.22). "यद्यपि कार्यात्मना उद्रिच्यते उद्गच्छति, तथापि यत् पूर्णत्वं तन्न जहाति—पूर्णमेव उद्रिच्यते" (बृ० भा० 5.1.1).

[4] "सोऽपि तु जीवस्य ज्ञानैश्वर्यतिरोभाव: देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिविषयवेदनादि योगात् भवति" (वे० भा० 3.2.6).

"विद्यमानमपि तत्तिरोहितं अविद्यादिव्यवधानात्"। "उपाधिकृतस्वरूपति-रोभावात्...स्वरूपस्य तु अनपायित्वात्" (वे० भा० 3.2.5 & 35). "तत्पुन: तिरोभूतं यतमानस्य जन्तो:.....ईश्वरप्रसादात् आविर्भवति" (3.2.5).

"Âtma," says Sankara, "has been expanded in man only. With other animals, eating and drinking alone constitute their sphere of knowledge. But man is entitled to approach and reach the supreme end of life (निःश्रेयस्). He it is who *desires to gain* the highest end by appropriate *means* and by knowledge (ब्रह्मविद्यया)."[1]

"अहमेव उत्कर्षे: अभ्युदय सत्प्राप्तिईतु:।
कैषां ?—भविष्यतां—भाविकल्याणानां
उत्कर्षप्राप्तियोग्यानां"

(गौ० भा. 10·34)

That is to say—'it is the actual presence of the Supreme End behind them—which constitutes the possibility for their *future progress* from the present stage to the next higher and higher stages—of those who are fit for such progress.'

"Man's distinction lies in the fact that instead of being passively disposed of by his impulses and desires, he can bring them under the law of the *rational self* which the impulses envelop."

It is this presence, within us, of something inexhaustible which makes us desire *more and more*, and it is for this *infinite possibility* in us that we never feel satisfied with our actual thoughts and deeds.

---

[1] किं पुन: प्राधान्यं ? कर्म्मज्ञानाधिकार: ।...पुरुषे त्वेव आविस्तरामात्मा ; स हि प्रज्ञानेन सम्पन्नतम: विज्ञानं पश्यति अश्नानं···मर्त्तेन अमृतं ईप्सति । इतरेषां पशूना मशना-पिपासे एव अभिविज्ञाने" (तै० भा० 2·1) । "मनुष्य एव विशेषतोऽभ्युदय-नि:श्रेयसाधने अधिक्रत...(बृ० 1·4·10).

Man solely responsible for his deeds.

Because of this *possibility* of man that he is held responsible for the works—good or bad—done by him. How is it that we do not make animals accountable for their evil works? What is it that distinguishes a man from the lower animals? It is not at all *possible* for an animal to do otherwise than what is dictated to it by its *actual* nature, by its impulses and passions. But with man the case stands differently. He could have, had he only paused and deliberated, seen the consequences of his impulsive actions which he had indulged in. There was, in him, a possibility for a better course of action than what he had done, and this possibility he had ignored. Why did he, in following his evil impulse, stoop to an animal satisfaction? It is for this that we hold the man responsible for his evil deed and punish him for it. We all know, his actual life is not all-in-all to him; infinite possibility lies hidden in him. An infinite possibility either for good or for evil is always present in him. It is for this possibility within man that nobody can tell how he will express himself at the present crisis. It was for this possibility within him that the notorious Jagái (जगाइ) whose life had seemed irrevocably fixed in evil ways, was suddenly shocked into his real life and quite unexpectedly turned over a new leaf, resolving thenceforward to live a higher life,—when the famous saint of Nadia—Srichaitanya—had extended his arms of love towards him in return for the bleeding injury he had received from the cruel hand of the miscreant. It is this possibility or power which is the shaping or directing force (प्रेरयिता) within us, bringing man, step by step, to the ultimate realisation of his final end—his परमपुरुषार्थ. Man's *actual present* life is this possibility *so far realised*;—is the partial and imperfect

manifestation or expression of this inexhaustible possibility.

4. Sankara has observed in more places than one that—

The nature of Self: (*i*) It is an end—Purposive-Power—utilises all its activities for its own realisation.

"all the movements visible in the world, all its works and activities —must have a regulative purpose present behind them which shapes them for its own realisation."

It not only holds good in the outward world, but it is also true in all the activities of the inner world. He continues—

> "it is also the case with all the impulsive movements which go on within the human organism—all the actions of the sense-organs, all the functions of the *manas*, intellect and the like."

This is an observation the value of which, it is needless to add, cannot be exaggerated. What are these movements and activities for? For what use do these aspirations, efforts and actions [सर्व्वा: प्रवृत्तय:] go on? Their value, Sankara points out, does not lie in that they exist alongside of Âtma, but in the *use* (कर्म्मत्वापत्तिनिमित्त) which the Âtma (the self) makes of them.

"दृशिकर्म्मत्वापत्ति-निमित्ता हि जगत:
सर्व्वा प्रवृत्ति:।—'अहमिदं भोक्ष्ये'
...'एतदर्थमिदं करिष्ये' 'इदं ज्ञास्यामि'
—इत्यादा"।[1]——

---

[1] *Vide* Gita, 9-10—

"मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृति: सूयते स चराचरं।
हेतुनानेन कौन्तेय जगत् विपरिवर्त्तते॥

Sankara explains the Stanza in this way—'The विपरिवर्त्तन of the world, *i.e.*, the continuously changing elements of the world are

All these activities of the organism have their only value in the fact that they may be used by the इशि—the rational "I" for his own purpose; that they may be *utilised* for his end; that they may prove *useful* [कर्म्मलापत्ति or उपकार] to him. Otherwise, all these actions and movements [प्रवृत्तय:] will entirely lose their value.[1] There is the Âtma or the self within, *other than* these movements and activities, *for whose sake* they act. This remark proves the self (आत्मा) to be a Purpose—and end—which is realised in these activities, and which utilises these for its own use.

Elsewhere, Sankara's remarks in this connection are equally valuable and bring the same important truth into prominence—

> "Suppose," he says there, "no Âtma (self) is present behind these activities (प्रवृत्तय:); there are only these activities working, but there is no purpose to regulate them. An absurd consequence will follow, *viz.*, nobody is present whose *purpose* they serve; nobody is there to use them, to utilise them—

---

moving to realise a Divine Purpose or end. The world with all its changing elements is moving for the realisation of the Final end. हेतुना निमित्तेन अगत अध्यक्षत्वेन जगत् चराचरं विपरिवर्त्तते सर्व्वावस्थासु ...जगत: सर्व्वा प्रवृत्ति:...अवगतिनिष्ठा अवगत्यवसाना। *i.e.*, ब्रह्मावगति—The realisation of Brahma is its अवसान, *i.e.*, the Final end. In the Vedantabhasya he says—अवगतिपर्य्यन्तं ज्ञानं···नात: परं किञ्चित् 'आकाङ्क्ष' अस्ति। *i.e.*, the realisation of Brahma is the पर्य्यन्त—the final goal where all desires find their fulfilment. Hence the sense of the stanza is that all activities are for the realisation of the final Purpose.

[1] "काष्ठ-लोष्ठसमस्य चेतनेन अप्रवर्त्तितस्य प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्ते:" [वि० भा०, 3-2-38]. All प्रवृत्ति (activities) without the self to direct them are like काष्ठ लोष्ठ.

"अप्रसिद्धे हि आत्मनि, स्वार्थाः सर्व्वाः
प्रवृत्तयः व्यर्थाः प्रसज्येरन्" [1]।—

> 'The activities would thus prove *useless* (व्यर्थाः); they would be to no purpose. For, there is no regulation of these activities; no purpose to guide them.' Thus there would be no order, no unity, no central purpose in the human life.

It has been stated elsewhere, as a general principle that—

> "the works and activities (प्रवृत्ति), if *severed and cut off* from their source, the self,—are entirely valueless or useless, like the broom, the stick, the dust on the road-side."[2]

This important truth is also expressed in the Kena-bhásya where the self has been established as a purpose—a will-power—and it is this purpose for whose sake all

---

[1] *Vide* Gita-Bhasya, 18-50. Here also the commentator remarks that the actions and the works point to something beyond them whose purpose they serve, for whose sake they act. Otherwise pleasure, pain, etc., would have to be supposed to be acting for the sake of pleasure and pain, etc.; the activities of the body are for the sake of the body. To avoid such absurd supposition, the existence of the self must be admitted whose purpose these activities realise. "न च सुखार्थं सुखं, दुःखार्थं वा दुःखं। आत्मावगत्यवसानार्थत्वाच्च सर्व्वव्यवहाराणां।" All activities are moving for the realisation of the self (आत्मा) which is their final end (अवसान)। It is the self which connects and determines all these functions and activities for its own *final* realisation. This is the significance of the commentary here.

[2] "स्वतः काष्ठ-लोष्टसमानि हि तानि (चक्षुरादीनां दर्शनादिसामर्थ्यानि) चैतन्यात्मज्योतिःशून्यानि" (ब्र०भा० 4-4-18). *Cf.* "काष्ठ-लोष्टसमस्य चेतनेनाप्रवर्त्तितस्य प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः" (वेदा० भा० 3-2-38)। *Cf.* also "न हि निरात्मकं किञ्चिद्व्यवहाराय अवकल्पते"।

the elements of the body act. And this purpose is, iu its nature, *other than* (स्वतन्त्र) these activities which it directs and controls and moves for its own realisation—

" स्वतन्त्रस्य इच्छामात्रेणैव मन-आदि-प्रेषयितृत्वं " [1]

Do not all these passages clearly imply that Sankara's idea about the self was that it is an End-initself—a Purposive power—which purpose *utilises* all its impulsive movements for its own realisation? Can, in the face of such clear expressions embodied in these passages, Sankara's self be treated as a "mere intelligence divorced from action"? We have gathered together principal passages on the subject and presented them before our readers with the hope that they may come to their own conclusion on this important point for themselves.

But we have not done as yet. To another passage which is found recorded in the Katha-Bhásya [2] we now beg to request our readers to turn their attention. This passage will show that the self is a 'free causality' which

(*ii*) It is a 'free causality.'

---

[1] *Vide* Kena-bhásya, 1·1. Sankara has observed here that "किं यथाप्रसिद्धमेव कार्यकारणसंघातस्य प्रेषयितृत्वं, किंवा संघातव्यतिरिक्तस्य स्वतन्त्रस्य इच्छामात्रेणैव मनआदिप्रेषयितृत्वं"? This power is distinguished from the actions of the body, organs, manas, etc.; it does not disintegrate into those activities, none of which endures. The self, as causal Power, does not yield to the impulsive activities, but it lies entirely outside these empirical series and determines them. "मनः न स्वतन्त्रं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविषये अत्युग्रदुःखे कार्ये वार्यमाणमपि पतति मनः। तस्मात्युक्त एव केनेषित मिति प्रश्नः"।

[2] *Vide* कठ-भाष्य, 2.2.5. " मन्दबुद्धीनां दुर्विवेकरूपे पुरुषं प्राप्तुतः श्रेयः प्रेयश्च। धीरः मनसा आलोच्य गुरुलाघवं पृथक् करोति, विविच्य च, श्रेय एव अभिवृणीते, प्रेयसोऽभ्यर्हितत्वात् श्रेयसः : यस्तु मन्दबुद्धिः सदसद्विवेकासामर्थ्यात् प्रेयः पशुपुत्रादिलक्षणम् वृणीते "—इत्यादि।

weighs its impulses and determines their activities for the realisation of its own End or purpose.

> " The supreme good (श्रेय:) and the mundane good (प्रेय) are confusedly presented to the man. The intelligent *compare* the two, and on mature *reflection* discern their *relative* value—their difference—and having thus reflected, they embrace the supreme good as worthier than the pleasurable. Then they adopt means to the attainment of the End chosen."

We thus compare, estimate our impulses, and they, thus, become *objects* of our contemplation. A sum-total of feelings, impulses, etc., cannot compare, deliberate and control any more than each feeling and impulse separately. only a *free* self can do so which *has* them, which is *above* them. In a comparison between the impulses, in a preference among them of what is the highest good, we are *agents* and we are *free*. A man thus freely makes a choice from among its several objects of choice and desire which are qualitatively higher; and ultimately chooses what he *rationally* decides to be his *highest-good*. If it be true that—I often act *in opposition to* what is my strongest desire at the present moment, it follows that my self acts *independently* of pleasure, temperament, habit, etc.—

> "सर्व्वो हि उत्तरोत्तरं बुभूषति लोकः,
> तस्मान्न पुत्रवित्तादिलोभैः प्रलोभ्योऽहं ।
> ततोऽधिकतरं पुरुषार्थं दृष्वापमपि अभिप्रेप्सुः"
>
> (कठ-भाष्य) ।

Similar remarks are found embodied in the Gita also—

> " Man is man only so long as his *antah-karana* is competent to discriminate

between right and wrong. When he is unable to do so, he is debarred from attaining the highest of human aspirations. Hence at the very commencement he must *rise above* the sway of राग-द्वेष—affection for and aversion to the sense-objects or pleasures and pains." He must restrain these natural tendencies, he must exert himself with vigour to resist these natural impulses, and then the action of his will is in an opposite direction."

" महता प्रयासेन स्वभावप्रवृत्तिनिरोधं
कृत्वा, प्रतिस्रोतः प्रवर्त्तनमिव, प्रत्यगात्मानं पश्यति।
(कठ-भाष्य) [1]

Unrestrained *desire* works mischief ; and urged by uncontrolled desire, the man commits sin and evil. We are bent on selfish ends and are deluded by 'egoism'—when uncontrolled desire urges us to action. We must, therefore, bring our impulses and desires under the law of *rational* self, into the path of our positive purpose of life which we have deliberately selected and which has filled up our entire being.

---

[1] The conversion of undisciplined animal nature in man into a disciplined, moral and virtuous character involves great effort (महता प्रयासेन). The effort of the whole man must be turned and concentrated from the natural direction to its opposite direction.

The same idea occurs in the Vedanta-bhásya also—"यो हि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्त्तते पुरुषः,...न च तेन आत्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं लभते ; तं आत्यन्तिक-पुरुषार्थाभिवाञ्छिनं, स्वाभाविकात् कार्य्य-कारण-संघातप्रवृत्तिगोचरात् विमुखीकृत्य, प्रत्यगात्मस्रोतसया प्रवर्त्तयन्ति " (वे० भा० 1. 1. 4)।

5. The foregoing discussion has brought into clear light an important truth before our mind. Both—the gratification of impulsive desires and the realisation of the highest purpose of life—cannot be pursued by the same man as an *object* of his desire. There exists a conflict between the selfish impulsive activities and the realisation of the supreme purpose of life. Both cannot be chosen by a man, as an object for his realisation.[1] There cannot be *two ends* of his life. Sankara has repeatedly shown that there is an eternal conflict (विरोध) between Karma (कर्म्म) and Jnan (ज्ञान). Unless a man feels disgusted (विरक्त) with the pleasure-giving mundane ends, he cannot choose the realisation of self as his supreme and only End of life.

Karma and Jnana :— Both cannot be the ultimate end or परम-पुरुषार्थ।

Sankara has expressed his own idea on the subject, thus :—

(*a*) "I desire to attain an End which is eternal, imperishable and transcendental; what shall I do with Karma which is opposite to it in its nature?"

(*b*) "Light and shade cannot co-exist. Interests in outward activities and interests in the inner self are mutually exclusive. The dualism between the spheres of virtue and prudence is an irreducible dualism whose rival claims it is impossible to adjust."

(*c*) "Unless our mind is turned away from the mundane objects, we are unable to

---

[1] This is the notorious कर्म्म-ज्ञान-समुच्चय, against which Sankara has written so much.

devote it to the realisation of the self. You cannot desire both—the outward objects and the inner self at the same moment. There is conflict between the two courses."

(*d*) "In the world people revel with mundane goods. It is not so with the wise whose revel is centred in the self alone. For the unwise there are many pleasures due to the sense-objects. But to the wise their sole rejoicing proceeds from the self."

(*e*) "A distinction has been made between Jnana-nishthá (ज्ञाननिष्ठा) and Karma-nishthá (कर्म्मनिष्ठा). Vedic works are intended for him only who has desires. The renunciation of these works is enjoined on him who seeks only the self."

(*f*) "He who wishes to reach the eastern sea, cannot have the same road that the man who wishes to go to the western sea chooses. The difference between the knowledge (ज्ञान) and the works (कर्म्म) is as wide as between a mountain and a mustard-seed."

(*g*) "Emancipation being the *result* of knowledge, how can a man desire the *result* of works?"[1]

---

[1] (*a*) "अहं नित्येन कूटस्थेन अचलेन ध्रुवेनार्थेन अर्थी। न तद्विपरीतेन। अतः किं कृतेन कर्म्मणा अनर्थसाधनेन?" (भ्रु० भा० 1.2.12)।

(*b*) "न हि बाह्यक्रियावान्, आत्मरतिश्च भवितुं शक्तः। बाह्यक्रियात्मक्रीड़योः विरोधात्; बाह्यक्रियाविनिवृत्तौ हि आत्मक्रीड़ो भवति कथित् कचित्। न हि तमः-प्रकाशयो युगपदेकत्रस्थितिः सम्भवति" (भ्रु० भा०, 3.14)।

We need not quote further passages. The passages quoted above all declare what really worked in the mind of Sankara, and what led him to make a distinction between ज्ञान and कर्म्म—knowledge and works. His purpose was not that we are to renounce all works—even the higher moral virtues ;—and, as we shall presently see, he was not advocating inertia. These and other similar passages clearly indicate the truth that there can be only *one* ultimate End of life. ज्ञान and कर्म्म *both* cannot constitute the supreme End. Karma (कर्म्म) done to secure mundane pleasures or goods and Jnâna (ज्ञान), *i.e.*, the realisation of the self—cannot *both* be the ultimate ends of life.

Sankara thus contrasts the result of the two—Jnâna (ज्ञान) and Karma (कर्म्म) :

> If you desire the realisation of the self as your highest end, how can you choose works or (कर्म्म) ? For, works or Karma

---

(*c*) " न हि अस्मात् अनात्मनोऽव्याहृतचित्तस्य, आत्मानमेव लोकमित्युपासितुं बुद्धिः प्रवर्त्तते। बाह्यप्रत्यगात्मप्रवृत्त्यो र्विरोधात् " (ब्र० भा०, 1.6.1)। " न हि बाह्यविषयालोचनपरत्वं, प्रत्यगात्मैचण्यत्वं—एकस्य सम्भवति " (कठ-भा०, 4.1)।

(*d*) ' 'देहमात्रसाधना 'रतिः,' बाह्यसाधना ' क्रीड़ा '—लोके। न तथा विदुषः ; किं तर्हि ? आत्मविज्ञाननिमित्तमेव उभयं भवति।.....शब्दादिनिमित्त 'आनन्दो'ऽविदुषां। न तथा विदुषः ; किं तर्हि ? आत्मनिमित्तमेव सर्व्वं " (छा० भा० 7.25.2)।

(*e*) " ज्ञान-कर्म्मनिष्ठयोर्विभागवचनात्।...अविद्या-कामवतएव सर्व्वाणि कर्म्माणि श्रौतादीनि दर्शितानि। तेभ्यो व्युत्थानं आत्मानमेवलोकमिच्छतोऽकामस्य विहितं " (गी० भा०, 2.10)।

(*f*) " न हि पूर्व्वसमुद्रं जिगमिषोः, प्रातिलोम्येन प्रत्यक्समुद्रजिगमिषुणा समानमार्गत्वं सम्भवति। प्रत्यगात्मविषयप्रत्ययसन्तानकरणाभिनिवेशस्य—ज्ञाननिष्ठा। सा, प्रत्यक्समुद्रगमनवत्, कर्म्मणा सहभावित्वेन विरुद्धयते। पर्व्वत-सर्षपयोरिव अन्तरवान् विरोधः " (गी० भा० 18.55)।

(*g*) " न ज्ञाननिष्ठा कर्म्मसहिता उपपद्यते। कैवल्यफले ज्ञाने, क्रियाफलार्थित्वानुपपत्तेः " (गी०, 18.66)।

can be chosen only for the following purposes :—

(*i*) You can choose Karma, if you are desirous of producing something which is as yet non-existent (उत्पाद्य). But as the self is what is already in you eternally existent, —how can Karma produce it?

(*ii*) If you desire to reach a place or an object you must perform certain activities or Karma for it (आप्य). But the self is what is always within your reach, no Karma is needed at all for it.

(*iii*) For the purpose of effecting a change or transformation to a thing, work or Karma may prove necessary (विकार्य्य). But as the self is beyond change, as it is subject to no transformation—is immutable—Karma is out of place here.

(*iv*) If you desire to effect purification to your mind or something else, work or Karma proves useful for the purpose (संस्कार्य्य). But what would action do to the self which is always pure? [1]

Now, from the foregoing discussion it follows that there can be but one object of our desire, one supreme end of our life, and that is—the realisation of the self. And works or Karmas are only needed for the purification of our mind or antáhkarana.

---

[1] *Vide* Vedanta-Bhásya, 1-1-4 and Brihadáranyaka-bhásya, 3-3-1, and other places for this discussion.

The place of higher altruistic Karmas : and their needs.

6. We have seen above that we are naturally selfish beings. We seek always the gratification of our pleasure, to appropriate which to ourselves, we do not hesitate to work mischief to others. Our mind is, by nature, filled up with desire for agreeable objects and aversion to disagreeable—राग-द्वेष,—and driven by these impulses, we work blindly for our selfish ends and often quarrel with others to secure pleasure to ourselves. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, for us to *purify* our mind from these selfish desires and inclinations, and to free it from their influences. Unless this purification can be effected, the realisation of the self is out of the question.

The purification of the mind or antahkarana can be effected by restraining these egoistic impulses and tendencies to action (negatively), and by performing higher kinds of works (positively). By exerting ourselves always for the good of the community and by the performance of unselfish and disinterested works, our mind may become gradually free from selfish passions and desires ; and when these impurities are thus removed, it is prepared for the supreme realisation. But a caution is needed here. These unselfish works ought not to be done, nay they cannot be done—as *ends*-in-themselves. As there can only be *one* supreme *End*, *viz.*, the realisation of the self which is the only object of our desire ; higher disinterested works can be done only *as a means* of helping that realisation. This, in brief, is the view of Sankara.

Works done with impulsive and selfish motives have been condemned in the Vedanta, as *Sakáma-Karmas*. And as such works have always been looked upon as the source of bondage, with a view to supplant and supersede these self-seeking activities, higher disinterested kinds of works have been prescribed and the

aspirants after emancipation (मुमुक्षु) are called upon to diligently perform these works. These higher works are considered indispensable for the purification of the mind (चित्तशुद्धि or सत्त्वशुद्धि), infested as it is with selfish impulses and desires.[1] And as these are done for emancipating the mind from the influence of the lower natural tendencies, which would ultimately lead to the realisation of the true self, these works cannot prove a bondage. If, however, the supreme end is forgotten, and these are done as ends-in-themselves, only then they will prove a bondage.

(1). They are indispensable for purification of mind (सत्त्वशुद्धि)

An idea prevails among many that in Sankara's System of Vedanta no room has been left for works and that his aim was to get rid of all works altogether. To our mind, this is an idea which cannot be accepted and which must be condemned as erroneous, with all the emphasis which we can command. We have said above that as our mind is naturally swayed by selfish passions and desires, it needs purification in order to prepare it finally for the realisation of the ultimate End which constitutes the only object of our desire. How this purification is to be executed will appear from the following passages :—

(*a*) "When a man performs higher kinds of *works* (Nitya-karmas or obligatory works), his mind or antahkarana, unsoiled by

---

[1] "इन्द्रिय-विषयसंसर्गजनित-रागादिमलकालुष्यापनयनेनात्, आदर्श-सलिलादिवत्, प्रसादितं स्वच्छं अवतिष्ठते यदा, तदा ज्ञानस्य प्रसादः स्यात्" (मु० भा०, 3-1-8)।
"दृष्टा हि अप्रसादितकल्मषसा उक्तेऽपि ब्रह्मणि अप्रतिपत्तिः, विपरीतप्रतिपत्तिश्च।" (केन० भा०, 4-8)।

desire for results,—without attachment and longing for results—becomes *regenerated and pure.* When thus purified, the mind becomes fit for contemplation of the self. Thus the man whose mind has been purified by the performance of obligatory works (नित्यकर्म्म) and who is thus *prepared* to acquire the self-realisation, may gradually attain to Jnāna-nishthá (the final End)."

(*b*) "The three higher kinds of action should be performed ; for, they cause *purity* in those who have no desire for fruits... These actions should be performed by a *seeker of liberation,* though they form the cause of bondage in the case of one who has an attachment for the actions and a desire for their fruits."

(*c*) "The seekers of liberation must perform ritual works and other obligatory duties without any longing for the fruits of such works. When performed, the works prove useful as a *means* to the birth of spiritual regeneration of the mind (विद्योत्पत्तौ)."

(*d*) "He who is free from a desire for the fruits of action and performs action as a bounden duty (Nitya karmas)—not as a Kámya-karma ; he who performs actions thus, is superior to those who perform action in a different spirit..... One who is devoted to action abandoning attachment for the results of action—performs for the purification of the mind

(सत्वशुद्धि) is said to be a Sanyāsin and a Jogin."[1]

(*e*) "Works are meant for the *purification* of the mind. Selfish desires and passions are *impediments* to self-realisation. Unselfish prescribed duties when not done with self-seeking motives remove these impediments, effect purification of the mind, and thus help the final realisation."[2]

We need not multiply instances. Such observations are to be found everywhere in the Vedanta works. The readers will judge for themselves if such observations at all favour the idea of *inertia* prevalent among the critics of the Sankara's theory. We find Sankara everywhere teaching that higher works which are described as Nitya-karmas must be done for the purification of the mind.

---

[1] (*a*) " यः नित्यं कर्म्म करोति, तस्य फलरागादिना अकलुषीक्रियमाणमन्तः-करणं, नित्यैश्च कर्म्मभिः संस्क्रियमाणं विशुध्यति। विशुद्धं प्रसन्नमात्मालोचनक्षमं भवति। तस्यैव नित्यकर्म्मानुष्ठानेन विशुद्धान्तःकरणस्य, आत्मज्ञानाभिमुखस्य क्रमेण तन्निष्ठा स्यात " (गी० भा०, 18.10) ।

(*b*) " यज्ञोदानं तपश्चैव पावनानि विशुद्धिकराणि फलानभिसन्धीनां।..... सासङ्गस्य फलार्थिनो बन्धहेतव एतान्यपि कर्म्माणि मुमुक्षोः कर्त्तव्यानि इत्यपि शब्दस्यार्थः " (गी० भा०, 18.5 & 6) ।

(*c*) " अनभिसन्धाय फलमनुष्ठितानि यज्ञादीनि मुमुक्षोर्ज्ञानसाधनानि भवन्तीति प्रपञ्चितं...धर्म्मविशेषैरनुग्रहो विद्यायाः सम्भवति" (वे० भा०, 3.4.27 & 38etc.)

(*d*) " यो हि कर्म्मफलतृष्णावान्, स कर्म्मफलमाश्रितो भवति। अयन्तु तद्विपरीतः अनाश्रितः कर्म्मफलं.....स कर्म्मान्तरेभ्यो विशिष्यते "।..." किं तर्हि ? कर्म्मी अपि। कर्म्मफलासङ्गं सन्न्यासः, कर्म्मयोगमनुतिष्ठन् सत्त्वशुद्ध्यर्थं—'स सन्न्यासी च योगी च' भवतीति स्मृयते " (गी० भा०, 6-1 ; and intro.) ।

[2] " कर्म्मणां विशुद्धिहेतुत्वात्। कर्म्मभिः संस्कृता हि विशुद्धात्मानः शक्नुवन्ति-आत्मानं अप्रतिबन्धेन वेदितुं।...एवं काम्यवर्জ্জितं नित्यं कर्म्मजातं सर्व्वं आत्म-ज्ञानोत्पत्तिद्वारेण मोक्षसाधकत्वं प्रतिपद्यते। एवं कर्म्मकाण्डेन सह एक-वाक्यतावगतिः " (ब्र० भा०, 4.4.22) ।

But a word of caution is again necessary. These are never to be performed *as an End*, *i.e.*, as an object of desire. For, as we have seen, there can only be *one* object of desire, —one End, *viz.*, the realisation of the true self.

(II) Why Karma-Section of the Veda not useless.

As a corollary to the above proposition, we may mention here another fact. The reader will find an objection raised by Sankara himself in several places of his works that—if the self-realisation be the only End which we must pursue, all works necessarily become useless. And the work-section (कर्मकाण्ड) of the Veda—in which rules and prescriptions have been elaborately laid down for the performance of works—does also prove utterly valueless. To meet this objection, Sankara replies :—

> "Only the selfish works (Sakámakarmas) are to be considered useless. The higher disinterested works (Nityakarmas) have always a value in the Vedanta ; they are never to be considered useless. For they are meant for the *purification* of the mind. Disinterested works always help the realisation of the self."[1]
>
> The reply suggested by Sankara in his commentary on the Gitá is still more valuable and deserves our particular consideration—"Our theory does not lead to the conclusion that the idea teaching

---

[1] "न च निष्प्रयोजना प्रवृत्तिः।...यदि हि आत्मविज्ञानेन आत्मविद्याविषयत्वात् परितित्याजयिषितं कर्म, ततः 'प्रक्षालनाद्धि पङ्कस्य दूरादस्पर्शनं वरं' इति अनारभ्य एव कर्मणः श्रेयान्।...एतत्तु सकामस्य, न निष्कामस्य। तस्य तु संस्कारार्थानि एव कर्माणि भवन्ति।...निष्कामस्य तु आत्मज्ञान-प्रतिबन्ध-प्रमार्ष्टा भवति। उत्पन्नात्म-विज्ञानस्य तु, अनारम्भो—निरर्थकत्वात्" (केन० भाष्य, 1.1)।

works proves useless. For, by restraining the first *natural activities* one after the other, and thereby gradually inducing fresh and *higher activities*, it serves to create an aspiration *to reach the innermost self.*"[1]

From these passages the readers will find a very clear enunciation of the Sankara's position about the works. It is not true that works have no place in his philosophy and that he considered all work as fetters. On the contrary, higher and higher works, as we have just seen, must always be performed—so long as we have not reached the final End where all works, all our duties find their completion and highest fulfilment—

"न च असति सम्यक्दर्शने, सर्व्वात्मना काम्य-प्रतिषिद्धवर्ज्जनं केनचित् प्रतिज्ञातुं शक्यं"— (वे० भा०, 4.3.14);

"यत् कर्त्तव्यं तत् सर्व्वं, भगवत्तत्त्वे विदिते कृतं भवेत्; न च अन्यथा कर्त्तव्यं परिसमाप्यते कस्यचित्"।—

(गी० भाष्य, 15.20)।

But here we must remind the readers of the note of warning which Sankara had sounded. No works, however high their nature, should be done as an end-in-itself; no work ought to be made an object of your desire (न द्रष्टव्यत्वेन). For, as an *object* of desire, work will constitute itself *as an end*. Wherefore it is that, everywhere it has been laid

---

[1] "न चेवं कर्म्मविधिश्रुतेरप्रामाण्यं। पूर्व्वपूर्व्वप्रवृत्तिनिरोधेन, उत्तरोत्तरापूर्व्व-प्रवृत्तिजननसा प्रत्यगात्माभिमुख्येन प्रवृत्त्युत्पादनार्थत्वात्" (गी० भा०, 18.66)। *Again cf*: "भगवत्कर्म्मकारिणो ये युक्ततमा अपि कर्म्मिणो ये, ते उत्तरोत्तरहीन-फलत्यागावसानसाधनाः" (गी० भा०, 18.66)।

down that works are not to be performed with a desire for their fruits (फलाकाङ्क्षा). Since, there can only be *one object* of desire, one ultimate End of life. Works ought not to be abandoned—

"न त्याज्यं, कार्य्यमेव तत्"—

They must be done for the purification of our mind—

"पावनानि मनीषिणाम्"—

which is full of impure thoughts and tendencies to activity. Only they must not be done as ends-in-themselves—as if they possess a primary and independent value in themselves. But their performance is always indispensably needed as a *means* (उपायत्वेनैव)[1] ; they must be utilised by us, so that they may prove *useful* for the ultimate purpose we have in view, *viz.*, the realisation of our final goal. The works, nay—everything of the world—have value, *not* as they exist alongside of the Atma, but only so far as they are *used* by us—how we use them—

"सन्निपत्य 'उपकारकत्वं' (ब्र० भा०, 4. 5. 15)."

"अहिंसा-ब्रह्मचर्य्यादीनाञ्च विद्यां प्रति

'उपकारकत्वात्" (तै० भा०, 1. 11).

"अनभिसन्धाय फलमनुष्ठितानि यज्ञादीनि

मुमुक्षो ज्ञान'साधनानि' भवन्ति" (वे० भा०, 3.4.27).[2]

---

[1] "परस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि चित्तावतारोपायत्वेनैव एते परिकल्प्यन्ते, न द्रष्टव्यत्वेन" (वे० भा०, 3. 3. 12) [Here 'उपायत्व' stands in *contrast* with 'द्रष्टव्यत्व'। उपायत्व useful as a means. न द्रष्टव्यत्वेन—*i.e.*, not as an End.]

[2] All the good and disinterested works and virtues are *means* useful for the realisation of the final End. They are to be looked upon as instruments (साधनानि) which we must use (उपकारक) as *helps* to the realisation of the self. They have value, only because they are *utilised* by the self for its own purpose.

"उपायभूतानि हि कर्म्माणि संस्कारद्वारेण ज्ञानस्य।"—केन० वाक्य भाष्य.

(iii) Higher Nitya-Karmas regenerate man from animality to rationality :

In this way, by the performance of disinterested higher works, the man is regenerated from the undisciplined 'animality' (पशुत्व – असुरत्व) to the disciplined 'rationality' (देवत्व). In the Brihadárányaka, the yielding of the mind to the natural inclinations and instincts has been called as Ashura-vába (असुरभाव—पशुत्व), and the doing of higher disinterested works for the good of the community, under the prescriptions of the shástras, with higher and unselfish purposes and inclinations has been designated as Deva-bháva (देवभाव).[1] If men follow passively the natural bents of their mind and permit them to become the sole guide of their life, they are no higher than animals. But if they obey the injunctions of the sâstras and work for social good and public utility—such disinterested motives and works will exalt them to the higher attributes of benevolent gods (देवत्व). This high lesson the Vedanta teaches. How to make men possessors of godly qualities—and thereby to establish a Divine kingdom on earth—is the aim of Vedanta. But here again the Vedanta has not stopped. Its ultimate aim is to carry the man to final realisation and to fulfil his *transcendental* destiny.

Higher, disinterested works cannot be hypostatised as an *End*. Two *reasons* stated. They are to be used as a *means*.

7. We have said that the higher forms of works—Nityakarmas—works done with disinterested motives cannot be treated as ends-in-themselves, but always as *means*—as a sâdhana (साधन) useful through the purification of mind, for the attainment of the true self which is our ultimate End.

---

[1] "स्वभावसिद्धौ राग-द्वेषौ अभिभूय, यदा शुभवासना-प्राबल्येन धर्म्मपरायणो भवति, तदा स 'देव':। यदा स्वभावसिद्ध-रागद्वेष प्राबल्येन अधर्म्मपरायणो भवति, तदा 'असुर:'।"—गीताभाष्यव्याख्यायां मधुसूदन:।

If, however, these works are treated as *ends*, as is generally done, some serious consequences will follow. Let us consider these consequences now.

We are all members of a social whole. We belong to Barnâsrama-community, of which we are the members. Certain rules and laws we find recorded in the *sastras* for our guidance. These laws are authoritative for us; because they form the collective experiences and opinions of the best selves of the community. It is generally held that certain rules and acts which have been evolved within the community for its own preservation, are imposed upon its individual members, so that each of them may observe and act up to these rules. Thus the preser vation or the good of the community becomes the *End* for which the individual members live and act. These actions are known as Barnasrama-Dharma (वर्णाश्रम धर्म्म) and we must all perform these Dharmas or duties for the good of the Barnasrama-community, of which, we as members, form parts. Its prescriptions (विधि) and its prohibitions (निषेध) are all binding upon us which each of us must obey. This is the generally accepted and usual view with regard to Barnasrama-Dharma. The individuals can have no other purpose in their life, but to perform these duties or Dharmas. Regarded in this way the individuals have only an instrumental value;—they are reduced to a machine somehow constructed to produce certain works beyond themselves, for the good of the community. They exist for these duties which they owe to the community of which they form quite an insignificant part; they have value only for these works. The community thus annexes the individuals to itself. The moral value of the individuals entirely depends upon their works—their service—their utility to the community as a whole. Their moral criterion is judged only by some *outward result* which

they can produce. Individual is thus entirely resolved into his works. If the outward works are regarded as ends in themselves ; such inevitable consequence is bound to follow.

But this cannot be the right view of the works. Sankara urges his objections against this view of the works thus—

He points out—

(I) Man cannot be made an object of command (नियोग-विषय) from outside. Man is not a *thing* to be passively moulded and shaped from outside.[1] He may be persuaded from the inner side, not controlled passively from the outside. Sankara has told us that—

"ज्ञापकं हि शास्त्रं, न कारकं"

"Man chooses his *end* according to his own light. The Sastras only present before him the lower and higher lines of conduct, but do not compel him to select a particular course of action. The Sastras do not mould the man to their own ideas of good ; they can only appeal to his inner self.[2]

---

[1] Vide Ved. bhasya, 3.2.21 and 2.3.48. "ज्ञानन्तु प्रमाणजन्यं, यथाभूतविषयञ्च। न तन्नियोगशतेनापि कारयितुं शक्यते ; न च प्रतिषेधशतेनापि वारयितुं शक्यते। वस्तुतन्त्रं हि तत्। अतोऽपि नियोगाभावः" (3.2.21).

[2] "न तु शास्त्रं भृत्यानिव बलात् निवर्त्तयति नियोजयति वा।...पुरुषाः स्वयमेव यथारुचि साधनविशेषेषु प्रवर्त्तन्ते। यस्य यथाभासः, स तथारूपं पुरुषार्थं पश्यति तदनुरूपाणि साधनानि उपादित्सते" (ब्र० भा० 2.1.20)। Hence, how can you say that the rules prescribed by the community (through its Sastras) are the *ends* to which the man is entirely *subordinated* ? As if the man is a *mere means* for the performance of these prescribed duties as his *end*.

(II) Again, Sankara points out that the ideas of good works (virtues) and bad works (vices) evolved within the community cannot be regarded as *ends in themselves*. For, he says, we find the ideas of virtue and vice in a particular epoch of society *differ* from the ideas of virtue and vice in the next or another epoch.[1] Again, "in the same epoch of the community different people select different works as ends." "What are looked upon as good works in a particular time and place are regarded otherwise in a different time and place." [2]

(III) It is also laid down in the Vedanta-bhasya that "in the progressively higher and higher worlds, the virtues and vices are being evolved in higher and higher forms up to *Brahma-loka* where they are perfected." [3]

---

[1] "उपासनेषु पूर्व्वस्मात् फलविशेषं उत्तरस्मिन् उपासने दर्शयति।...ब्रह्मतत्त्वेतु कथं फलविशेषः स्यात् ब्रह्मणोऽविशिष्टत्वात्" (वे० भा०4-3-16)। "विद्या 'साधन" स्ववीर्य्यविशेषात् स्वफले एव विद्यायां, *i.e.* virtues कञ्चित् अतिशयं आसञ्जयेत्।..... न विद्या-'फले' सुक्रौ।...न सुक्रावपि उत्कर्ष-निकर्षात्मकोऽतिशयः उपपद्यते।..... तस्यां चिराचिरोत्पत्तिरूपोऽतिशयो भवन् भवेत्" (वे० भा०, 3.4.5)।

[2] "तथाच यागाद्यनुष्ठायिनामेव विद्यासमाधिविशेषात् उत्तरेण पथागमनं; केवलेरिष्टापूर्त्तदत्तसाधनैः दक्षिणेन पथा।...तत्रापि साधन-तारतम्यं श्रूयते" (वे० भा० 1-1-4)।

"यस्मिन् देशे काले निमित्ते च यो धर्म्मोऽनुष्ठीयते, स एव देशकालनिमित्तान्तरेषु अधर्म्मो भवति" (वे०, 3.1.25)।

[3] "मनुष्यत्वादारभ्य ब्रह्मान्तेषु देहवत्सु सुखतारतम्यं अनुभूयते, ततश्च तद्धेतोर्धर्म्मस्यापि तारतम्यं गम्यते" (वे०, 1.1.4).

All these clearly show that virtues (and vices) are constantly evolving in higher and higher forms, and they are constantly growing with the progressively growing communities and the worlds. They cannot therefore be regarded as the *ultimate end of* life.

We can do no better than to repeat in this place the utterances of Sankara himself which embody his general views on the Barnâsram-duties (वर्णाश्रम धर्म्म). These remarks are important and we invite particular attention of our readers to them. These remarks bring the relation between the higher karmas (कर्म्म) and Jnâna (ज्ञान) very forcibly home to the mind; and the valuable bearing which the works have upon the self-realisation stands palpably revealed. Sankara writes—

> "These duties, respectively enjoined on the several castes, lead, when rightly performed, to swarga as their *natural result*..... But from the *operation of a new cause*, a higher result accrues; *viz.*, worshipping the Lord (ईश्वर) by performing his duty, man *attains perfection*, through his being qualified for the Jnana-nishtha.[1]
>
> (Gitâ-bhasya, 18-44-45.)

> "Can this *perfection* be attained *directly* by the mere performance of one's duty? No;—how then? ..... The perfection accruing in worshipping the Lord through

---

[1] "एतेषां जातिविहितानां, कर्म्मणांसम्यगनुष्ठितानां स्वर्गप्राप्तिःफलं स्वभावतः। ...कारणान्तरात्तु इदं वक्ष्यमाणं फलं।...स्वकर्म्मानुष्ठानात् अशुद्धिक्षये सति, कार्य्येन्द्रियाणां ज्ञाननिष्ठायोग्यतालक्षणां संसिद्धिं लभते"।

one's own duties qualifies the aspirant for the Jnana-nishthá which *culminates* in Moksha" (18-56).[1]

In this manner—

"the works which are held as a *bondage* are converted into a *means* for the *self-realisation.*"[2]

From these observations, we can now conclude that the works (Karma) when regarded *as ends,* as objects of desire—do prove a *bondage,* and they come into *conflict* with the Jnána (*i.e.*, the self-realisation). But taken *as a means,* and used as such, this conflict (विरोध) between them vanishes, and instead of offering opposition to Jnâna, the works prove a very useful ally—

"तेषां निरभिसन्धीनां नित्यानां कर्म्मणां
आरादुपकारकत्वात्, मोक्ष-साधनान्यपि
कर्म्माणि भवन्तीति, न विरुध्यते"
(ब्र० भा०, 3-3-1)।—

The rights, therefore, of Karma as separate and rival interests, as rival ends-in-themselves—must die; because Karma is *superseded and included in* one supreme interest or end of life. All works thus become *an element in* this one interest, and *organic* to this one central purpose.[3]

---

[1] "किंस्वकर्म्मानुष्ठानत एव साक्षात् संसिद्धिः? न; कथंतर्हि?...स्वकर्म्मणा तमीश्वरं अभ्यर्च्य केवलं, ज्ञाननिष्ठायोग्यतालक्षणां सिद्धिं विन्दति मानवः।...ज्ञाननिष्ठा मोक्षफलावसाना"।

[2] "ननु बन्धहेतूनां कर्म्मणां कथं मोक्षहेतुत्वं? उपासनाविशेषादित्याह 'तच्छुतेः' इत्यादिना" (मधुसूदन's gloss)।

[3] *Cf.* "ज्ञानस्यैव हि प्रापकं सत् कर्म्म प्रणाड्या मोक्षकारणं भवति। तस्मात् कर्म्मणोऽपि ज्ञानसंयुक्तस्य 'मोक्षकार्य्यौपपत्तेः'" (वे० भा० 4-1-16). And also *cf.* मुमुक्षुणा मोक्षप्रयोजनोद्देशेन कृतं—प्रतिबन्धकारणोपात्तदुरितक्षयहेतुत्वद्वारेण—ब्रह्मविद्यया सह 'एककार्य्यं' भवति" (वे० भा० 4-1-18)।

CENTRAL LIBRARY

All works now become the medium, the vehicle, the opportunity for the realisation, in and through them, of the spiritual purpose—

"सर्व्वं कर्म्माखिलं पार्थ ज्ञाने परिसमाप्यते"।

What then is the outstanding relation between Karma and Jnana? Higher Karmas point to the Transcendental goal.

8. The foregoing discussion has brought us to the conclusion that the life of higher works—of unselfish virtuous deeds is not the ultimate goal of human life. Virtuous deeds possess value in that they purge off our mind from selfish, self-seeking propensities which know no other higher end than gratification of the sense-pleasures, and thus to prepare it for the realisation which alone constitutes the ultimate goal of our life. One deed of virtue leads to another, which again leads to a still higher deed of virtue and so on perpetually. Sankara has pointed out that one work done is succeeded by another work which awaits you for its accomplishment.[1] Moral or virtuous life is therefore a life of incessant endeavours for, and aspirations after, higher and higher virtues (पुण्योत्कर्षं), which cannot be *completed here* under mundane conditions. It is, thus, a life of constant progress; it is marked by incessant advancement from lower to higher deeds; such a life therefore cannot itself be an end but always points to an End, to a goal *beyond it*, where all its aspirations after higher and higher *goods* will reach their

---

[1] "बहुनि हि कर्म्माणि...तेषां कानिचित्लब्धावसराणि,...कानिचित्तु देशकालनिमित्तप्रतीक्षाणि आसते, इत्यतस्तेषां अवशिष्टानां साम्प्रतेन उपभोगेन क्षपणासम्भवात्। ...कर्म्मशेषसद्भावसिद्धिश्च" (वे० भा०, 4. 3. 14)।

fulfilment and complete satisfaction.[1] Thus, the human life of virtue will reach its perfection in a Transcendental goal which is the End towards which it is perpetually moving.

We have before seen that the performance of higher works and virtuous deeds is not an end in itself—is not the ultimate goal of human life. These virtuous deeds are needed for the *purification* of our mind from selfish propensities and tendencies and for constant preparation for the ultimate End. The higher works, in this way, prove to be an *indirect* cause for the attainment of Mukti or the final goal.[2] They cannot *directly* produce Mukti; for, in that case, these works would themselves become the ultimate End. The readers will realise that Sankara's position in this respect remains logically unassailable. As the ultimate goal is transcendent, no mundane works or attributes can have power to directly produce it.[3] For, in that

---

[1] "यावत् यावत् पुण्योत्कर्षः, तावत् तावत् फलोत्कर्षप्राप्तिः। तस्मादुत्तमेन पुण्योत्कर्षेण मोक्षो भविष्यतीति आशङ्का स्यात्। सा निवर्त्तयितव्या। ज्ञानसहितस्य प्रकृष्टस्य कर्म्मणः एतावती गतिः। व्याकृतनामरूपास्पदत्वात् कर्म्मणस्तत्फलस्य च। नतु अकार्य्ये नित्ये...क्रियाकारक फलस्वभाववर्ज्जिते (Transcendental goal) कर्म्मणो व्यापारोऽस्ति" (ब्र० भा०, 3. 3. 1.)। *i.e.*, When the works are not ends in themselves, the End must be beyond them to which they lead; moral ideal is not an absolute and self-sufficient ideal, but it is a progress to the supreme or perfect End.

[2] "विषयोपलब्धिलक्षणस्य विज्ञानस्य शुद्धिः—आहारशुद्धिः रागद्वेषमोहैरसंस्पृष्टं विषयविज्ञानमित्यर्थः। तस्यां सत्यां, अन्तःकरणस्य सत्त्वस्य शुद्धिः भवति सत्त्वशुद्धौ ...विशेषेण प्रमोक्षणं यत एतत् 'उत्तरोत्तरं' (progressively higher and higher) आहारशुद्धिमूलं, तस्मात् सा कर्त्तव्या" (छा० भा०, 7. 26. 2)। "पूर्व्वं पुण्यकृत्भूत्वा, पुनस्त्वक्लेषणः परमात्म तेजसि अभिनिष्पन्नः"।

[3] There must therefore always be a *negative relation* between the mundane life (and its works) and its transcendental goal (towards which it moves and when it will be perfected). Yet it is the same life: This mundane life would become transformed into supra-mundane life.

"अस्य आत्मलोकस्य कर्म्मभिः असम्बन्धात्, कृत्स्नस्य च कर्म्मफलस्य विद्याफलेऽन्तर्भावात्" (ब्र०, 4. 4. 2)।

case, what is transcendent would become merely mundane; —the distinction between the two worlds or lives would disappear: the mundane works would themselves become the final end or goal: mere performance of higher works would give us perfection, and moral life, as it is known to us *here*, will cease. In the system of Sankara, ethical or moral progress points to a transcendental goal beyond, where the infinite aspirations after higher and higher deeds will reach final satisfaction and all our higher and higher desires and aspirations reach final fulfilment.[1] Thus, morality or ethics ends in religion, in the Vedanta system; it cannot be pursued for its own sake. Ethics, without religion for its fulfilment, is incomplete. Hence we find that the life's End cannot be realised ultimately, merely by the performance of civic duties or वर्णाश्रमधर्म्म [2] which we have already considered. All the life's *duties* reach their final fulfilment in a higher life than this, *i.e.*, in a transcendental goal.—

"न च अन्यथा कर्त्तव्यं परिसमाप्यते कस्यचित्।
भगवत्तत्त्वे विदिते यत् सर्व्वं 'कर्त्तव्यं', तत्सर्व्वं
कृतं भवेत्"।

(वेदा० भा०, 15. 20)।

---

[1] "अल्पमिदं प्रमाणं···नातःपरं किञ्चित आकाङ्क्षामस्ति। न तु आत्मैकत्वव्यतिरेकेण अवशिष्टमानोऽन्योऽर्थोऽस्ति, यः आकाङ्क्षां त" (वे० भा०, 2.1.14)।... "पुरुषार्थसमाप्तिवुद्ध्युत्पत्तिः...तथैव च विदुषां तृप्त्यनुभवादिदर्शनात" (4. 3. 14)।

[2] In Vedanta-bhasya 4. 3. 14, it is shown that mere performance of social duties (नित्यकर्म्म) is not sufficient. Life cannot be made perfect here by doing civic works. For, there is no completion of our works in this world. One work accomplished finds other works waiting for their accomplishment and so on. Such is the characteristic of the mundane life. All our duties can reach their final accomplishment, only when the Transcendental goal, *i.e.*, Brahma is reached.

'रागद्वेषमोहाना मन्यव आत्मज्ञानात् उच्छेदानुपपत्तेः, धर्म्माधर्म्मोच्छेदानुपपत्तिः"। Similar arguments occur in the Gita-bhasya also.

"नहि सम्यक्दर्शने निष्पन्ने, 'यवान्तरं'
किञ्चितशासितुं शक्यं'।..."आत्मविदः
कर्त्तव्याभावं दर्शयति...न किञ्चिदन्यत् 'कृत्य'
मवशिष्यते। (वेदा० भा०, 4. 1. 2)।

9. We are now in a position to enumerate some of the higher virtues, ethical and moral qualities, the cultivation of which has been deemed *useful* for the realisation of the self, through the purification of the mind. But before we proceed to do so, it may be found instructive to make a rapid survey of the entire position which we have tried to sketch in the preceding pages.

A running survey of the position thus far reached :
Moral endeavour passes into a higher fulfilment and is completed in the Transcendental goal.

Man is, we have found, naturally a selfish and egoistic being, seeking the gratification of his own pleasure and depriving others of it; and all his activities are impelled by impulsive, self-seeking motives. As man is thus subject to sensibility, he commits sin and evil, under its influence. But man is *also a higher* being in whom God has been revealed, and a life of infinite Divine possibility is implanted in him, and this is the true man within him. Man is thus endowed with a discriminative knowledge of right and wrong.—

> "The ignorant, *natural* man regards desire (राग-द्वेष) as a friend at the time when he thirsts for objects. The mind, when allowed to be engrossed in the thoughts of various pleasurable objects, loses its discriminative knowledge of the self and the not-self and turns towards the sense-objects." But as man is a *rational* animal, he must bring his impulses under the law

of the rational self which those desires envelop. In fact, he exerts himself *actively* with vigour to resist and control such impulses and consequently his action is in an *opposite* direction—

" आत्मवश्यै र्विधेयात्मा विषयानिन्द्रियैश्चरन् " ।

Sankara further observes—

"Manis man only so long as his *Antah-karana* is competent to discriminate between right and wrong. When he is unable to do so he is debarred from attaining the highest of human aspirations (परम-पुरुषार्थ) । Hence at the very commencement, he must *rise above* the sway of राग-द्वेष—affection for and aversion to sense-objects of pleasure and pain. He must restrain these natural tendencies *by means of their enemy, i.e.*, by actively cultivating the *virtues* which are the enemies (प्रतिपक्ष) of love and aversion." [1]

When the man, thus, cultivates these *ethical and moral virtues*, he is no longer subject to *his own nature* (प्रकृति). These virtues are the *means* (ज्ञान-साधन) for attaining the

---

[1] " कार्य्याकार्य्यविषयविवेकायोग्यता अन्तःकरणस्य नाश उच्यते । तावदेव पुरुषो यावदन्तःकरणं तदीयं कार्य्याकार्य्यविषयविवेकयोग्यं, तदयोग्यत्वे नष्ट एव पुरुषो भवति...पुरुषार्थायोग्यो भवति ।" (गी० भा०, (2-63) । " तत्रायं पुरुषकारस्य (human free-will) विषय उच्यते···या हि पुरुषस्य प्रकृतिः सा रागद्वेषपुरःसरेव स्वकार्य्ये पुरुषं प्रवर्त्तयति (man is passive here)···यदा पुनः राग-द्वेषौ तत्प्रतिपक्षेण नियमयति, तदा शास्त्रदृष्टिरेव पुरुषो भवति न प्रकृतिवशः (actively free) तस्मात तयोर्वशं नागच्छेत् " (गी० भा०, 3-34) ।

self-knowledge which is his highest end.[1] Natural राग-द्वेष creates the idea of *separateness* or exclusiveness ; but as these are supplanted by the moral virtues, his *true unity* with his fellow-beings will gradually remove this idea of exclusiveness.[2] The term दैवी-सम्पत (Daivi-Sampat) used in the Gita covers under it the virtues which man must cultivate in the place of the natural selfish impulses for which the term आसुरी-सम्पत (Âsurî-Sampat) has been used.[3] These virtues have been described as—

> "the virtues leading to *liberation* from Samsára."

Is it not, we ask, wrong, in the face of all these remarks of Sankara, to suppose—as has been supposed by many—that the Vedanta "insists upon the *emptying* of the human mind, making it a barren desert ?" Is it not wrong to hold that "no moral virtues are taught in the Vedanta" and that "all actions are treated as a bondage and therefore liberation from this bondage is the goal or aim of the Vedanta ?"

From what has been stated above, the readers must have seen that such remarks as these [4] do the greatest injustice to Sankara's own views and his writings.

---

[1] These are called as धर्मप्रसूत (गी० भा० (12-12) and they are means to the highest realisation.

"ज्ञान-साधनगणं, यस्मिन् सति ज्ञेयविज्ञाने योग्यो भवति। ज्ञान-साधनत्वात् ज्ञानशब्दवाच्यं (गी० भा०, (13.6)।

"ज्ञान-निमित्तत्वात् ज्ञानमुच्यते" (गी० भा०, 13-12)।

[2] "यथा मम सुखमिष्टं तथा सर्व्वप्राणिनां। यच्च दुःखं मम प्रतिकूलमनिष्टं तथा सर्व्वप्राणिनां।...सुखदुःखे...तुल्यतया सर्व्वभूतेषु समं पश्यति, न कस्यचित् प्रतिकूलमाचरति" (गी० भा० 6-32)।

[3] "दैवी सम्पत विमोक्षाय, निबन्धायासुरी मता" (गी०, 16-5)।

"देह्याः आदानाय, इतरयोः परिवर्ज्जनाय" (गी० भा०, 16-1)।

[4] For other similar remarks, *vide* p. 104 of this book where they are quoted.

Nothing short of a Transcendental good satisfies man.

Man cannot find final satisfaction of his self in any earthly and temporal order of things. He seeks in Brahma the fulfilment of the good he is trying to realise in his own life. The supreme good (प्रियतम)—which is working and revealing itself in the worldly objects,—of which they are but imperfect manifestations—is the *highest* end of human pursuits. The higher and lower objects are therefore only the proximate ends and these can be made to be embraced and included in the supreme End. But as Brahma *transcends* the temporal order of things, man must not rest satisfied with these lesser ends, but must move through them for a *final* realisation of the supreme good [1]—

> " अयमात्मा सर्व्वलौकिक-प्रियेभ्यः
> प्रियतमो भवति। तस्मात् तद्भावे
> महान् यत्न आस्थेयः'। "

The self-realisation, therefore, is the life's highest End. This End, says Sankara, which has been deliberately chosen, must be *steadily kept in view* and resolutely maintained against all other partial interests and ends.[2] For, it is only when one perceives the End of knowledge that one will endeavour to *cultivate the attributes* which are the *means* of attaining that knowledge.[3] The inner

---

[1] " आत्मानात्मप्रिययोः, अन्यतरप्रहानेन इतरप्रियोपादानप्राप्तौ, आत्मप्रियोपादानेन, इतरहानं क्रियते " (ब्र० भा०, 1. 4. 8.);

[2] " आत्मतत्त्वमेव ज्ञेयं अनादृत्य अन्यत्। अन्यत् लौकिकं प्रियमपि अप्रियमेवेति निश्चित्य, आत्मैव प्रियो नान्योस्तीति प्रतिपद्यते।···योहि लोके निरतिशयप्रियो भवति, सर्व्वप्रयत्नेन लभ्यो भवति.....कर्त्तव्यताप्राप्तमपि अन्यप्रियलाभे यत्नमुत्सृज्य " (ब्र० भा०, 1. 4. 8)।

[3] " आत्मविषयं ज्ञानं···तस्मिन् नित्यभावः। अमानित्वादीनां ज्ञान-साधनानां भावनापरिपाकनिमित्तं तत्त्वज्ञानं; तस्य अर्थो मोक्षः संसारोपरमः। तत्त्वज्ञानफलालोचने हि तत्साधनानुष्ठाने प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् " (गी० भा०, 13. 11.)

purity of the mind consists of the removal from it of the dart of attachment and other passions (राग-द्वेषादि), by cultivating the ideas that are inimical to them.[1] "These attributes or moral virtues are conducive to knowledge. What are *opposed* to these, *viz.*, pride, hypocrisy, ignorance, cruelty, insincerity, impatience—should be shunned as tending to *bondage and samsâra*." [2]

A glance at these 'moral virtues' as elaborated and explained by Sankara in his commentaries on the Gitá and other Upanishads will convince one with their *social or civic character*, and their inestimable value will be found in our daily and hourly dealings with our fellow-beings. If one fails or neglects to cultivate these virtues, the purification of the mind or inner organ which is naturally vitiated by impure thoughts and impulsive tendencies would be hindered and the possibility for the self-expansion and self-realisation would be debarred.

Ethical virtues and altruistic deeds—enumerated in four main groups :

10. We now proceed to give below a list of these virtues (धर्म्म-पूग) and must rest content with referring our readers to the elaborate explanation of each of the factors constituting this list, as given in the commentaries of Sankara.

The ethical or moral virtues to be cultivated are—

---

[1] "अस्य मनसः 'प्रतिपक्षभावनया' (अमानित्व-मैत्रीकरुणादीनां भावनया—मधु० टीका) रागादिमलापनयनं" (गी० भा०, 13. 7.)। "एतेहि संस्कृतस्य सत्त्व-शुद्धिद्वारा तत्त्वज्ञानोत्पत्तिः दृष्टा" (केन० भा० 4. 8)।

[2] "एतत् अमानित्वादि...ज्ञानमिति प्रोक्तं ज्ञानार्थत्वात्, ज्ञाननिमित्तत्वात्। अज्ञानं—यथोक्तादन्यथा विपर्य्ययेण। मानित्वं, दम्भित्वं, हिंसा, अचान्तिः, अनार्ज्जवं इत्यादि 'अज्ञानं' विज्ञेयं, परिहरणाय संसारप्रवृत्तिकारणत्वात्" (गी० भा०, 13.11)।

(*a*) The *first group* of moral virtues described by *Patanjali* in his *Yog-philosophy* is this—

" मैत्री-करुणा मुदितोपेक्षाणां
सुख-दुःख-पुण्यापुण्यविषयाणां
भावनातश्चित्त-प्रसादनं" [1]

Before we proceed to explain this group, we should like to invite our readers' attention to the remarks made by Madhusudan when elaborating the commentaries of Sankara on the moral virtues enumerated in the Gitá. Madhusudan observes to the effect that this group of moral virtues together with the *two other* groups given in the Gita—form three groups and all these must be cultivated. These virtues properly cultivated and developed would remove and supplant the natural evil desires (राग-द्वेषादि) and gradually create the healthy idea of our unity with our fellow-beings.[2]

Now, to explain the *first group* stated above—

" मैत्री or sympathy is the identity of feeling with the object of the emotion which one experiences on seeing happiness or misery. If we see one happy, our feeling must be identical. Compassion (करुणा) is the same feeling for misery of whatever kind. It implies, besides the emotion, *action*, on

---

[1] *Cf.* here मधुसूदन's observations..." सा च वासना द्विविधा—मलिना, शुद्धाच। शुद्धा देवीसम्पत्। मलिना—आसुरी सम्पत्। तासां वासनानां परित्यागो नाम—तद्विरुद्ध मैत्रादि वासनोत्पादनं"। Sankara himself also expresses the same idea "यदा पुनः रागद्वेषौ तत्प्रतिपक्षेण नियमयति, तदा...न प्रकृतिवशः पुरुषः—इति पुरुषकारे विषय उच्यते" (गी० भा०, 3. 34.)।

[2] "मैत्री-करुणा-मुदितो पेक्षाणामिति—ऐक्यादिचतुष्टयञ्च उपलक्षणं। 'अभयं सत्त्वसंशुद्धि' रित्यादीनां, 'अमानित्वादीनाञ्च' धर्म्माणां सर्व्वेषां मैत्रीयं शुभवासना-रूपत्वेन, मलिनवासनानिवर्त्तकत्वात्"।

the part of him who feels the emotion, as lies in his power. Complacency (मुदिता) is joy at the sight of virtue and the sacrifices incidental to its practice. As to vice which enters so largely in the composition of the human society, the least that one should do is entire indifference. If he can help to cure the one and remove the other it is sacrifice of a superior kind; but generally indifference is the best attitude to maintain." [1]

(*b*) The *second group* of moral virtues is given and explained in Gitá-bhásya 13. 7-11— Absence of self-esteem and self-assertion; doing no injury to any living being, and not being affected when others have done any injury; inner purity consisting in the removal from the mind of the dirt of attachment and other passions; direction, to the right path, of the body and [2] its organs which are naturally attracted in all directions; thinking of what evil there is in birth, age, disease and death; non-attachment for things which may form object of attachment; constant

---

[1] This explanation is mainly taken from the "Joga-Sutra" of Patanjali edited by Manilal Nabhubhai Dvivedi.

[2] Truthfulness (सत्यं) in conduct, speech and mind—is a most imp rtant virtue stated in इइ०, छा०, केन० and other Upanishads. "सत्यमिति अमायिता अकौटिल्य वाङ्मनः-कायानां।
तेषु हि आर्जयति विद्या ये अमायाविनः, नासुरप्रकृतिषु मायाविषु···सत्यस्य साधनातिशय-ख्यापनार्थं" (केन० भाष्य 4. 8)। "कुहक-माया-शाठ्याहङ्कार-दम्भानृत-वर्जिताः"—मु० भा०, 3·16.

equanimity consisting in not being jubilant over attaining the desirable and in not chafing on attaining the undesirable; the society of disciplined men, because such society is an aid to self-realisation and distaste for society of ordinary undisciplined men."[1]

(*c*) The *Third group* is embodied in Gitá-bhásya, 16-1-3.—

"Abandonment of deception, dissimulation, falsehood and the like, in all our practical transactions; reflection and recognition of the true nature of things (वस्तुस्वरूप); concentration through the subjugation of the senses; constant steadiness of our attitude; abstaining from injury to sentient beings; speaking of things as they are without giving utterance to what is unpleasant or false; suppression of anger arising when reviled or beaten; compassion to those in suffering; absence of fickleness."[2]

---

1 "अमानित्व मदम्भित्वमहिंसा शान्तिरार्ज्जवं
आचार्योपासनं शौचं स्थैर्यमात्मविनिग्रहः ॥
इन्द्रियार्थेषु वैराग्य मनहङ्कार एव च।
जन्ममृत्युजराव्याधि दुःखदोषानुदर्शनं ॥
असक्तिरनभिष्वङ्गः पुत्रदारगृहादिषु।
नित्यञ्च समचित्तत्व मिष्टानिष्टोपपत्तिषु ॥*
विविक्तदेशसेवित्वमरतिर्जनसंसदि ॥—इत्यादि।

N.B.—"संस्कारवतां विनीतानां संसत्, तस्या ज्ञानोपकारकत्वात्"।

2 अभयं सत्त्वसंशुद्धिर्ज्ञानयोग व्यवस्थितिः।
दानं दमश्च यज्ञश्च स्वाध्यायस्तप आर्ज्जवं ॥
अहिंसा सत्यमक्रोध स्त्यागःशान्तिरपैशुनं।
दया भूतेष्वलोलुप्त्वं मार्दवं ह्रीरचापलं ॥—इत्यादि।

(*d*) It has been laid down as a general principle that those characteristics in the disposition and conduct, which have grown habitual and natural with a Mukta, *i.e.*, a man who has already realised the ultimate good are to be considered as the *Sádhanas* for a *Mumukshu*, *i.e.*, an aspirant after the self-realisation. With diligence and good care these are to be constantly cultivated *as virtues* by him.[1]

(*e*) The surrender of the self to the supreme self (*i.e.*, Brahma) and meditation on His Swarupa. A man cannot hope to be Mukta, unless Brahma's grace falls upon

---

Cf. "सर्व्वभूतेषु शत्रुभावरहित: आत्मनोऽत्यन्तापकार-प्रवृत्तेष्वपि"—गी० भा०, 11·55.

N.B.—All these virtues have been mentioned in all the *Upanishad-bhasyas* also.

Cf.—"एवमाद्यन्यदपि ज्ञानोत्पत्तेरुपकारकं—"अमानित्वमदम्भित्व'मित्यादि... ...तेषूहि सत्सु ब्रह्मविद्या प्रवर्त्तते" (केन० भा० 4.8).

[1] "सन्न्यासिनां परमार्थज्ञाननिष्ठानां धर्म्मजातं।.....इदं धर्म्मामृतं 'मुमुक्षुणा' यत्नतोऽनुष्ठेयं विष्णो: परमं पदं विजिगमिषुणा" (गी० भा० 12·20)। "ज्ञानसाधनगण ममानित्वादिलक्षणं—यस्मिन् सति ज्ञेयविज्ञाने योग्योभवति; यत्पर: सन्न्यासी ज्ञाननिष्ठ: उच्यते" (13·6)। गुणातीत:...एतदन्तं यावत् यत्नसाध्यं तावत् सन्न्यासिन: अनुष्ठेयं गुणातीतत्वसाधनं मुमुक्षो: Nilkantha explains this idea thus :— "मुक्तलक्षणानि एव मुमुक्षो: साधनत्वेन विधत्ते" (*Vide* Nilkantha's notes on 12·20). Some of the habitual characteristics of a *Mukta* are given in Gita, ch. 13·19—

"अद्वेष्टा सर्व्वभूतानां, मैत्र:, करुण एव च। निर्म्ममो निरहङ्कार: समदु:खसुख: क्षमी:॥ यस्मान्नोद्विजते लोको लोकान् नोद्विजते च य:। सम: शत्रौ च मित्रे च तथा मानापमानयो:"—इत्यादि।

him, unless He helps him graciously in the task "[1]—

" तदनुग्रहहेतुकेनैव विज्ञानेन मोक्षसिद्धिर्भवति " (वे० भा० 2.3.41)।—

In connection with the cultivation of these ethical virtues, Sankara has remarked in a place that these virtues cannot be developed in a day or two, but it requires time to gradually make them more and more matured (परिपाक), developed and perfected. So long as these are not perfected, the self-realisation would remain incomplete. It is necessary therefore to make life-long endeavours towards the maturity and perfection of these virtues, so that the man may gain a thorough and perfect mastery over the impulsive self (प्रतिपक्षहीनस्य), such that his true self may be realised in it.[2]

(*f*) For the completion of the list on the moral virtues, we must mention here the fact that the list includes in it the performance of certain ritual works (यज्ञ)—*Jajnas*—which, when done with a *higher motive* for the final realisation, certainly help the *purification*, (सत्त्व-शुद्धि) of the mind which forms the object of all other higher works or virtues.

---

[1] " विद्यमानमपि· जीवस्य ज्ञानैश्वर्यं तिरोहितमविद्याव्यवधानात्। तत्प्रेन-स्तिरोहितं सत्, परमेश्वर मभिध्यायतो यतमानस्य.....ईश्वर प्रसादात् संसिद्धस्य कस्य चिदेव आविर्भवति " (वे० भा० 3-2-5)। " तमेव ईश्वरं आत्मस्थं गच्छ सर्वात्मना। तत्-प्रसादात् ईश्वरानुग्रहात्·····विष्णोः परमं पदमवाप्स्यसि " (गी० भा० 18.62)। "तेषां कथं श्रेयः स्यादिति दयाहेतोरहं...अन्तःकरणाश्रयेऽस्थितः सन्, ज्ञानदीपेन... भक्तिप्रसादश्रेहाभिधिहेन...तमो नाशयामि " (गी० भा०, 10.11)। " संराधनञ्च— भक्ति-ध्यान-प्रणिधानाद्यनुष्ठानं " (वे० भा०, 3.2.24)।

[2] "ज्ञानस्य स्वात्मोत्पत्तिपरिपाकहेतुयुक्तस्य, प्रतिपक्षविहीनस्य, यदात्मानुभवनि-श्चयावसानत्वं तस्य—ज्ञानोत्पत्तिपरिपाकहेतुं सहकारिकारणं बुद्धिविशुद्ध्यादि अमानि-त्वादि च अपेक्ष्य जनितस्य...आत्मानुभवनिश्चय-रूपेण यदवस्थानं सा परा 'ज्ञाननिष्ठा' (*i.e.* ज्ञानाहत्तिलक्षणा) इत्युच्यते" (गी० भा०, 18-55)।

The views of Sankara on the *Jajnas* (यज्ञ) will appear in the following paragraphs where we have gathered together his opinions, for the benefit of our readers :—

> Certain portions of those Upanishads which are regarded as most reliable and ancient are found to contain discussions about the manner in which *Jajnas* are to be performed. This shows that कर्मकान्ड is not really antagonistic to the ज्ञानकाण्ड, as some scholars hold. The former has an intimate relation with the latter, and far from being hostile it forms a necessary part of the latter. There is no real conflict between the two sections of the Veda. The purpose of the rituals is to *purify* the mind—exclusively and deeply engrossed in the attachment for the pleasure-giving sensible objects,[1] so as to prepare it for the dawn of perfect knowledge. The actions which are done from a lower motive for the enjoyment of pleasure, and which have only selfish and self-seeking ends—have been condemned as *Sakâma*. Those who are naturally selfish and are deeply absorbed in the sensual pleasures and worldly objects, cannot at once be raised to the contemplation of an ideal which is exalted beyond all sensual conditions. Their minds are to be gradually worked upon by the gradual

[1] "अज्ञानां जिजीविषूणां ज्ञाननिष्ठासम्भवे—'कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि' त्यादि कर्मनिष्ठा उक्ता द्वितीयो वेदार्थः" (ईशा भा०, 8)।

change of the ideal to which they are attached.[1]

Three different ideals for three different classes of people according to three distinct types of culture received by them have been laid down side by side in the Rig-Veda[2]; and these three types of people are to be found, we believe, in every stage of society. Those who travelled on the lowest plane and whose mind could not and did not receive any spiritual culture, and who had desires and longings for self-seeking pleasures, worshipped the gods; and to these, the gods appeared endowed with sensible attributes and each seemed to have a distinct existence of its own and each capable of fulfilling the desires of the devotees.

But to the people of higher types, these gods appeared not as self-existing and independent entities, but only manifestations of *one Power* working within them

---

[1] "मन्दबुद्धीनां दिगदेशादिभेदवद् वस्त्विति एवं भाविता बुद्धिः न शक्यते सहसा परमार्थविषया कर्तुं इति। अनधिगम्य च ब्रह्म न पुरुषार्थसिद्धिरिति। अनेकजन्मविषयरे वाभ्यासजनिता विषय-विषया तृष्णा न सहसा निवर्तयितुं शक्यते। सोपानारोहणवत् स्थूलादारभ्य सूक्ष्मं सूक्ष्मतरञ्च बुद्धिविषयञ्च ज्ञापयित्वा, तदतिरिक्ते स्वाराज्ये ऽभिषेत्यामीति नामादीनि निर्दिदिक्षति"—इत्यादि (ब्रह्म० भा०)।

Cf. "न हि अग्निहोत्रादीन्येव कर्म्माणि। ब्रह्मचर्य्यं, तपः, सत्यवदनं, शमो, दमो ऽहिंसा—इत्येवमादीन्यपि 'कर्म्माणि' विद्योत्पत्तौ साधकतमानि भवन्ति। ध्यानधारणादिलक्षणानि च वक्ष्यति"—तै० भा०—शिक्षावल्ली।

[2] *Vide* our Introduction appended to the third Volume of our work —"Upanishader Upadesh" in which various arguments from the Rig-Veda have been collected and discussed in support of this position.

and realising its purpose in and through these manifestations. For these the Veda has enjoined 'conjunction of work with knowledge" (ज्ञानकर्म्म-समुच्चय). But there are still higher types of people who, owing to the superior spiritual culture they received through good works done in the previous states of existence, the Veda holds out the ideal of Brahma—both immanent and transcendent—and for these no ritual duties were thought useful and necessary, but only the exercise and repetition of contemplation, altruistic thoughts and works, cultivation of moral virtues ('अमानित्वादि') were deemed as the only *means* for the attainment of this ideal. कर्म्मकाण्ड has, thus, its own efficacy and purpose and is not in any way conflicting and antagonistic to the ज्ञानकाण्ड। We for these reasons find it difficult to subscribe to the view that at the Vedic period the Vedic people could not rise above the idea of duality and from the planes of selfish ends.[1]

Such, in brief, is the view of Sankara on the Karma-kanda of the Veda and in this manner he has attempted a

---

[1] We cannot also agree with the view that the Vedic people—one and all without exception—could not rise to the grasp of the highest unity ब्रह्म—and that all of them worshipped as gods the striking phenomena of nature which by their grand and impressive features captured their imagination. This view goes against the conclusion arrived at by Sankarácharyya and others.

CENTRAL LIBRARY

reconciliation of the Karma section with Jnana section of the Veda—

"एवं कर्म्मकाण्डेनास्य एकवाक्यतावगतिः"

(ब्र० भा०, 4.4.22)।[1]

Certain anomalous passages explained, and cleared up.

11. Before we take leave of the subject under discussion, we must try to estimate the real purport of certain passages found dispersed in the Bhâsyas of Sankara, which may, possibly, create some confusion in the mind of the readers.

(*i*) Let us first consider such passages in which "abandonment of *all* kinds of works", has been taught.[2] Such passages, to all outward appearances, demand, no doubt, from all, the renouncement of all sorts of works including even the disinterested higher nitya-karmas. But when these passages are considered, not isolating them from, but taking and reading them in connection with, the contexts in which they occur, and in the light of Sankara's general position on the Karmas which we have tried to exhibit in this chapter,—the right import and true solution of these passages cannot but stand revealed before the readers in their own light.

When an aspirant has already attained the self-knowledge, has reached the final

---

[1] *Cf.* "काम्यवर्ज्जित नित्यं कर्म्मजातं सर्व्वमात्मज्ञानोत्पत्तिद्वारेण मोक्षसाधनत्वं प्रतिपद्यते"।

[2] Compare such passages as—"सर्व्वकर्म्मसन्न्यासः कर्त्तव्यः," etc., etc.

goal, no further need arises for him to perform any kind of works—lower or higher. Sankara suggests this truth in the line—

"उत्पन्नात्मविदस्य तु अनारम्भः निरर्थकत्वात्"—

(केन भा०, 1.1)।

For, when the man has attained the Transcendental goal (ब्रह्मात्मभावः), all his duties have reached their fulfilment. All contrast between lower and higher works, all succession of time-order, all his higher and higher endeavours and aspirations have ceased for him to have any further meaning.[1] "For him who has realised the Âtma, no further work remains to be done."—

"न चैवमात्मान मनुभवतः किञ्चिदन्यत् कृत्यं अवशिष्यते"।

(बृ० भा०, 4.12)।

We find therefore that the "abandonment of works" mentioned in those passages is meant only for the 'Âtma-vid,' *i.e.*, for those who have already realised the final End, which is the *completion* of all desire.

(*ii*). We now come to consider the nature of some other passages. There are some passages in the Bhásyas, which speak of the higher Nitya-karma in terms no better than the Sakáma impulsive activities. Like our selfish works the nitya-karmas are

[1] "न च तस्यामपि उत्कर्ष-निकर्षात्मकोऽतिशय उपपद्यते—उत्कृष्टैव हि विद्या भवति" (बृ० भा०, 3.4.52)।

sometimes described as the "product of *avidyá*, and of love and hatred (राग-द्वेष)." Take such passages as—

"यद्यपि शास्त्रावगतं नित्यं कर्म्म, तथापि
अविद्यावत एव भवति"—

(गौ० भा०, 18.66)।

i.e., the Nitya-karma is committed by him who is influenced by passions and other lower tendencies.

For the solution of this apparent difficulty, we must call our reader's attention to the fact that our outward actions are always the outcome of our inner motives and intentions;—our outward works entirely depend upon our inner motives, of which they are the expressions. It follows therefore that our selfish activities may, by changing our inner motives, be converted into disinterested actions; and our unselfish works might change their disinterested character, if they are done with selfish ends in view. Sankara's idea is—'even the virtuous deeds (धर्म्म-कर्म्मs)

---

[1] *Cf.* "विषयप्राप्तिनिमित्तं कामाः पुरुषान् नियोजयन्ति तेषु तेषु विषयेषु.....तैः धर्म्माधर्म्मप्रवृत्तिहेतुभिः विषयेच्छारूपैः—इत्यादि (सु० भा० 3.22)। Also *cf.* such passage—"काम-क्रोधादिपूर्व्वक-पुण्यापुण्यकारिता.....संसारस्य कारणं" (बृ० भा० 4.4.5)। "लोक-वयसाधनं...मानुषं वित्तं कर्म्मरूपं पितृलोकप्राप्ति—साधनं विद्याश्च देवं वित्तं देवलोकप्राप्तिसाधनं.....अविद्याकामवत एव सर्व्वाणि कर्म्माणि" (गौ०, 2.11)।

may be done with a lower motive—with a desire to gain some mundane end, such as social position, prosperity, higher regions or Devatâs, and the like; and when so performed, the virtuous deeds become *ends* in themselves, not *means*. His idea therefore is that the value must be placed not upon the outward deeds—not even upon virtuous deeds, but upon the inner intention.[1]

---

[1] "दृष्टा च काम्याग्निहोत्रादौ कामोपसर्जनं न काम्याग्निहोत्रहानिः। तथा मतिपूर्व्वकामतिपूर्व्वकादीनां कर्म्मणां कार्य्यविशेषस्य आरम्भकत्वं दृष्टं। तथेहापि..... कर्म्मापि विदुषोऽकर्म्म सम्पद्यते" (गी० भा०, 4.24)। "अभ्युदयार्थोऽपि प्रवृत्तिलक्षणो धर्म्मः देवादिस्थानप्राप्तिहेतुरपि सन्, ईश्वरार्पणबुद्ध्यानुष्ठीयमानः, सत्त्वशुद्धये भवति फलाभिसन्धिवर्ज्जितः" (गीता० उपोद्घात)। "कामप्रयुक्तो हि पुरुषः पुण्यापुण्यकर्म्मणी उपचिनोति; उपचितेऽपि पुण्यापुण्ये कर्म्मणी कामशून्ये फलारम्भके न भवतः" (ब्र० भा०, 4.5.5).

"साभिसन्धीनां नित्यानां कर्म्मणां ब्रह्मत्वादीनि (लोकप्राप्ति) फलानि। येषां पुनः नित्यानि निरभिसन्धीनि, तेषां उपकारकत्वात् मोक्षसाधनान्यपि कर्म्माणि भवन्तीति न विरुध्यते" (ब्र० भा०, 3.3.1)।

i.e., Even these higher works when done for gaining a higher world or for gaining identity with the *Devatâs*, they still involve *avidya* since they are done for *pleasure*. But when these are done to gain final realisation (through purification of self), they are done with higher motives.

"दैवयाज्यात्मयाजिनोः, आत्मयाजिनो विशेषश्रवणात्—'दैवयाजिनः श्रेयान् आत्मयाजी'—

आत्मयाजी आत्मसंस्कारार्थं नित्यानि कर्म्माणि करोति (ब्र०, 3.3.1)।

Man has always an infinite *possibility* either for good, or for evil; man's nature cannot be *exhaustively* expressed in his past and present achievements. Man is always *more* than what he actually is. If he allows himself to be *passively* guided by the impulses (अविद्याध्यस्त), his actions are selfish. If he keeps himself alive to his *rational* nature, he is unselfish.

Thus the apparent difficulty is solved.

12. We ought to look upon the world of emergent nâma-rupas *from the standpoint of unity*, from the standpoint of the underlying Brahma. In that case no difference, no भेद, will appear to us. All the so-called differences would appear as higher and higher revelations of that unity.

But such is the perversity of the human intellect that we ignore the underlying unity and identify it with the emergent nâma-rupas. And the emergent differences become the only standpoint to us from which we look upon the world. Everything appears to be composed of parts (अवयव) and one part lying outside another part and one part being distinct and different from another part—

" स्वाभाविक्या अविद्यया...नाम-रूपोपाधि-
दृष्टिरेव भवति स्वाभाविकी " ।—

This false view of the world is entirely due to our *avidyá*, our intellectual error. It is our intellect which entirely *identifies* the underlying unity with the emergent differences and thus imagines *parts* in the unity. Really there can be no such identity. The underlying Brahma retains

its unity, maintains its own nature in these emerging diversities of nâma-rupa. Sankara has pointed out—

"न हि बुद्धिपरिकल्पितेन अवयवेन
परमार्थतः सावयवं वस्तु भवति"— [1]

i.e., our intellect has no power to effect any actual change in the object. The unity does not change to multiplicity, simply because our intellect imagines parts (अवयव) in it, identifies the two.

"Can the mirage actually wet the surface of the desert"?

We must make earnest effort to change our intellectual outlook. We must try to look upon the world from the standpoint of the unity, from the standpoint of Brahma. Sankara says—

> 'There can be no object—subtile or gross —past or present—distant or near— which can remain *separated* from the underlying Brahma—either in space or in time.'

"न हि आत्मनोऽन्यत्...तत्-प्रविभक्तदेशकालं
सूक्ष्मंव्यवहितं भूतं भविष्यद्वा वस्तु विद्यते"—
(तै० भा०, २-६)।

No *difference* will appear again to our changed outlook now, as it used to appear before. Everything—all

---

[1] अविद्यापरिकल्पितेन दोषेण तद्विषयं पारमार्थिकं वस्तु न दूष्यति। मरीच्यम्भसा उषरदेशः न पङ्कीक्रियते। ज्ञेयेन भ्रातुः संसर्गानुपपत्तेः। न च मिथ्याज्ञानं परमार्थवस्तु दूषयितुं समर्थं (गो० भा० १३।२)। बुद्धिपरिकल्पितेभ्यः सदवयवेभ्यः विकारसंस्थानोपपत्तेः···एकमेवाद्वितीयं परमार्थतः 'इदं'-बुद्धिकालेऽपि" (छा० भा०, ६-१-२)।

differences of nâma-rupa will now appear as revelations of Brahma's nature, as higher and higher manifestations of the underlying unity which is realising itself in them. The diversities of nâma-rapa being only the manifestations of Brahma's nature, how can these have a nature of their own which can be called *different* from the nature of Brahma? It is the self-same nature of Brahma which is present before us now in the form of diverse nâma-rupas. Hence, this world of nâma-rupas cannot be looked upon as something *different* from the nature of Brahma. They are merely the *expressions* of the nature of Brahma, which we used to call erroneously as *this* or *that* thing,[1] which we so long used to regard as *different* from Brahma. And this idea of separateness (भेदबुद्धि—अन्यत्व-बोध) is due to the deep-rooted and inveterate error of our intellact (अविद्या). This erroneous idea, says Sankara, stands between our self and Mukti or the final realisation. All our endeavours are to be directed to the extirpation of this illusion born of the habits of our thought.[2] All phenomenal objects, all

---

[1] यथा सतो 'ऽन्यदस्त्वन्तर' परिकल्पः पुनस्तस्यैव प्रागुत्पत्तेः प्रध्वंसाच्च ऊर्ध्वं असत्त्वं ब्रुवते तार्किकाः; न तथा अस्माभिः सतोऽन्यदस्तु परिकल्प्यते। सदेव तु सर्व्वमभिधानं, अभिधीयते च यदन्यबुद्धया। यथा रज्जुरेव सर्पबुद्धया सर्प इत्यभिधीयते; यथा वा पिण्ड-घटादि सदोऽन्यबुद्धया पिण्ड-घटादिशब्देन अभिधीयते" (छा० भा०, ६-२-३)।

[2] (*a*) "अन्यत्व-दर्शनापवादाय विद्याविषये सदृशयः श्रूयन्ते"। (*b*) "विद्या-ऽविद्याकार्य्यं—सर्व्वात्मभावः, परिच्छिन्नात्मभावश्च—आत्मनः 'अन्यदस्त्वन्तर" प्रत्युपस्थापयति अविद्या"। (*c*) "यदन्ययदृशं.....तदविद्याकृतं"। (*d*) "विद्यया अविद्याकृतं अन्यत्वावभासं तिरस्कृत्य।...परमात्मस्वरूपात् अन्यदिव प्रत्यवभासमानं"। (*e*) "अन्यत्वापोहेन अतद्भाध्यारोपेण संसारोपरमः कर्त्तव्यः"। (*f*) "इमानि भूतानि मत्तोऽन्यानि, कामाः सर्व्वे मत्तोऽन्ये ...नत्वेतं इन्द्रश्च छित्तं न तु राज्ञो राज्यान्निवत् अन्यत्वेन" (छा० 8.12.1).

activities are to be looked upon as *means, instruments* for the realisation of the Divine Purpose working in them. Sankara calls this—Sarvâtma-vâba (सर्व्वात्मभाव). This idea of सर्व्वात्मभाव, *i.e.*, the idea of taking all emergent nâma-rupas, all emergent activities as higher and higher *expressions* of the Divine Purpose is to substitute the former false idea, *i.e.*, the idea of *separateness* (अन्यत्वबोध). When this सर्व्वात्मभाव is firmly established in the place of अन्यत्वबोध—Mukti or the final realisation is reached. This is Mukti in the Sankara's system.[1]

The individual Ego is not a *component part*, a mere phase of Brahma. But, as we have already seen, all Egos have a 'nature,' have infinite *possibility* in them ; and this possibility has become so far *expressed* in our *actual* states and activities. Through our constant endeavour, through the constant cultivation of the moral virtues and performance of higher moral works, we must *purify* our *sense*-organs, *manas*, intellect and our mental capacities more and more. We shall, then, be able to comprehend and realise more and more, through these, the infinite wealth of the inexhaustible nature of Brahma which is present in our

---

[1] "(*a*) सर्व्वात्मभाव: स्वाभाविक:। यत्तु सर्व्वात्मभावात्·····वालाग्रमपि 'अन्यत्वेन' दृश्यते···तदवस्था अविद्या...सर्व्वात्मभावो मोक्ष:" (ब्र०भा०, 4.3.20).

(*b*) "ज्ञानञ्च तस्मिन् परात्मभावनिवृत्तिरेव। नित्यो हि आत्मभाव: सर्व्वस्य 'अतद्विषय' इव (*i.e.* अन्य इव) प्रत्यवभासते। तस्मात् अतद्विषयाभासनिवृत्ति-व्यतिरेकेण न तस्मिन् आत्मभावो विधीयते। अन्यात्मभावनिवृत्तौ आत्मभावो भवतीति ...आत्मा ज्ञायते" ब्र० भा०, 4.4.11)

(*c*) "परमार्थतोऽहेते.....भिन्नमिव वस्त्वन्तरमिव आत्मन उपलभ्यते।...यदा ब्रह्मविद्यया अविद्यानाशमुपगमिता, तदा आत्म-व्यतिरेकेण 'अन्यस्य' अभाव:" (2.4.14)

(*d*) सर्व्वात्मन: सर्व्वफलसम्बन्धोपपत्ते रविरोधात्—सदेव सर्व्वघट-कुण्डाद्याप्ति:" (छा०, 8.12.1)।—*vide* p. of this book.

finite self as the infinite possibility or purpose.[1] In our higher and higher progress to the higher and higher worlds, we shall build up higher organisms. And through these higher organs and organisms, we would be able to realise Brahma in a higher and superior form.[2] In this progress, there is no breach of memory.

This realisation, by the Ego, of the inexhaustible Brahma in him has been beautifully described by Sankara by an illustration. "The union of man with Brahma," he says, "is like the union between man and his beloved wife in marriage." "When a man embraces in love and affection his beloved wife, he forgets the presence of the objects near him and loses this consciousness of himself and everything else in the perfect happiness born of this mutual

---

[1] "यस्मात् विद्या-कर्म्मणी पूर्व्वप्रज्ञा च देहान्तरप्रतिपत्तःपभोगसाधनं, तस्मात् विद्याकर्म्मादि शुभमेव समाचरेत् यथा इष्टदेहसंयोगोपभोगौ स्यातां" (ब्र० भा०, 4.4.2).

"पूर्व्वकर्म्मोद्भवैः विविधैः कार्य-करणैः संयुक्ते जन्मनि सति, प्रज्ञामेधास्मृति-वैशारद्यं दृष्टं" (ब्र० भा० 1.4.2).

"कार्य्येन्द्रियाणां ज्ञाननिष्ठायोग्यतालक्षणां सिद्धिं लभते" (गी० भा० 18.45)।

"विषयोपलब्धिलक्षणस्य विज्ञानस्य शुद्धिः.....रागोद्वेषमोहैरसंस्पृष्टं विषयविज्ञानं ...तस्यां सत्यां अन्तःकरणस्य शुद्धिः...अविच्छिन्ना स्मृतिर्भवति। यत् एतत् 'उत्तरोत्तरं' आहारशुद्धिमूलं, तस्मात् सा कार्य्या" (छा०, 7.26.2)।

[2] "स्नातलेनैव हि शरीरादिव शरीरान्तरं, अन्यमन्यं देहं संचरन्तः...अपरिमुषित-स्मृतयः एव। देवेन्द्रियप्रकृतिवशित्वात् निर्म्माय देहान् अधितिष्ठति" (वे० भा०, 3.3.32.) In छान्दोग्यभाष्य, it is stated that a Mukta possesses his organs, intellect purified and perfect—"स वै मुक्तः सर्व्वात्मभावमापन्नः सन्..... मनउपाधिः सन् एतेनैव मनसा कामान् पश्यन् रमते" (छा० 8.12.5)।

union."[1] The readers will realise from this illustration that this सर्व्वात्मभाव, the result of the union—is not the actual *abolition* of the objects of the world as unreal,[2] leaving Brahma as the only reality. This is also not the *absorption* of the Ego in Brahma—which is his true essence. And this सर्व्वात्मभाव is the Vedantic *Mukti*;—it is simply the cessation of the idea of *separateness* or अन्यत्व-बोध। "सर्व्वात्मभावो मोच उक्तः" (ब्र०, 4.4.6.)

—o—

---

[1] "यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया सम्परिष्वक्तो...न बाह्यं किञ्चन वेद—मत्तः 'अन्यस्तु' इति; अपरिष्वक्तस्तु तया, 'प्रविभक्तः' जानाति सर्व्वं। एवं पुरुषः चेतज्ञः भूतमात्रासंसर्गतः 'प्रविभक्तः' (*i.e.*, अन्य इव),...स्वाभाविकेन आत्मना सम्परिष्वक्तः··· 'सर्व्वात्मा' न बाह्यं 'वस्त्वन्तरं' वेद" (ब्र० भा०, 4.3.21)। "भेदजातस्य सर्व्वस्य आत्मभूतत्वात्" (तै०भा० 3.10.5)। "कथं सर्व्वात्मत्वोपपत्तिरित्याह—इमान् लोकान् आत्मत्वेन अनुभवन्···ब्रह्म सर्व्वानन्यरूपं गायन्" (तै० भा०, 3.10.5)॥

[2] It is simply looking upon everything as *not* '*anya*' (अन्य) from the self. "द्रष्टृ'रन्यत्वेन' सर्व्वेषां अभावात् न पश्यति...मुक्तस्यापि सर्व्वैकत्वात् समानोदितीयाभावः—'केन कं पश्येत्' इति च उक्तमेव" (छा० भा०, 8.12.3)। [For the sense of 'केन कं पश्येत्?'—*Vide* Chap. III of this book where such expressions have been explained].

Index of Sanskrit References.

These are arranged in order of the sources from which they have been quoted in the book.

—:o:—

Sankara's Commentary on Brahma-Sutra—

Chap.	Sec.	Aph.	Page.
I.	1.	1	...4, 50, 51
—	1.	4	51, 68, 141, 151
—	1.	5	... 6, 14
—	1.	11	... 107
—	1.	17	... 83
—	1.	25	... 105
—	1.	35	... 106
—	3.	1	...105, 106
—	3.	20	... 113
—	3.	30	... 3
—	3.	39	... 38
—	4.	2	.. 11
—	4.	19	...103, 113
—	4.	22	... 69
—	4.	26	... 122
—	4.	23 & 26	... 4
—	4.	25 & 27	... 4
II	1.	2	... 57
—	1.	4	102, 105, 107
—	1.	7	... 109
—	1.	9	25, 67, 99

Chap.	Sec.	Aph.		Page.
II.	1.	14	...	12, 21, 22, 23, 24, 36, 50, 77, 79, 100, 101, 105, 106, 112, 120, 123, 124, 161.
—	1.	15	... ...	4, 34, 72,
—	1.	16	... ...	... 4
—	1.	17	... ...	... 109, 122
—	1.	18	... ...	33, 34, 55, 69, 79, 81, 99, 121.
—	1.	19	... ...	... 124
—	1.	22	... ...	... 23
—	1.	27	... ...	... 179
—	1.	34 & 42	... ...	... 29
—	2.	2	... ...	... 38
—	2.	10	... ...	... 117
—	2.	15 & 20	... ...	... 120
—	2.	17	... ...	28, 58, 91, 117
—	2.	21	... ...	... 107
—	2.	25	... ...	... 64
—	2.	26	... ...	... 33, 107
—	3.	9	... ...	... 34
—	3.	40	... ...	... 44
—	3.	48	... ...	... 155
—	3.	50	... ...	... 84, 85
III	1.	25	... ...	... 156
—	2.	6	... ...	48, 131, 133
—	2.	5 & 35	... ...	48, 133, 177
—	2.	7 & 21	... ...	... 13
—	2.	9	... ...	... 30
—	2.	11	... ...	12, 39, 101, 102
—	2.	15	... ...	... 40
—	2.	21	... ...	... 39, 155
—	2.	22	... ...	111, 114
—	2.	23 & 24	... ...	... 12

Chap.	Sec.	Aph.	Page.
III.	2.	25	13
—	2.	27	131
—	2.	38	18, 137, 138
—	3.	12	152
—	3.	32	183
—	4.	5	156
—	4.	27	152
—	4.	27 & 38	149
—	4.	52	176
IV	1.	2	162, 176
—	1.	14	114
—	1.	16	158
—	1.	18	158
—	3.	14	40, 50, 53, 54, 84, 159, 161.
—	3.	32	183
—	4.	17	6
—	4.	18	6
—	4.	21	6

Sankara's Commentary on Brihadáranyaka—

Chap.	Brâh.	Sloka	
I.	2.	1	71, 78, 118, 119
—	4.	2	183
—	4.	8	165
—	4.	10	35
—	4.	15	55
—	4.	17	47
—	5.	1	83
—	5.	3	63
—	5.	4	107
—	6.	1	8, 77, 79, 100, 103, 116, 141, 144.

Chap.	Brâh.	Sloka.	Page.
I	6.	3	...
II	1.	15	...
—	1.	17	...
—	1.	18 & 19	... 80, 102
—	1.	20	37, 42, 80, 155
—	3.	1	...
—	3.	6	...
—	4.	9	24, 34, 35
—	4.	11	... 4, 68
—	4.	13	... 80, 102
—	4.	14	...
—	5.	1	...
—	5.	15	...
—	5.	18	...
III	2.	1	...
—	3.	1	... 145, 158, 160, 178
—	4.	2	... ... 59, 61
—	5.	1	... ... 79, 80, 103, 122, 123, 179.
—	7.	1	...
—	8.	9	...
IV	3.	2	...
—	3.	6	...
—	3.	7	... ... 13, 52
—	3.	9	...
—	3.	10	...
—	3.	15	...
—	3.	20	... 181, 182
—	3.	21	... ... 18, 184
—	3.	21 & 23	...
—	3.	33	...
—	3.	35	...

Chap.	Brâh.	Sloka.		Page.
IV	4.	2	...	... 2,4, 121, 128, 160, 183.
—	4.	3	...	 55
—	4.	5	...	 177
—	4.	6	...	... 15, 28, 57, 184
—	4.	9	...	 160
—	4.	11	...	 182
—	4.	18	...	 138
—	4.	20	...	 181
—	4.	22	...	... 149, 175
—	4.	23	...	 55
—	4.	31	...	 55
—	5.	5	...	 178
—	5.	15	...	 152
V	1.	1	...	... 107, 110, 133

Sankara's Commentary on Chandogyya—

Propa.	Khanda-	Sloka		
VI	2.	1	..	... ... 9, 19
—	2.	2	...	... 77, 91 (আ০), 124, 180.
—	2.	3	...	... 104, 181
—	3.	2	...	... ... 4, 17
—	7.	1	...	 103
—	8.	4	...	... 8, 83, 103
—	10.	2	...	 71
VII	1.	1	...	... 122, 128, 124, 173.
—	4.	1	...	 79
—	17.	1	...	... ... 93, 123
—	25.	2	...	 144
—	26.	2	...	... 160, 183
VIII.	1.	1	...	 173

Propa.	Khand.	Sloka.		Page.
VIII	5.	4	... ...	... 98, 103
—	12.	1	... ...	181, 182
—	12.	3	... ...	. 184
—	12.	5	... ...	21, 66, 183
—	14.	1	... ...	11, 12, 75, 109

Sankara's commentary on Kena-Upanisad—

Khanda—	sloka			
I.	1 (Bákya)	...	.. ...	152
—	1 „	..	... ...	45, 65
—	1 (Pada)	...	... ...	39, 139
—	2 „	...	... ...	51
—	2 (Bákya)	...	... ...	66
—	2 (Pada)	...	... ...	76
—	4 (Bákya)	...	... ...	46, 97
II.	1 (Pada)	...	... ..	84
—	4 „	...	... ...	18, 38
III.	1 (Bákya)	...	... ...	20
—	12 (Pada)	...	... ...	56
IV.	8 „	...	...	147, 166, 168, 170

Sankara's commentary on Ishá-Upanishad—

Sloka.					
4	...	...	...	...	75
8	...	...	...	...	172

Sankara's commentary on Prasna-Upanisad—

Prasna—	sloka				
II.	6	...	...	...	82
IV.	5	...	...	...	92
—	8	...	...	...	53
VI.	2	...	...		7, 77, 103

Sankara's commentary en Mândukya—

Prakarana—	Sloka / Karika	Page.
I.	6	10, 78, 89, 90
—	7	16, 17, 90, 92
II.	18	... 90
—	32	... 115
—	32 & 33	... 102
—	33	... 104
—	34	... 112
III.	7	... 84
—	8	... 117
—	17 & 18	... 125
—	19	... 109
—	27	... 90
—	32	8 (আন০), 110
IV.	37	125 (আন০)

Sankara's commentary on Muudaka—

Mun.—Khand—	sloka.	Page.
I.	2 12	143
III.	1 4	143
—	1 6	168
—	1 8	147
—	2 2	177

Sankara's commentary on Katha Upanisad—

Valli—	sloka	Page.
I.	28	140, 141
II.	2	70, 139
III.	11	11
—	14	115
IV.	1	144
—	3	38, 46

Valli-sloka.				Page.
V.	5	...	...	38, 73, 74, 124
—	9 & 10	...	...	... 68
—	12	...	...	... 117

Sankara's commentary on Aitareya—

Chap.—sloka				
IV.	1	...	...	... 62
V.	3	...	...	... 75

Aait.—Aranyaka—

II.	1. 3	...	...	... 71, 113

Sankara's commentary on Taittiriya—

Valli—Anuv

I.	11	...	...	37, 128, 152, 173
II.	1	...	...	18, 49, 113, 134
—	3	...	...	... 129
—	4	...	...	... 113
—	6	...	...	7, 11, 52, 162, 82, 89, 91, 93, 103, 180.
—	7	...	...	... 38, 73
—	8	...	...	... 56, 97
III.	10. 5	...	...	... 184

Sankara's Upadesha-Sáhasri (with commentary)—

Quoted at p. 8, 13, 18.

Sankara's commentary on Gitá—

Discourse—Sloka				
II.	10	...	...	... 144
—	11	...	...	... 177
—	63	...	...	... 131, 163
III.	23	...	...	... 131
—	32	...	...	... 8
—	33	...	...	... 130

Discourse—Sloka	Page.
III. 34 & 37	130, 163, 167
IV. 24	178
— 33	159
VI. 1	149
— 32	164
VII. 7	35, 37, 42
— 10	35
— 27	132
VIII. 3	133
— 18	129
IX. 10	41, 136
— 18	30, 42
— 19	8
X. 9	75
— 11	171
— 32	30, 35
— 34	134
— 41	2
XI. 55	170
XII. 1	37
— 12	164
— 20	170
XIII. 1	46
— 2	37, 110, 180
— 6	... 136, 176
— 7	51, 54, 166
— 11	... 165, 166
— 12 & 13	64, 79, 124, 164
— 14	88
— 17	41, 50
— 19	6, 170
— 22	2, 66, 74
— 50	38

Discourse	Sloka	Page.
XV.	12	107, 113
—	20	151, 161
XVI.	1	164
—	1 & 3	169
—	5	164
XVIII.	5 & 6	149 152
—	10	149
—	20	133
—	22	49
—	41	130
—	44 & 45	157, 183
—	45	158
—	50	41, 53, 138
—	55	171
—	56	158
—	62	171
—	66	45, 60, 131, 151, 177

ERRATA & CORRIGENDA

Page.		*Incorrect.*		*Correct.*
5, *l.* 13	...	With whose	...	Whose
7, *l.* 17	...	वे० भा०	...	तै० भा०
12, *l.* 17	...	his	...	This
17, *l.* 20	...	नाद्याप	...	नाद्यापि
45, *l.* 21	...	has	...	have
51, *l.* 4	...	elament	...	element
57, *l.* 3	...	brings	...	bring
62, *l.* 13	...	*Ait Bhasya*, 2	...	*Ait Bhasya*, 4. 1
72, *l.* 12	...	असतो	...	असति
75, *l.* 14	...	and	...	as
119, *l.* 22	...	असतो	...	असति
161, *l.* 22	...	(ऐदा० भा०	...	(गीता० भा०

POST GRADUATE COUNCIL IN ARTS
LENDING LIBRARY
CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

Works by the same Author.

1. The Outlines of the Vedanta Philosophy.—(Published by the Calcutta University). Re. 1.

2. Adwaita-Vada.—(Published by the Calcutta University). Rs. 3.

3. Upanishader Upadesh (Bengali).—

———Vol. I. Chandogya and Brihadaranyaka. (Third Edition.) Rs. 2-4.

———Vol. II. Katha and Mundaka. (Third Edition.) Rs. 2.

———Vol. III. Isha, Kena, Prasna, Aitareya, Taittiriya. (Third Edition.) Rs. 2

[In each volume, complete translation with elaborate exposition of the commentaries of Sankara has been given. Three Introductions have been appended to the three volumes. Highly spoken of by eminent scholars and the Press. Each volume has been translated into Hindi by Pandit Nandakishore Sukla in Oudh].